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This dissertation focuses on the experiences of Haitians living in France who are 
active in organizations seeking to benefit Haiti.  Focusing on “hometown associations”—
collectives formed by members of the diaspora who are generally from the same town, 
that engage in activities and projects for the benefit of their home country—my main 
question is how do a group of Haitians, committed to transnational engagement between 
France and Haiti, manage the challenges, pressures, and expectations in being a 
“diaspora” in light of the category’s increasing institutionalization?  Previous research 
has examined the impact of hometown associations in nations such as Mexico, but I 
sought to understand their importance in the context of personal, national, and 
international agendas, agendas that often neutralize or undermine the purpose of 
hometown associations.  Despite increasing attention by national and international policy 
makers citing diasporas as integral to the survival and growth of struggling nations, my 
research shows that there is little support given to such collectivities, especially in the 
case of the Haitian diaspora.  I argue that diaspora as a category has become more 
institutionalized, and as a result is inhibiting progressive, grassroots change more that it 
 ix 
empowers.  My research hopes to highlight this trend so that policy makers and 
humanitarians can take a step back to better identify the future of diaspora as a 
geopolitical force for change in countries like Haiti, and gauge whether it can still 
function under the weight of its signification.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The meeting had started late, and by 8pm, patience was wearing thin.  The 
exhaustion was palpable, given that most of the people present had rushed over from 
work to attend, as was often the case for these meetings.  After a round of introductions, 
including presenting myself, the meeting of the board of the Plateforme des Associations 
Franco-Haitiennes got underway.  The majority of the items on the agenda revolved 
around the upcoming August 2011 mission to Haiti.  Following the January 12, 2010 
earthquake that leveled much of the country’s capital, the Fondation de France, a 
philanthropic donor organization, set up a special fund to distribute donations and 
government aid money to French organizations working in and for Haiti.   The 
Plateforme, commonly known as PAFHA, had received a two-year grant, the first in their 
near decade-long existence as a federation of hometown associations. The grant notably 
permitted PAFHA to hire full-time staff members for the first time.  The centerpiece of 
their proposal, however, was their Formations des professionals, a bi-national training 
program that would offer those in France and Haiti professional support to develop and 
fund projects to benefit Haiti.  The project was PAFHA’s most formal and ambitious to 
date, and with it came new considerations.   
“We need to discuss our presence in Haiti,” began the president of PAFHA, Gary 
Fleurimont.  “Although the Ministry of Overseas Haitians sees us as an international 
NGO [nongovernmental organization], we are not formally declared.  Without this 
declaration, we do not have access to a special import tax rate, for example.  However we 
can also create a local version of PAFHA in Haiti, and become a local NGO.  In order to 
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do this, it would require a number of local Haitians on the board.  So I pose to you the 
question, should we declare ourselves an international NGO or go local?” 
Gadner Seac, the former treasurer of PAFHA and well known for his 
loquaciousness, was the first to speak: “The priority of the mission is to train people in 
Haiti.  All the energy of the president”—he avoided making eye contact with Gary—
“should be to pave the way for Roosevelt’s mission.  I do not agree at all with becoming 
an NGO.  We are an organization of Haitians.  By declaring ourselves an NGO, it would 
be as if we just like any other international organization going to Haiti, and we know how 
those organizations are.”  Around the room, there were nods of assent.  “An alternative to 
NGO status would be to regroup the associations that members of PAFHA have in Haiti.”   
Gary, sensing upset, headed Gadner off.  “We need not be afraid of the term 
NGO.  Regardless of whether we are Haitian, the reality is we are coming from France, 
and that’s exactly how Haitians see us.  They don’t care that we are Haitian; they will 
treat us like any other outside organization.  Like I said, the Ministry of Overseas 
Haitians already sees us as an international NGO.  We just have to make a more concrete 
decision, and there are multiple options.”   
A younger member piped up. “We’ve been discussing this NGO status for a while 
now, and I’ve been here for a year.”   
“Bear in mind we have certain obligations to the Fondation de France”, 
interjected Vladimir Boereau, PAFHA vice-president in charge of hometown association 
membership.  “We need to set a date for what needs to be done now.  We’ve wanted a 
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PAFHA in Haiti for some time, so why not just settle with that?  It’s worked for 
Alexandre and his organization, right?” 
Alexandre Fleurime, vice-president of international relations within PAFHA, 
shrugged.  “It would be nice to do the PAFHA-Haiti thing, but Vladimir is right, the 
Fondation de France is getting impatient, and they want to know what we’re going to 
do.”   
The conversation made its way around the room, with camps being formed for 
and against the declaration of PAFHA as an international NGO in Haiti.  Though at first 
people vehemently opposed the proposal, one member articulated a different perspective.   
“If we were to work with the Ministry as an NGO, it would be a great strategy to 
give PAFHA more visibility and to act with greater efficiency,” offered Liam Vertus, 
vice-president of Union des Saint-Louisiens de France pour le Développement de Saint 
Louis du Sud.  “Associations in Haiti are limited in scope and vision.  If we don’t become 
an NGO, are we missing a chance to be involved in serious discussions in Haiti?”   
Vladimir shook his head and raised his voice to be heard over the fresh outburst 
of conversation.  “PAFHA’s vocation is to bring organizations together, especially those 
of the local paysans to put them into contact with each other.”  Vladimir was clearly 
drawing on the perspective of his organization, ARCHE, which raised money to purchase 
cattle for local farmers.  Impassioned, he continued, “We must not abandon this aspect of 
our mission.  It is indispensible!” 
“Ok, ok, hold on a second.  One does not cancel out the other,” Gary reasoned, a 
bit exhausted and perhaps bewildered by the intensity of the debate.  “Let’s really look at 
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the options.  If we create a local organization, we must have a certain percentage of 
Haitians running it, and who knows how long it will take to find someone, especially 
given the current state of the country.  Furthermore, we need to consider what form it will 
take, and what laws we must follow.  But I gather than the sentiment seems to be to 
abandon the international NGO track…” 
“The biggest, and most efficient organizations in Haiti don’t even have NGO 
status!” interrupted Jean-Francois Chausson, the only white French member of the board, 
president of his organization L’Espérance.   “We need to reinforce our network in Haiti!” 
He smacked the table for emphasis.  “We don’t need NGO status.  If done correctly, we 
will have all the power without all the disagreeability of the NGO status.”   
Bookending the debate, Gadner declared that no vote could be taken that evening.  
“We need more research before we can make an informed decision.  I motion to table this 
discussion.”  After more arguments, including threats to abstain or vote not to vote and 
simply take the discussion of becoming an international NGO off the table entirely, there 
was a unanimous vote and one abstention to push the NGO discussion to another 
meeting.  After two more grueling hours of debate, the meeting adjourned around 11pm, 
and people wasted no time heading to the nearby metro to rush home to their families, 
tabling Haiti for another day.   
This dissertation focuses on the experiences of Haitians living in France who are 
active in organizations seeking to benefit Haiti.  My main question is how does a group 
of Haitians committed to transnational engagement between France and Haiti manage the 
challenges, pressures, and expectations in being a “diaspora” in light of the term’s ever-
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shifting meaning?  I focused specifically on diasporic collectives known as “hometown 
associations,” organizations formed by members of the diaspora who are generally from 
the same town, that engage in activities and projects for the benefit of their home country.   
Previous research has examined the impact of hometown associations in Haiti, notably 
their support of health and social services (Fagen, 2009; Mooney, 2011).  Researchers 
who looked at the diasporas in New York City, Montreal, and Miami found similar 
trends: hometown associations were often headed by an individual or a very small, 
committed group; fundraising was a priority but mostly done through informal channels; 
inter-group relations were often fractured; there was limited engagement with the Haitian 
government or with the local communities being served; and an overall lack of 
organizational sustainability due to the trends outlined above.  These characteristics were 
also found amongst the hometown associations in Paris.  My aim, however, was to 
examine the ways national and international policy agendas shaped the conditions and 
possibilities of hometown associations, viewed writ large as “diaspora organizations” or 
as “diaspora activism”.  “Diaspora” has become a new buzzword in international donor 
organizations (with lofty titles such as Diaspora: New Partners in Global Development 
Aid and Diaspora for Development in Africa), but what diaspora means in these larger 
institutions does not necessarily translate to what the term signifies to the populations 
themselves.  Rather, the term’s popularity in this arena has led to the institutionalization 
of diaspora—the deliberate use by nation-states and international agencies of diasporas as 
extensions or substitutions of state projects.  In other words, diasporas being brought into 
the world of humanitarian aid and are being asked and expected to perform the work 
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of/with NGOs, irrespective of the particular histories, formations, and personal agendas 
of those communities or the countries they represent.  This is particularly detrimental for 
a population such as Haitians living in France, given the complexity of the post-colonial 
relationship between France and Haiti, the history of anti-immigrant sentiment and 
identity politics in France, and Haiti’s struggle achieve sovereignty.     
Hometown associations amongst Haitians are one of several well-known 
expressions of transnational diasporic engagement.  Transnationalism is best defined as 
“the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that 
link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Blanc, 
1993: 6).  These processes are not independent of the societies involved, but are in fact 
made possible or facilitated by availability of technology or open communication 
channels.   For example, remittances—money sent to friends and family left back 
home—are possible because of money transfer companies like Western Union, yet 
policies regulate the fees that are charged that can make it more burdensome to send 
money.  In France, the ease with which one can create nonprofit organizations facilitated 
the use of hometown associations as the main form of social and political engagement by 
Haitians living in France.  Ease is one thing; sustainability is quite another.  My research 
shows that there is little financial or material support from the government or 
development agencies given to such collectivities.   This has a ripple effect, where 
Haitians living overseas are seen as unhelpful or selfish by their country folk back home, 
when in fact they may lack the means and support to take action.   
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Transnationalism is also deeply tied to the term “diaspora.”  Diasporas are 
vehicles for transnational practices, which are actions (such as calling home or sending 
money) and behaviors (such as reading a local newspaper or listening to a local radio 
station) that bridge two or more nations in order to “create a sense of community based 
on cultural understandings of belonging and mutual obligations” (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-
Saucedo 2002: 767).  It is important to note that transnationalism is not always practiced 
by diasporas, nor are all diasporas transnational.  In the broadest sense, a diaspora is a 
group of displaced people that have a common place of origin.  It is when we attempt to 
further define a diaspora’s characteristics that it becomes increasingly difficult to have a 
conversation in which everyone is on the same page.  The Haitian population is an 
excellent case study on the complicated nature of diaspora.  For Haitians, it is more than a 
classification; it can signify national unity, cultural distance (you are not as Haitian as 
those in the country), or responsibility. These shades of difference are linguistically 
represented in the Haitian Creole language; what diaspora signifies is context-dependent, 
but still carries material, discursive power.  Diaspora as a “floating signifier” makes it 
challenge to target the issues raised when attempting to organize or mobilize.  When 
international aid agencies use the term “diaspora,” they have a specific idea in mind.  For 
example, in the Migration Policy Institute’s report entitled Diasporas: New Partners in 
Global Development Policy, they quote Gabriel Scheffer’s definition: “Modern Diasporas 
are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host counties but 
maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their 
homelands” (Newland, Terrazas, & Munster, 2010: 3).  This could be considered a 
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neutral definition, but the report’s aim is to demonstrate the ways in which governments 
can leverage diasporas as “new actors in development,” giving them a chance to “deploy 
their resources faster and more flexibly than official aid agencies, which are inhibited by 
bureaucratic requirements” (ibid, 2).  There is a lot of expectation placed on the potential 
of diasporas, seen as possessing a wealth of resources that governments and agencies can 
tap into.  However, it is this expectation that can also set a diasporic community or 
organization up for failure.   In light of the call to the diaspora following the earthquake 
that struck near Haiti’s capital on January 12, 2010, we may perhaps ask ourselves 
whether the term has become a danger to itself and to the people it (presumably) 
represents.   
I argue that “diaspora” as a category has become more institutionalized, inhibiting 
progressive, grassroots change more that it empowers.  This reality also pushes us to 
revisit the concept of diaspora.  I am invested in diaspora as a term of empowerment and 
agency.  In the 1950s and 60s, the term was “re-branded” to not only refer to a group of 
people, but act as a unifying identity that implied a sense of belonging and even 
responsibility towards a home country (Clifford, 1994).  Diaspora as a “condition” or a 
state of being became a powerful means of building community and nationalist sentiment 
among previously independently-acting individuals and families.  Displaced people were 
more than immigrants, defined by their presence here, but had history and loose forms of 
community, defined by their existence elsewhere.  Arguably, the concept itself has never 
been seen as a problem; scholars have mainly lamented its widespread use and dilution of 
its potential and capacity to explain migration-related phenomena.  In this research, 
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however, I ask whether the term “diaspora” has become a liability, acting against the 
interests of those invested in it.  Haitians living in France, particularly those who 
participate in community organizing, have become handicapped by the internal and 
external challenges they face with respect to their personal identities, community 
participation, national(ist) dialogues, and global expectations, and I claim that the 
institutionalization of diaspora is a root cause.  Being labeled and engaged as diaspora 
can empower but without the appropriate structural support, diasporas—and their 
respective organizations and practices—can easily falter.  
Through an analysis of the inner politics of hometown associations, all the while 
contextualizing them in higher level politics born out of imperialism, I suggest that we 
must not only work to particularize diasporic experiences (see Jackson, 2011a), but also 
take a step back to better identify the future of diaspora as a geopolitical force for change 
in countries like Haiti, and to gauge whether it can still function under the weight of its 
signification.  In focusing on this specific community of Haitian immigrants—made up of 
politicians, teachers, doctors, students, and entrepreneurs—my aim is to shed light on the 
ways in which smaller organizations try to have an active role in their home country 
while dealing with a multitude of local, national, and international challenges, as hinted at 
in my ethnographic introduction.  I am not prepared to argue for the term’s death because 
it won’t address the fundamental problem of these populations inability to be self-
determined, but I do believe that the term has been stretched past its limits, and the 
Franco-Haitian diaspora is a case study in how a term can empower and limit.  
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My inquiries stem from my fieldwork spent living amongst Haitians living in 
Paris, France between the years of 2006 and 2012.  When I had first started exploring the 
Haitian population in France, I had expected there to be a strong community with a deep 
sense of historicity and social consciousness that would compare to my experiences in 
New York where I was born and raised.   I discovered quickly this was not the case, and 
my first reaction was, why not?  To answer this initial question, however, I was forced to 
interrogate my expectation that there should have been such a community.  The 
combination of my scholastic immersion in theories of diaspora and transnationality, and 
my personal experience of Haitian transnational practices had set me up for a strong bias.  
Beyond the “displaced people” definition, I already had an organic understanding of 
diaspora as a consciousness, in line with Clifford’s description of diaspora as a people 
living in “tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and 
remembering/desiring another place” (Clifford, 1994: 311).  The Haitian communities in 
New York, Miami, and Montreal had so strongly embodied this tension and yearning that 
I had taken it as a natural part of the Haitian experience outside of Haiti.  Moreover, so 
strong was the bond between the country and her people that physical separation caused 
the same symptoms of historical memory, cultural pride, obligation to financially support, 
and desire to socially organize, regardless of the cities.  I had believed that the historical 
and colonial bond between France and Haiti would produce even worse symptoms, a 
proud defiance and strong sense of cultural activism.  That is why I was so drawn to 
small hometown organizations; there, I felt, I would bear witness to the various diasporic 
practices and activities that attempted to bridge the distance between the two countries. 
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What I discovered instead was that France had exerted a much stronger influence 
on the possibilities and potential of diasporic communities.  Furthermore, in spite of 
Haiti’s move to harness the power of its citizenry abroad through the creation of a special 
state department, it remains a partially realized endeavor as the government tries to 
determine to what extent Haitians abroad can be part of Haitian life.  Lastly, the 
devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake exposed to another set of constraints at the level 
of international development.  As I spent time with the Haitians living in Paris, both as a 
volunteer worker and as a friend, I witnessed to the direct detrimental impact French state 
and international aid policies had on an important facet of the diasporic experience: 
community organizing.  In France, the diaspora was not an alternative, transnational 
space as it has been described in North America; rather, Haitian community organizers 
appeared more dependent on nation-state for funding and other kinds of support.  
Moreover, as France delved deeper into a foreign policy that emphasized partnership with 
diasporas and local organizations within the developing country, the shift also opened the 
door to diaspora as a neoliberal extension of the state, (Kunz, 2011) and placed the 
“burden of proof” of successful development initiatives on the organizations.  What the 
case of Haitians in France pushed me to ask is if a diaspora is still a diaspora if it’s 
existence is because of, not in spite of, national policy, and its capacity to thrive is tied to 
the state.   
It is possible that diaspora is not the right term to use.  For one, I use diaspora in 
the singular, while in fact it can refer to contradictory things (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 
2001; Jackson, 2011a).  It creates an awkward situation for myself and other scholars to 
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use a term that is well understood and misleading at the same time.  However, I am not 
prepared to offer a replacement, because the term is not the problem.  Rey Chow argues 
that language, the articulation of something, has discursive power.  She writes, “The act 
of naming, then, is not intrinsically essentialist or hierarchical.  It is the social 
relationships in which names are inserted that may lead ego the essentialist, hierarchical, 
and thus detrimental consequences” (Chow 105).  For this reason, I look at the ways 
internal and external dynamics shape how a population is articulated as well as their 
process of self-making.   
The subjective construction of Haitian identity is quite layered, and in a country 
such as France—with its political ideology of republicanism that sees a one-to-one 
relationship to the state, and its push to create a homogenous nation-state by suppressing 
racial, ethnic, and cultural identifications—the negotiations of Haitian identity are often 
an exercise in proving one’s modernity.  In chapter 4, I go into detail on the ways that 
various individuals perform “Haitianess” or “Frenchness”.  This performance is based on 
a common idea that there are readily understood markers of being Haitian, as exemplified 
in the oft-used phrase, “you know Haitians…” In all the places I’ve traveled to with a 
significant population of Haitians, I’ve inevitably encountered someone who will explain 
some cultural phenomenon or behavior with a small head shake, a long-vowel “a” sound, 
and say, “you know Haitians…” and be met with nods of understanding.  The 
universality of that phrase, “you know Haitians” belies the real differences between and 
within populations of Haitians, rendering the phrase as meaningful as it is meaningless.  
Yet the belief in universality of cultural behavior and experience is what allows me to ask 
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what makes the Franco-Haitian diaspora such an interesting and distinct group 
comparative to other diasporic communities in North America.     
The inequality between the various Haitian migrant communities is an important 
factor in this research. The “Haitian diaspora” as a recognized grouping was born out of a 
political movement in New York to protest the Center for Disease Control’s labeling of 
Haitians as high-risk carriers for HIV in the 1990s (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 2001).  As 
tens of thousands of Haitians marched down the streets of Manhattan, a heightened sense 
of nationalism was created amongst a generation; even the Haitian flag was imbued with 
more meaning as people waved them in solidarity (Laguerre, 1998).  That period marked 
the beginning of “diaspora” as a culturally relevant term to describe Haitians living 
abroad, even as the term also masked some of the particularities of each of the distinct 
Haitian communities.  The term was meant to impart a sense of unity, yet as migration 
patterns developed, it became clear that what it meant to be Haitian in New York City 
was not the same as being Haitian in Montreal or Paris.  In fact, Haitians living in the 
different cities perceived each other differently, and could often describe to me the 
characteristics of Haitians living in the different locations.  Researchers only recently 
have begun unpacking how important these differences are in how Haitians perceive 
themselves and their relationship to their country of settlement as well as Haiti.  The push 
towards particularizing diasporic experiences has gained significant traction, but as the 
term gained popularity outside of academia, it presents new concerns, notably in the area 
of development aid.   
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The official development aid (ODA) model, in which “first world” nation-states 
provide financial and material support to “third world” nation-states has been roundly 
criticized as imperialist, especially when the loans and grants offered were generally tied 
to conditions that undermined the sovereignty of the nation-states being helped.  In the 
past seven to nine years, there has been a big push to create a more sustainable 
engagement between “donor” and “recipient” countries. Following a series of global 
conferences such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for 
Action, concerted efforts were made by nation-states such as France and supranational 
entities such as the European Union and USAID to be more cooperative in their aid 
policies.  This was reflected in the linguistic shift from “recipient” to “partner”.  As a 
result, the category of diaspora became more popular, as it leveraged the skills and 
resources of a population that had a vested interest in helping the country they left.  Haiti 
was featured in many of the reports released by development agencies, many of them 
lauding the diaspora as Haiti’s best hope of recovery.  In chapter 5, I detail a number of 
reports came out in 2010 and 2011 that examined the transnational practices of the 
Haitian diaspora and called upon all international aid agencies to include the diaspora in 
their mission and projects.  The reality however is that policy suggestions will always be 
shaped by state interests and historical circumstances.  
Franco-Haitian organizations do their best to either sponsor or carry out projects 
in Haiti while living over 3,000 miles away.  These smaller organizations are generally 
transnational in nature, and are considered “philanthropic groups with the capacity to 
work on various kinds of development projects…and in many cases provide a valuable 
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source of social capital and a potential for development” by researchers and policy 
makers alike (Orozco, 2003: 6).  Those who participate in hometown associations are 
attempting to enact what Glick-Schiller and Fouron would refer to as “long-distance 
nationalism” (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 2001).  Instead of being limited by the borders of 
the nation-state, “long-distance nationalism binds together immigrants, their descendants, 
and those who have remained in their homeland into a single transborder citizenry” 
(Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 2001: 20).  The concept of long-distance nationalism is 
important when trying to understand how national and international policies undermine 
the capacity of hometown associations to fully participate in the re-building of their 
nation-state.   The term allows us to articulate how the experiences of those abroad is 
“linked to conditions both in the homeland and the country of settlement” (ibid, 27).   
The relationship between Haiti and her “children” abroad is far from smooth.  The 
dispersed populations of Haitians in cities like New York, Miami, Montreal, and Paris 
have fought to be more included in government decisions.  In 2001, former president 
Jean-Betrand Aristide created a special department, Ministre des Haïtiens Vivant à 
l’Etranger (Ministry of Overseas Haitians) to manage the needs of what is known as the 
“Haitian diaspora” (Laguerre, 1998).  The ministry, however, has struggled to be 
effective in addressing the Haitian diaspora’s concerns, and moreover has been plagued 
by leadership turnover, most recently having gone through three in the past two years.  
Frustration with the ministry was clearly felt amongst the Haitians I spoke with, in 
particular because the community of Haitians living in France is often given less attention 
and financing than communities in North America.  So although the Ministry of Overseas 
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Haitians was meant to serve all of the Haitian diaspora, to quote a well-known Haitian 
proverb, “tout moun se moun, men pa tout moun se menm” (all people are people, but not 
all people are equal.) 
Moreover, there is a hesitation on the part of the Haitian government and the 
Haitian people to expand opportunity to Haitians in the diaspora because of perceived 
(and somewhat real) lack of resources.  When dealing with Haitian bureaucracy, Haitians 
returning home for a visit chafe at the necessity to pay import taxes or an entry fee at the 
airport.  I heard often that Haitians abroad felt like “ATMs,” charged soley with funding 
initiatives.  The pressure to make and send home money is commonly found.  Other 
countries such as India or Mexico are more inclined to provide more incentives to the 
diaspora because their priority is investment (Migration P. I. Newland, 2010). Other 
countries have framed the parameters of involvement by offering ease of access in 
exchange for job creation.  The department of Overseas Haitians has struggled to do 
either since its creation.  In Chapter 3, I elaborate on some of the conversations that 
Haitian government officials had with the Franco-Haitian diaspora around this very issue.  
Glick-Schiller and Fouron do not use them term “diaspora,” arguing, “it 
confounds the different historical experiences and forms of consciousness.  Instead, we 
differentiate between identification with a particular, existing state or the desire to 
construct a new state, which we call long-distance nationalism, and other forms of 
transborder ideas about membership, such as those based on religion or a notion of shared 
history and dispersal” (ibid, 23).  It is true that the actions that I have observed would fall 
under the category of long-distance nationalism.  Nation building is the primary objective 
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of Haitian hometown associations.  At the same time, what I observed was how 
membership in these associations was often a way to assert one’s identity as Haitian.  It 
was within these spaces, in the middle of Paris, that Haitians could be fully Haitian, and 
could hone their performances.  It is perhaps why it was so common to hear the phrase, 
“you know Haitians…” regardless of whether what followed was positive or negative 
comment.  It can explain why it was more frequent to discuss the challenges in the 
community or within the country, rather than envision ways to push past them.  Long-
distance nationalism places its focus on territory, actions, political mobilization, national 
involvement, but doesn’t (or refuses to) address the performative aspect of being Haitian, 
which is constitutive of the experience of Haitians in France. 
France is a proud nation that seeks to maintain a culturally and racially 
homogenous and secular citizenry (Weil, 2008), and over the past number of decades 
government policies have grown increasingly hostile towards communities of immigrants 
that try to claim distinct identities by calling into question their national loyalties 
(Hargreaves, 2007; Keaton, 2005, 2006; Peabody & Stovall, 2003; Simon, 2012).  
Immigrant organizations are looked upon suspiciously by French authorities (Beriss, 
2004; Kastoryano & Diop, 1991) and do not receive nearly the same amount of public 
support as other groups such as sport or social service organizations (Archambault, 
2001).  As Østergaard-Neilsen writes, for Europeans concerned with migration and the 
national loyalties of new arrivals, “homeland ties and politics of migrants have always 
been identified as an intrusion” (Caglar, 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001).   
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On the other hand, Haiti is a country almost in perpetual difficulty either due to 
political upheaval or natural disasters.  Most recently, tentative progress towards stability 
following heavy foreign investment in 2008 and 2009 was effectively crushed on January 
10, 2010 during an earthquake that killed thousands and destroyed a large part of the 
country’s capital, Port-au-Prince.  As the world reacted to the earthquake, an 
unprecedented number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from other countries 
established themselves in Haiti, often without fully researching the context in order to 
understand what was and wasn’t possible.  They relied on outdated information such as 
the CIA citing the official language of Haiti being French (not only is Haitian Creole the 
other official language, it is the language that the entire country speaks, whereas 
approximately only 10% of the population speaks French.)  It is within (and a result of) 
these circumstances that Haitians living in France have invested enormous effort, time, 
and money to “give back” to their home country via development projects in Haiti and 
community building efforts in France.   
In spite of conferences and agency reports urging international NGOS to include 
the diaspora, and more specifically hometown associations, organizations created by 
Americans and Haitians with heavy financial backing of either private donors or grants 
from the United States were given preference over smaller Haitian organizations with 
more local networks and access.  Diasporic involvement often meant offering contracts to 
organizations with already established relationships with international agencies, to the 
detriment of local organizations in Haiti and smaller organizations created by the Haitian 
diaspora who lacked the access to resources or political support to accomplish the same 
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work.  Moreover, because of the political and financial relationship between the United 
States and Haiti, a heavy emphasis was given to organizations in the United States.  
Haitian organizations in France received a fraction of the funds supposedly available for 
all of the “diaspora.”   
My mission is to frame the struggle of small Haitian organizations in the broader 
context of discursive and structural inequalities that make it difficult for the Haitian 
diaspora in France to take their place in Haiti’s reconstruction.  These inequalities stem 
from the hegemony “for the constructed, dominant view of the Diaspora” in what 
Laguerre calls the diasporic public sphere, “the political arena where the Diaspora 
expresses its political views, discusses its project for the homeland and the Diaspora, 
interacts with hostland and homeland government officials and politicians, and reflects on 
its contribution to society” (Laguerre, 2004: 207).  In the diasporic public sphere, there is 
a pressure to have a homogenized opinion, “to persuade others of the legitimacy of their 
claims so that the Diaspora can be of one voice on a given issue” (Laguerre, 2004:209). 
Such homogeneity ends up disempowering groups that have a different set of 
circumstances, like those in France, although this is contested in different ways, 
especially with the help of researchers who have been teasing out what diaspora means 
locally.  In spite of their unique challenges, Haitians in France contest and persist, and in 
this dissertation I examine both the motives and the passion behind the decision for a 
group of Haitians to create and/or participate in diaspora organizations, as well as the 
impact of the social investment of such organizations. 
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Using the theoretical frameworks of transnationalism (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-
Saucedo, 2002; Kearney, 1995; Vertovec, 1999a), diasporic subjectivity (Brodwin, 
Jackson, & Martinez, 2006; Gordon, 1998; Radhakrishnan, 1993), and diasporic 
citizenship (Laguerre, 1998; Siu, 2005a), I grapple with the question of how hometown 
associations can become more effective in light of the complicated nature of development 
and shifting views on diaspora as a group that can be politically mobilized.  Several 
scholars have already noted the difficulty Haitians in France face in trying to effect 
meaningful change for their Haitian brethren (Béchaq, 2010; Mooney, 2009).  I argue that 
these persistent and specific issues of the Haitian diaspora in France are to a certain 
degree a product of institutionalized marginalization by France and international donor 
organizations.  This dissertation hopes to give voice to these overlapping struggles, and 
offer potential new directions for international aid policy to better support diaspora 
organizations.  
OUT OF ONE DIASPORA, MANY 
I have repeatedly used the term diaspora, while also voicing my concerns with it.  
In this section I establish the term’s historical and political origins--and what I mean—by 
the term “Haitian diaspora.”  On the surface, the term can simply refer to all persons born 
in Haiti but living and working outside the country.  When you start to prod, however, the 
questions flow: what about those born to one or two Haitian parents outside Haiti?  Is 
there an age limit?  Is there an expiration date, where after a number of years or decades 
outside of Haiti you no longer qualify as a member of the diaspora?  Can the term be 
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ascribed and then shed with the appropriate amount of time in Haiti?  Is a diaspora a 
community or classification?  Is diaspora a condition or a state of mind? 
Many scholars have tried to answer these questions, but diaspora still remains a 
word with indefinite boundaries.  As a term, diaspora was a unifying identity built on a 
shared experience of (forced) dispersal, exploitation, marginalization and struggle.  As 
the movement of people became more pronounced and spanned ever-longer distances, 
diaspora as a category has been nuanced to reflect the specificity of experiences of 
diasporic communities and members.  At the same time, not every dispersed population 
can be considered a diaspora (Clifford 1994; Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1996); certain 
conditions must be met that permit such an identity to have roots.  William Safran lists 
six criteria, among them the maintenance of a “memory, vision, or myth about their 
homeland”; the “belief that they “should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance 
or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity”; and a continual 
relation, “personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their 
ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of 
such a relationship” (Safran 1991: 82-83).  These criteria serve merely as a foundation for 
understanding the myriad kinds of relationships that exist between peoples and nations.  
In this thesis, the way I understand and use diaspora comes out of the intersection 
of a number of intellectual movements in global Black history, including theories of 
“double consciousness”, cultural continuities, and hybridity, along with pan-African and 
Black nationalist movements; all have shaped the ways in which the “Black Diaspora” 
developed and evolved (Glissant, 1989; Kelley & Patterson, 2000; Matory, 1999; 
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Yelvington, 2001).   Early Africanist scholars such as Herskovits and Price sought to 
develop a synchronic re-telling of the history of people of African descent.  Through 
observation and fieldwork, they discovered continuities that proved that Africans and 
Afro-descendant people had (enduring) history, in spite of slavery and their generations-
long separation from the African continent (Herskovits, 1941; Mintz & Price, 1992).  
Afrocentric movements including Pan-Africanism and Black Nationalism have been built 
on these findings, and theorists such as Molefi Asante “consciously set out to explain a 
theory and a practice of liberation by reinvesting African agency as the fundamental core 
of our sanity...concerned with nothing less than the relocation of the subject-place in the 
African world” (Asante 1994: 20-21).  Although Afrocentric theorists have been 
stigmatized in the academic (and non-academic) world as being essentialist, based on 
perceived shared history as African (and Black) peoples without much concern for 
difference within and between them, they also paved the way for critical interventions 
that de-essentialized origins in favor of a “theoretical relocation” (Scott, 1991) and 
discursivity (Hall, 1994; Mercer, 1960; Scott, 1991).  Hall writes “cultural identities 
[read: diasporas] are the points of identification, the unstable points of identification or 
suture, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture.  Not an essence but 
a positioning” (Hall 1994:395 his emphasis).  Arguably for Hall, identities (including 
diasporic ones) about a politics of location, the intersections of history and culture, and 
the use of both axes in order to position one’s self at a given moment in time.  Other 
poststructuralist scholars such as Brent Hayes Edwards and Michelle Wright have 
challenged any attempt to fix the Black diasporic experience within discourses of 
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political solidarity. Instead, the concept of diaspora needed to handle the complex 
processes of identity formation that did not involve an essentialist notion of Blackness, 
but rather viewed Blackness as always in a state of becoming (Hall, 1994) yet 
simultaneously rooted in the material and lived experiences of racism and racialization.  
Diasporas are thus fluid concepts, “a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’“ (Hall 
1994: 394). 
While diaspora has been debated over decades, the term diaspora didn’t enter into 
Haitian vocabulary until the 1980s (Glick Schiller, 2011; Richman, 2005).  Diaspora 
became important during and following the Duvalier dictatorships and the economic 
crisis it precipitated that pushed Haitians to look to the United States, Dominican 
Republic, and other Caribbean countries for economic opportunities.  Around this time, 
Haitians in New York City began organizing in protest against the oppressive Duvalier 
regime.  One of the first official uses of the term diaspora was by Haitian scholar Georges 
Anglade who published the book “La Diaspora,” in which he created a map detailing the 
various migratory paths Haitians have taken over the past century, and argued that the 
diaspora is more than monetary transfers and has yet to realize its full potential (Icart, 
2012; Jackson, 2011b).  This was the beginning of a diasporic consciousness, the idea of 
“l’espace Haïtien,” a Haitian space outside of Haiti from which to mobilize.   Following 
the removal of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier from office in 1986, the collective 
capacity of the Haitian diaspora was once again put to the test in 1991.  Haiti had held its 
first fair and democratic election that put former priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide into the 
presidential office.  Unfortunately only nine months later, he was removed from office by 
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a military junta, and Aristide was forced to flee to the United States.  Many Haitians 
living in the States supported the ousted president, and thus worked with him to rule from 
a distance and ultimately get him back into office (Laguerre, 1999).  Aristide’s return to 
office in 1994 was arguably only possible because of the strength of the diaspora and the 
growing diasporic consciousness and possibilities of transnational action (Richman, 
2005).   
Questions around whom and what qualifies as diaspora are debated regularly 
amongst Haitians, with answers shifting based on a range of circumstances and socio-
political agendas.  I personally classify myself as part of the Haitian diaspora in spite of 
being born in the United States because I was raised by a first-generation Haitian parent 
who socialized and educated me in the Haitian tradition.  I try to claim authenticity by 
knowing Haitian history, speaking fluent French and Haitian Creole, maintaining 
connections with my Haitian family members and friends, and listening and dancing to 
Haitian music.  I leveraged these “legitimacies” during my fieldwork in order to gain 
quick acceptance into various Haitian spaces, but a backhanded compliment was never 
too far away.  People were often surprised by the fact that I spoke French and Creole 
well, “for a diaspora.”  Men marveled that I kept pace on the dance floor, dancing well 
“for a diaspora.”  It said something not only about the expectations that Haitians have 
from those born outside of the country to Haitian parents, but also about the different 
conceptions of diaspora that existed.  “Diaspora” was a flexible term, used as a 
description, compliment, and insult, and they way it was used not only depended on the 
immediate context (e.g., at a conference on Haiti, informal gathering of family and 
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friends, or a dance party), but also on the city I was in.  “Diaspora” was geopolitically 
grounded in the different experiences of each diasporic location, and each place carried 
it’s own expectations of the “diaspora” based on the location’s history with immigration, 
movement, and community building. Moreover, each location brings with it geopolitical 
specificities that inform the meaning of "diaspora," even as it remains an indelible part of 
the language (Brodwin et al., 2006; Glick Schiller, 2011).  However, there is also a 
dominant image of diaspora stemming from North America that has deeply affected the 
self-perception of Haitians in France as a diaspora.         
A frequent question I got in response to an explanation of my research is, “Oh, are 
there Haitians in France?  I never thought about it.” In fact, after the United States and 
Canada, France is home to the third largest diaspora (INSEE, 2009; Local, 2004).  Only 
recently, however, has the Haitian diaspora of France been given attention in research on 
migration and ethno-cultural communities, in an explicit attempt to disrupt the hegemony 
of the US Haitian diaspora as representative of all diasporas (Béchaq, 2010; Brodwin et 
al., 2006; Jackson, 2011a; Mooney, 2009).  The Franco-Haitian diaspora also compares 
itself to North American diasporas, often using a more idealized image to do so.  As a 
result, there was a lot less room for multi-layered meanings of diaspora.   
Arguably because there was neither a strong community formation, nor a national 
space for cultural identity to exist along a national one, being diaspora was more limited, 
often meant you were less than Haitian natif-natale, born-and-raised.  This often 
structured the conversations I had with other Haitians, as well as the conversations they 
had with each other.  Being natif-natale gave you a legitimacy to say certain things and to 
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act a certain way.  When Gadner in the opening ethnography states that “we are an 
organizations of Haitians,” juxtaposing himself against “those other” organizations, he is 
asserting a particular knowledge that comes with being born in Haiti, in spite of having 
lived for over 20 years in France and being a French citizen.  This is also the assumption 
that is being made by large international NGOs who desire to work with Haitian 
organizations; ethnic community-based organizations have specific and useful 
information that would either help NGOs be more effective, or need to be supported in 
their own right.  However, this mentality of legitimacy can have a negative effect.  In 
discussions amongst association members, I would often hear the phrase “you know 
Haitians” when discussing the feasibility of a project or activity.  There was a 
reinforcement of negative stereotypes—that Haitians didn’t want to do the work, that 
Haitians weren’t going to come to an event without some incentive, that Haitians would 
arrive late—that often proved themselves true, but were also never directly addressed.  
This then led to speeches that began “We need to…” or “We must…” which, as a 
directive, set itself up for more inaction.  (It is interesting to note that these kinds of 
conversations nearly always occurred in spaces that were presumed all-Haitian, and 
rarely in “mixed” company where non-Haitians were present.) 
Just as diaspora can be seen as a condition, many viewed their Haitian-ness as a 
permanent reality, regardless of their current citizenship or years out of the country.  
When I asked one Haitian man who had moved to France in the 1970s whether he felt 
more Haitian or French, he replied, “I am 100% Haitian, and 100% French.”  Another 
Haitian man, one who has written a book in French and had lived in France since 1984, 
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described feeling “at home” whenever he returned for two-week long vacations, yet 
admitted he would never return to Haiti to live.  The complicated relationship between 
diaspora and citizenship highlights the fact that diaspora is not merely a designation for a 
group of people, but is in fact a condition (B. H. Edwards, 2003; Gordon & Anderson, 
1999), a  persistent state of being, built even into the Haitian language.  Diaspora refers to 
those who have left and those who have returned (Schuller, 2007b), presenting a 
discursive burden on those who wish to be seen legitimately as Haitian.   
The permanence of the diasporic condition and of being Haitian can lead to a 
dissonance in how people imagine Haiti, both now and in its future.  Haiti has changed a 
great deal from decade to decade, and people born and raised in specific periods have 
very different ideas of Haiti.  For example, the nostalgia for a Haiti “before Duvalier” is 
very present amongst older Haitians.  The years under the President Estimé, who 
immediately preceded Duvalier, are sometimes referred to as the “golden years.”  Under 
Estime’s rule, many Haitians testify to how well the country was run.  Subsequent 
generations of Haitians (who are now in their 30s and 40s) can only point to the 
militarized reign of the Duvaliers that, in contrast to the subsequent military juntas and 
precipitous decline of country, seemed preferable to the abject poverty they experience 
today.  The latest generation of Haitian youth under 25 years of age will never know 
Haiti under Duvalier.  These segmented collective memories create rifts in cross-
generation communication and lead to differing ideas of what Haiti’s reconstruction 
should look like and shape even imagined possibilities for Haiti’s recovery.  Those who 
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are able to testify to Haiti’s previous glory have nostalgia unmatched by those who only 
have their imaginations with which to envision a new future.   
A few friends and I were enjoying our first trip together to Port-au-Prince on our 
way to the “Festival d’Artisanat,” an annual two-day forum featuring locally made art, 
ranging from pottery to metal work to woodwork.  We felt like school children on a 
fieldtrip, excited to escape our little street in Gressier (a town an hour outside of Port-au-
Prince) for an adventure.  Frederique was especially taking advantage of the unobstructed 
view from the passenger side to film video, since our mode of transportation was a retired 
tap-tap taxi-van, and the sliding door had been removed for easy in and out access.  We 
watched the other cars, tap-taps and pedestrians zoom by as Mario Percy, a local artist 
and impromptu tour-guide pointed out various buildings and points of interest.  The road 
from Gressier to the capital runs along the coast of Haiti and in between the green fields 
and full trees, you could catch glimpses of boats fishing in the water.  Closer to the 
capital however, the road moved inland, and passed by a couple of factory plants and 
homes and office buildings in various states of disrepair.  Trash, mostly consisting of 
Styrofoam food containers and plastic bags of water, was strewn everywhere.   
Caught in traffic at one point, I stared outside at a group of grey concrete homes 
haphazardly erected close to each other.  “You see here?” Mario waved his hand into the 
open space where the door would have been, “these houses didn’t use to be here.  You 
could be standing at this spot and see straight through to the ocean from here.”  
Confused, I peered out.  “You mean the ocean isn’t that far from here?”  
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“No!  It’s right behind those houses!  Under Duvalier, you weren’t allowed to 
build just anywhere.  This place used to be so beautiful.  My friends and I would come 
here at night, never worried about violence or being attacked….well, I was a young man, 
so it was different, but you could be outside at night, and enjoy the beach.  It was clean!  
The beach used to come all the way up to where we are now.” 
Disbelieving, I pressed further.  “If that’s true, how did they manage to build 
houses on sand?” 
He scoffed.  “They built them on the trash piles!  Haitians continue to build 
poorly-made building after poorly-made building, and there was no government to stop 
them from doing so.”     
I looked out again, a little more wistfully.  “Such a shame.  I wish I could have 
known that Haiti.” 
“I feel bad for people your age,” Mario agreed.  “They’ll never know Haiti as I 
knew it.  You think this is Haiti, and it’s not. That’s why the youth don’t care.  They’ve 
never known any other Haiti.”   
I share this example to convey the difficulties in managing the expectations and 
responsibilities of the various parties invested in Haiti’s recovery.  Within Haiti, there is a 
diversity of perspectives on Haiti’s potential amongst the various generations.  For 
Haitians living in other countries, having seen how democracy and bureaucracy function 
elsewhere has influenced their opinion on the direction the country should take.  
Moreover, those in the diaspora who are still invested in rebuilding the country fight for 
their voice to be given as much weight as those who continue live in Haiti, which has 
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created conflicts.  Adding to the already cacophonous mix, international aid agencies, 
influenced by the political and economic interests of the countries that fund them, also 
regularly weigh in, their opinion often out-weighing the rest combined.  With these 
multiple, contrasting visions for Haiti, which path will take the country out of poverty for 
good?  My inquiry into the challenges of Haitian organizations in France is rooted in the 
everyday negotiations and decisions that occur as a result of these conflicts of opinions.  
On a more practical note, in trying to clarify my terminology, I feel caught 
between a rock and a hard place: I cannot escape using diaspora as both a category and 
concept.  When using diaspora to talk about a population of Haitians, I use it in reference 
to those born in Haiti or of Haitian descent, through the third generation. These are 
people who at the very minimum actively acknowledge and build a part of their identity 
around being Haitian, but do not currently live in Haiti.  I will use diaspora 
interchangeably with “diasporic community,” taking care to qualify the term 
“community” due to the common hesitation by Haitians living in France to consider 
themselves as part of a “community” as they defined it, as I will address in chapter 2.  For 
many of the Haitians that I met both in France and in Haiti, being part of the diaspora did 
not mean that you necessarily had contact with people in Haiti, spoke the language, or 
were active in an organization.  To that end, I will also use diaspora as a concept: a “third 
space” where “the ‘here and there,’ ‘now and back then’ coexist and engage in constant 
negotiation, and it is within this time-space continuum that diasporic subjects interpret 
their history, position themselves, and construct their identity” (Siu, 2005b).  Haitians in 
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France are always negotiating their identities, never fully “being” diaspora but, to 
paraphrase Hall, always in the process of becoming (Hall, 1994).  
By separating out concept and category, I do not imply that the two don’t overlap.  
Rather, it is a way to stress my point that diaspora as an institutionalized category may 
have compromised its fluidity as a concept, and created the possibility of a failed 
diaspora.  The concept of a failed state has its origins in the writings of Max Weber who 
stated that the success of a state is tied to its monopoly on force (Weber, 1994).  This is 
later nuanced by Antonio Gramsci, who argued that states can rule either through force 
(coercion) or through consent (hegemony) (Forgacs & Gramsci, 1988); either way, there 
is an acknowledgement of the state’s sovereignty, or capacity to act on behalf of its own 
self-interest.  A failed state, then, is one that is unable to act for itself.  I apply the same 
logic to the idea of a failed diaspora—a diaspora that cannot act on behalf of its own self-
interest.  Diasporas in and of themselves cannot neither be a “success” or failure—they 
do not have a defined boundary or centralized governing body.  The judgment of a 
diaspora as a failure can only occur through the institutionalization of diaspora, that 
makes it a constituency with interests worth defending (even if this is difficult to prove.)   
Institutionalization also creates material contours around which they are evaluated and 
measured.  Who would be defining diasporas as failures?  It occurs implicitly in the ways 
the Haitian diaspora is described by parties at all levels—international, national, and 
local, including by Haitians themselves.  It becomes easier to point and blame when 
diaspora moves out of the realm of the concept and into the world of categories.   
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Institutionalization requires definition, a naming.  Institutionalization of diaspora 
has focused on their capacity to produce capital, due to their focus on remittances and the 
economic development of the country.  This includes tourism, entrepreneurship, 
philanthropy.  It has been noted that the work of local groups and hometown 
associations—broadly labeled as “diaspora advocacy”—has been the least studied by 
international aid agencies (Newland 2010:10).  International aid agencies are actually 
responsible for this direction of institutionalization.  The typical focus in Haiti on poverty 
reduction has led to the major focus on the economic potential of the diaspora, rather than 
supporting and expanding the knowledge and skills within the diaspora, and bridging the 
diaspora to Haiti through various institutions.  The Haitian diaspora in France is 
particularly susceptible to the appellation of failed state because of the distinct nexus of 
French xenophobia, national and international aid policies, and local dynamics among 
Haitians that reproduce class and color inequalities.    The focus on poverty reduction 
limits the possibilities of the diaspora, and arguably forces them to be in a position of 
crisis management rather than focusing on long-lasting institutions.  It is why it is easy 
for Aiwha Ong to envision a multiple-passport wielding South Asian (Ong, 1999)—the 
diasporic focus is on mobility, market expansion, capacity building.  
To clarify, I am not calling the Haitian diaspora a failed one.  It is merely a way to 
show what can happen when the institutionalization of a term is taken to its full 
conclusion.  However, it is not a far cry from the feelings of frustration that are felt by 
Haitians themselves.  They may feel like failures because they are unable to become fully 
realized as diaspora, or as diasporic citizens.  Diasporic citizenship is defined as “full 
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belonging within the diaspora”, but the possibilities for diasporic citizenship are often 
shaped by the circumstances and access to different forms of capital.  Diasporic 
citizenship for Haitians is still a project on the route to realization, but not quite there yet, 
because of the gross levels of inequality that exist within Haiti that are often mapped onto 
the collectivities formed outside of Haiti.  It must be underlined that none of these 
concepts can exist outside of the context of the nation-state and international agendas. 
The important presumption in my research is that Haitians in France are distinct, 
and that Haitians organizing in France face specific challenges of identity and community 
formation that must be addressed both locally amongst themselves and globally by state 
and international institutions.  A solution would be to re-focus the priorities of 
government as well as allow the diaspora to define itself, and—paraphrasing Karl Marx’s 
theory of class-consciousness, act for itself.  
TRANSNATIONALITY AS IDENTITY AND THEORY 
 
The institutionalization of diaspora is in remarkable contrast to the general 
expectation of immigrants to assimilate into the dominant culture, often by severing ties 
with their home country as they integrate fully into the new society.  This expectation 
required an essentialization of the state, an expectation that subjecthood was achieved 
primarily through the nation-state (Foucault, 1978, 2003).  It was necessary for 
immigrants to integrate in order for them to achieve a sense of belonging, in turn 
contributing to a more cohesive society as well as a more controllable population 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Foucault, 1979).  As the movement of people 
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increased dramatically, social scientists began to question the assumption and examine 
the differences in the ways states' incorporated immigrants, and "how cultural, 
institutional, or ideological differences create different opportunity structures for 
migrants' subsequent incorporation and citizenship" (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and 
Yurdakul 2008: 152).  Moreover, it forced a reconsideration of the state as a central 
organizing institution, and opened up a space for theorizing transnationalism.   
Transnationalism was introduced in the late 1980s and popularized by 
anthropologists in the 1990s, during a period of great ideological debate over the future 
of the nation-state.  Increased migrant flows, rapid development of communication 
technology, globalization, and the rise of multinational corporations all contributed to the 
idea that the nation-state would no longer be the dominant model of political 
organization, but would give way to more global and supranational networks such as the 
European Union and more porous borders permitting exchanges of peoples and actions. 
As a theoretical framework, transnationalism reifies and challenges the nation 
simultaneously.  It relies on the networks created between nations, various systems of 
interaction and exchange while globally intensifying the kinds of interpersonal and 
community relations that were once seen as only local.  Vertovec states that 
"transnationalism (as long-distance networks) certainly preceded ‘the nation,’” yet now 
transnationalism cannot be engaged with without engaging nations.  The diaspora, as a 
group of dispersed peoples who are by definition associated with another nation (even if 
they do not actively maintain ties to it), are an excellent representation of transnational 
practices.  Safran looks at the diasporic experience as forming a “triadic” relationship 
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between “a globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups”, “the 
territorial states and contexts where such groups reside”, and “the homeland states and 
contexts whence they or their forebears came” (Vertovec 1999a; see also Faymonville 
2003; Safran 1991).   
 One of the first important ethnographies in the study of transnationalism was 
Constance Sutton’s Caribbean Life in New York City (Richman, 2005; Sutton & Chaney, 
1989).  Sutton studied the exchanges and networks developed between the Caribbean and 
the US, which she called the “transnational socio-cultural system” (1989: 20).  This 
spurred a number of ethnographies focusing on transnationalism, most notably the work 
by Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc.  An ethnographic study 
on immigrant populations from St. Vincent, Genada, Haiti, and the Philippines to the 
United States, Nations Unbound (1994) viewed the nation-state as a “deterritorialized 
construct,” and as such people outside the physical territory of the nation could still 
“forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin 
and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Blanc, 1993: 6).  Although not all immigrant 
populations were transnational by default, transnational practices such as keeping abreast 
of news from back home or sending money to family is not entirely uncommon.  
Karen Richman describes one of the creative ways in which diasporic connections 
are sustained.  In her detailed ethnography, Richman examines the discursive formation 
of Haitians in Haiti and abroad through the story of “Ti Chini”, a labor migrant who 
became Richman’s primary ethnographic participant (Richman, 2005).  While her overall 
project addresses Haitian political economy and the transformation of Haitians from 
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“agrarian peasants into producers of unskilled labor for export and consumers of 
imported food” (2005: 32), she looks at one particularly emotional transnational practice 
of exchanging “letters” via audiocassette tape.  Due to financial constraints and poor 
infrastructure, many Haitians are unable to go to school, and thus a disproportionate 
number of them are illiterate.  For those unable to call loved ones, many Haitians “write” 
letters by recording them on audiocassette tapes and mailing them or sending the package 
with another person.  The tapes permit a communication that moves beyond the two-
dimensional letter, as letter-writers are able to converse more naturally, sing, invite others 
to speak on the tape, and generally convey more emotions, even through silence.  
Richman describes both ends of the experience, the letter “writing” and the listening, 
which often involved a gathering.  By generating an audience, this “ritual” crosses space 
to bring people geographically separated together in one room.  This may be practice that 
is very much classed (growing up, my mom occasionally received such letters, but 
explained them to me in a way that registered them as shameful), but it is one expression 
of transnationalism among many. Categories of race, class, and gender, along with the 
politics of location, structure members’ engagement with Haiti.     
How do such transnational practices fit in with broader discourses of migration 
and globalized processes?  Aiwha Ong tries to strike a balance between the political 
economy of globalization and human agency, mediated through cultural dynamics.  
Moving beyond the local and the global division that reinforces the separation of the 
economic (global) from the cultural (local), Ong tries to understand these relationships 
from a “horizontal” and “relational nature of the contemporary economic, social, and 
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cultural processes that stream across spaces, and the embeddedness in differently 
configured regimes of power” (Ong, 1999: 4).  Also engaging the concept of 
transnationality, Ong captures both the movement across space and time, as well as the 
“changing nature of something” (1999: 4).  She uses the term flexible citizenship in order 
to address how migrants “respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-
economic conditions…and cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and 
displacement” (1999: 6).  She uses the image of the multiple passport-holder to show 
how migrants circumvent traditional relationships to the nation in order to create new 
possibilities for the lived experience.  The drawback to Ong’s argument is that is assumes 
mobility in the first place and a certain amount of privilege.  However, the multiple 
passport-holder is a transgressive subject, able to move beyond the limits set by the 
nation and maintain a plurality of relationships.  Although the acquisition of multiple 
passports for Haitians may not be as possible as it is for the Ong’s Hong Kong 
businessman, many Haitians have circumvented the limitations of their mono-citizenship 
by giving birth to their children in countries with policies of jus soli such as the US and 
France.  I encountered of a number of Haitians that acquired US or French citizenship 
through this means, but spent a large part of their childhood in Haiti.  One research 
participant explained that while he proudly retains his Haitian passport, his sister 
acquired French citizenship (thus giving up her Haitian passport) through a temporary 
government program for Haitian citizens born during a certain time period.   
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Subject Formation 
My discussion of identity and subject formation draws on the theoretical lens of 
Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Stuart Hall, and Franz Fanon, and those who are in 
conversation with them.  What links these theorists together is their postmodern, 
poststructuralist approach to subjectivity, which has paved the way for concepts 
extremely key in developing diaspora as a concept, process and identity, discussing the 
role of power, the relationship between agency and structure, and postcoloniality and 
racial subjectivity.  While they are all grounded in a similar deconstructivist approach, 
they have each offered a distinct angle in the discussion of the subject.  Foucault, for 
example defines the subject in two parts: 1) the processes by which individuals are made 
subject to power and 2) how these processes of power actually work to produce particular 
kinds of historical subjects.  For Foucault, power is enacted through discourse that seeks 
to normalize and regulate the production of particular kinds of subjects.  If the subject 
only comes into being through discourse, there can be no claims to identity that assume 
that identities are stable, unified, and coherent across time and space – the subject must 
always be located within history and discourse. However, Foucault does little to address 
how, if individuals are so permeated by and subjected to power, they are able to resist the 
discursive norms by which they are constituted and create social transformation (McNay 
1994).  
Whereas Foucault doesn’t believe in the unified subject, Althusser understands 
the subject to be overdetermined, created through multiple, overlapping discourses.  He 
uses interpellation to describe how a subject is “hailed”.  The Subject comes into 
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existence through a pre-existing discourse, where there are multiple levels of recognition: 
the recognition of one’s relationship as a subject in relation to a Subject, the Subject’s 
recognition of the subject, the subjects’ recognition of each other, and the subject’s 
recognition of itself.  Within these overlapping determinations, or overdeterminations, 
there is no room for self-making.  The subject is already determined before the subject 
exists, and therefore there is no agency.  
Stuart Hall situates himself in between these positions, and engages the concept of 
identification, which he views  “as a construction, a process never completed--always ‘in 
process.’ It is not determined in the sense that it can always be ‘won’ or ‘lost’, sustained 
or abandoned...identification in the end is conditional, lodged in contingency” (1996: 2-
3).  The subject cannot be overdetermined because it is constantly shifting, however is it 
not so fragmented that it cannot temporarily and strategically position itself.  The 
questions that become important aren’t who are we or where do we come from, but “what 
we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might 
represent ourselves. Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside 
representation”(1996: 4).  This is an important shift in thinking, because it re-situates the 
self within the discourse as an acting agent.  Social categories such as race are “floating 
signifiers” that derive meaning from context rather than being dependent on a dominant 
ideology (Hall 1986).  However, floating signifiers do not allow for solidarity based-
resistance, which limits the utility of his argument for social movements.  
 40 
Diasporic Citizenship 
We can better understand the relationship between local identity and community 
formations and participation in transnational networks through the use of the framework 
of diasporic citizenship. The concept has been central to the works of Michel Laguerre 
(1998) and Lok Siu (2005), each with a distinct take on what term means and its 
implications in studies of diasporic communities.  Michel Laguerre uses this framework 
to study the Haitian community in the United States, tying them to Haiti in a continuous 
flow.  Laguerre takes a sociological approach to diasporas, classifying them as either 
active or passive (in reference to their real or symbolic relationship to their homeland) 
which of course implies some hierarchy (whether intentional or not), and then writes that 
“diaspora entails a double allegiance” (1998: 9) which rests the relationship purely on a 
national dichotomy.  In a definition that is quite literal, Laguerre sees diasporic 
citizenship as describing  
 
the situations of the individual who lives outside the boundaries of the nation-state 
to which he or she had formerly held primary allegiance and who experiences 
through transnational migration (or the redesigning of the homeland boundaries) 
the subjective reality of belonging to two or more nation-states.  Diasporic 
citizenship includes the national and transnational outlook, attachment, and 
commitment.  It presupposes some level of integration in the country of residence 
and some kind of attachment with the homeland (1998: 13).   
 
Laguerre’s intervention is only a beginning, since he tends to homogenize the Haitian 
diaspora rather than offering points of how the diasporas have been differentially affected 
depending on their location.  In contrast, Lok Siu’s work on the Chinese diaspora in 
Panama incorporates the temporal and spatial dimensions of belonging, and destabilizes 
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the category of citizen as tied to the nation.  She takes a different definitional approach, 
describing diasporic citizenship as:  
 
the processes by which diasporic subjects experience and practice cultural and 
social belonging amid shifting geopolitical circumstances and webs of 
transnational relations; suggests marginality, difference, and lack of full 
belonging to any one nation-state, yet it also hold out the possibility of creativity, 
innovation, and perseverance that come with occupying this intersection; a social 
process that encompasses both the legal-juridical aspects and the cultural-
affective dimensions of belonging (2005:10). 
 
This definition offers a more nuanced means of understanding the politics of belonging, 
and requires a deeper discussion of the role of cultural memory and nostalgia.  
Furthermore, her ethnography brilliantly handles the way “contests of belonging within 
the local Chinese community are intertwined with a collective struggle to claim 
belonging to the National Panamanian community” (2005:162).  Such a framework is the 
most useful for the purposes of this research in being able to understand how Haitians in 
France manage both local productions of identity and community in a hostile national 
environment, and within a broader discourse of transnational participation in the Haitian 
diaspora.  Diasporic citizenship also seems to be a middle class concept because of the 
kinds of access that the middle class (both within the diaspora in Haiti) seek.  The desire 
for diasporic citizenship is salient in France because of how middle-class the diaspora is.  
Diasporic citizenship works better for my research rather than long-distance nationalism 
because of the ways that identity and self-making are tied into the everyday transnational 
practices.  
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RESEARCH SETTINGS, FIELDWORK, AND METHODOLOGY 
For this study, the activities of hometown organizations in the department of Ile-
de-France, France and the departments of Ouest and Nippes in Haiti were analyzed over 
the course of two years.  In France, the study focused on the ten-year old federation (an 
organizational structure that functions to bring together disparate associations) 
Plateforme des Associations Franco-Haitiennes (PAFHA) and a number of its member 
associations, the Haitian cultural organization Collectif 2004 Images, and the website 
Reseau Culture Haiti.  The organizations and projects subsequently analyzed in Haiti 
were selected from those that had ties to member organizations of the federation PAFHA.  
Methodology included participant observation, formal and informal interviews, and 
archive analysis.  My main form of participant-observation involved volunteering with 
both PAFHA and Collectif 2004 Images.  With PAFHA, I was a regular in the office, and 
was assigned work as needed, and was drafted onto committees whenever appropriate.  
The director of Collectif 2004 Images, Anne Lescot, essentially took me on as an 
administrative assistant, and I helped her create promotional material, update the website 
and social networks, and assisted her in hosting two artists from Haiti who spent a month 
in artist residency in Paris. Through both of these connections, I met a number of people 
who were either involved in other associations or only loosely active in, or unaffiliated 
with, any particular organization, who were particularly instrumental in my research.  I 
conducted several formal, semi-structured interviews with the leaders of the 
organizations, using only note-taking.  I also frequently spoke with members of the 
organization as well as event participants, and made note of certain comments and 
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conversations in my field notes.  It was within these informal contexts that I was best able 
to get a sense of the everyday Haitian “experience” from more marginalized perspectives.  
I was always very explicit in my intentions, and everyone I spoke with knew I was a 
researcher studying Haitians in Paris.  I aimed to have a diversity of perspectives, 
particularly amongst men and women, older generations and younger generations, and 
Haitians and non-Haitians. 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
The significance of this research lies in shaping the conversation amongst 
Haitians in the diaspora and critiquing the relationship between diasporic Haitians and 
state and international institutions.  This introductory chapter has served to outline the 
main objectives of the dissertation and present the problematic of Haitian associational 
life in France and the theoretical frameworks of transnationalism, subject formation, and 
diasporic citizenship that I will use to interpret the experience of Haitians living and 
organizing in Paris, France.  Chapter two will elaborate on the context of my research, 
examining the relationship between and within associations in France and their partner 
organizations and projects in Haiti.  After laying out Haitian history and the 
circumstances surrounding the various periods of emigration, I will delve into Haitian 
associational life in France.  There have always been various organizations created by 
Haitians who migrated to France, but they have changed significantly from being more 
political in nature, protesting oppressive regimes and occupations, to leaning more 
towards social and/or social service based activities.  This is arguably due to the way the 
population has aged over time with fewer youth or second generation Haitians becoming 
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involved in cultural associations.  Amongst associations themselves, there have been 
efforts to develop a network in order to share information and build social 
capital.  Several issues exist however, including competition amongst associations, 
arguably a result of the strong focus on development projects in Haiti.  This unilateral 
focus offers less incentive to work with other organizations that may not share the same 
interest or desire to work in the same commune.  Moreover, communication between 
France and Haiti can be at times difficult or lacking, and these are challenges that must be 
addressed.  
 Chapter three will focus on the subject formation of those participating in Haitian 
associations.  Using the theoretical focus of diasporic subjectivity, I will look at how 
Franco-Haitians see themselves within the diaspora: what it means to them and how it has 
guided their actions and motivated to be actors in development.  Conversely, I will also 
examine how France views Haitians and Haiti, to understand how the process of 
interpellation shapes Haitian self-making. 
Chapter four I look at the ways gender and sexuality played roles in Haitian 
identity formation.  I build on Judith Butler’s theory of performativity to explain how 
gender and sexuality are used in forms of nationalist performance to assert one’s 
“Haitianess” or “Frenchness”.   
The penultimate chapter switches focus from the local to the national and global, 
examining the impact of the French state and international donors such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the capacity for Haitian associations in 
France to organize.  Focus will be given particularly to the France-Haiti partnership 
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framework document, which served as the blueprint for the French state's actions in 
Haiti.  Although in the past decade there have been concerted efforts to take more 
sustainable approaches to development aid and craft policy that would establish a more 
balanced relationship between the donor and aid-recipient ("partner" in development 
parlance) countries, the results have been inconsistent.  France in particular has made a 
concerted effort to stem immigration, and has tried to simultaneously address 
immigration and development aid by developing policies that encourage return migration, 
for example through entrepreneurship grants or simply offering money to return home.  I 
will also examine how the earthquake of 2010 shifted but did not fundamentally change 
things for Haitians living abroad.   
I focus on the particularity of the Haitian diaspora in France, noting that 
scholarship on the Haitian diaspora has typically focused on those in North America, who 
have a different experience of acculturation and identity formation than those in France 
due to the differing socio-political ideologies.  I argue that without taking into account 
the particular challenges of the Franco-Haitian diaspora, they will remain an outlier in the 
discussions of the potential of the diaspora to help Haiti.   
My conversation is in part with other Haitians, but also with those who work 
supposedly on behalf of Haiti.  My title, “You Know Haitians…” is a phrase that I heard 
by Haitians and non-Haitians alike—a kind of arrogant phrasing that undermined any 
kind of plurality in the Haitians experience and already precluded their potential.  
Ultimately, I argue that there has been a push to institutionalize diaspora, to use it as a 
tool to substitute Official Development Aid, but that because this is diaspora defined by 
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institutions with their own political agendas, it has actually undermined Haitian diasporic 
organizing by creating impossible standards, and then blaming Haitians for not living up 
to those standards.  
.   
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Chapter 2: A People’s History 
 
One of the main goals of the Plateforme des Associations Franco-Haïtiennes 
(PAFHA) was to bring Haitian associations, often disparate and isolated, into contact 
with each other in order to build bridges, exchange ideas, and develop a network.  In the 
second year of their existence, the PAFHA held an open house, known as the Journée des 
Portes Ouvertes  (JPO) in order to not only get associations in dialogue with each other, 
but to give the associations a chance to interact with the Haitian community and other 
people interested in working in and for Haiti.  The first JPO was such a successful event 
that it became the centerpiece of PAFHA’s work in France and an anticipated annual 
affair.  I was able to experience the JPO as a simple visitor, a volunteer, and as a 
volunteer coordinator.  My myriad experiences reflect the development of my 
relationship with the federation and its members, while also allowing me to offer a 
longitudinal perspective of the federation’s organization and activities. 
My first JPO was in 2007, during a month-long trip to Paris to do “pre-
fieldwork.”  I took the line 13 train to the last stop in Seine Saint-Denis, a working-class 
banlieu of Paris.  The late morning rain made it more difficult to find the large 
government building in which the open house was being held.  Once I found the large 
grey concrete and steel building, I pushed past the front doors and found myself swept 
into a cacophony of voices and music.  The tables piled high with books, pamphlets, 
paintings, and various knick-knacks visually overwhelmed me.  I had been unsure of 
what to expect from a cultural “open house”, yet I found myself mostly surprised by the 
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number of people.  A young woman greeted me, handed me a flyer, and waved me 
towards the center where on either side of the room tables were set up, and at each a 
different association.  I strolled from stand to stand, picking up brochures and letters of 
information.  Every so often I would apologetically dismiss offers to purchase the fairly 
generic souvenirs from Haiti, including small jewelry boxes, painted wooden chalices, 
and plastic key chains.  I followed a crowd upstairs, and found even more associations 
with their tables set up.  Towards the back there was a metal room divider crowded with a 
dozen large Haitian art-naïf paintings.  I didn’t know anyone and was feeling awkward, 
so I stood back, but I felt that I was drawing a certain kind of attention; I only realized 
during my last JPO that it was obvious that I was a newcomer.  The event tended to draw 
the same recognizable faces each year, so anyone new, especially someone who looked 
as out-of-place as I felt, would be easily identified.  Despite the large amount of 
advertisement in all the appropriate spaces—on the radio, at the Haitian consulate, at 
places of business, in some places of worship—PAFHA and other organizations always 
struggled to attract Haitian newcomers to their events.  Why, however, became 
somewhat clear as I met more Haitians living in France who were not a part of this circle.  
The member associations of PAFHA were often seen as exclusive, even if they did not 
mean to be.  I will discuss later in the chapter the impact of this belief.  At that moment in 
2006, however, I knew none of this, and excited to learn more about the community. 
     Panel sessions had been held throughout the day on three topics: agriculture, 
immigration and asylum/refugee rights, and intergenerational dialogue.  I went to all 
three, which were sparsely attended.  These conversations felt very side-lined to the more 
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boisterous tabling area.  I focused on the immigration and intergenerational dialogue.  
One of the (younger generation) panelists on the intergenerational dialogue hadn’t shown 
up, and the discussant turned to the audience for a volunteer.  I was definitely one of the 
younger people there (aside from the children), and I could feel the discussant eyeing me.  
With a mental “Why not?” I boldly raised my hand and offered to go on stage and join a 
young man, together representing “Haitian youth.” 
The conversation that ensued simultaneously addressed my own experiences as a 
Haitian-American and gave me insight into the particularities of growing up and being 
Haitian in France.  I grew up in an environment that was a balance of Haitian and 
American.  Haiti was never too far from my worldview although I was taught to fear it 
(“If you keep acting up, I’m going to send you to Haiti!”)  Conversely, my co-panelist, 
around 17 or 18 (to my 20 years at the time), felt that all he knew about Haiti “was the 
music and the flag.”  The conversation between ourselves and the audience centered 
around the responsibility of the parents to shed their “shame” of being Haitian and pass 
along the history, culture, and language to their children in order to build the next 
generation.  There was a vague agreement that parents in the United States and Canada 
had it “easier” since Haitian communities were more active, but the burden of 
responsibility lay entirely with Haitians themselves.  What I argue, however, is that there 
are greater forces at work that make community formation and effective diaspora 
organizing more difficult in France; forces that have been in motion since Haiti’s great 
revolution of 1804.   
In order to appreciate the Franco-Haitian diaspora, it is thus necessary to 
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understand the interlocking histories of Haiti and France.  This chapter aims to 
historically contextualize the challenges of the Franco-Haitian diaspora to organize 
within and between the two countries.  By understanding how and why hometown 
associations emerge, we are able to situate these smaller collectives within larger 
processes.  The dynamics within an organization, while based on individual personalities 
and discrete histories, can be seen as connected to larger, overlapping conversations and 
historical moments: an outcome of colonization and contemporary neglect and/or abuse; 
expressions of xenophobia and racism; conflict between local, national, and international 
interests; and an evolving discourse on the responsibility of the diaspora.  The 
conversations between organization members can appear on the surface (and are often 
described by members themselves) as a lot of in-fighting and dispute over priorities, but 
they do not occur in a vacuum.  My attempt to read between the lines comes from my 
goal of using them as indicators of the specific challenges the Haitian diaspora faces in 
France and situate these conversations in broader ones around immigrant community 
organizing.  By calling attention to their exchanges, I hope to make clear that the work of 
active Haitian organizers requires a socio-historical awareness by Haitians, the French, 
and all other parties invested in Haiti’s future that would lead to specific kinds of support 
of the activities of the diaspora and help them be more effective.  In later chapters, I will 
expand the significance of such a project on international development and in struggles 
for gender and sexual equality.  My aim in this chapter is largely historical, describing 
Haiti's triumph and downfall following French colonization, and the ways in which Haiti 
suffered at the mercy of the United States who often isolated Haiti from diplomatic 
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relationships with other countries.  Haitians have continued to migrate to mainland 
France (and as the political and economic situation in Haiti worsened, to the neighboring 
French colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana.)  There have been 
several distinct waves, each characterized by a particular politicization that shaped the 
kinds of organizations created, which I will discuss in the second section.  I will then do a 
comparative analysis of the various diasporas in order to show their divergences, arguing 
that these cleavages are key to understanding the current experience of Haitians in France 
and are a direct contributor to the challenges they face in community formation and 
organizing.    
HAITI’S HISTORY 
Caribbean colonization, as famously described by C.L.R. James (1989), was 
brutal, and control was maintained through violence and rigidly imposed racial 
hierarchies.  Following France’s first attempt at abolition in 1790, historian Laurent 
Dubois notes, “the contradictions and failures of emancipation led to new forms of racial 
exclusion…premised on and responses to projects of racial equality” (Dubois, 2003: 96).  
Those under colonial rule wanted true racial equality, as promised to them by France’s 
own Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.  The slave rebellions in the French 
colonies were distinct in the way they demanded rights using the language of 
republicanism.  The enslaved Africans “gave new content to the abstract universality of 
the language of rights, expanding the scope of political culture as they demanded 
Republican citizenship and racial equality…in winning back the natural rights the 
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Enlightenment claimed as the birthright to all people, however, the formerly enslaved laid 
bare a profound tension within the ideology of rights they had made their own” (Dubois 
2004: 2-3). Laurent Dubois goes even further to make the compelling argument that some 
of the aspects of universalist ideology was in fact derived from colonial Caribbean.  “The 
democratic possibilities imperial powers would claim they were bringing to the colonies 
had in fact been forged, not within the boundaries of Europe, but through the struggles 
over rights that spread throughout the Atlantic empires” (2004: 5).  Resistance and revolt 
against French dominance was in part shaped by discourses of republicanism that spread 
across the Atlantic, but were imbued with a racial consciousness that in its ultimate 
manifestation birthed the Haitian revolution.  The widespread desire to be modern 
subjects and afforded the same rights as that of French men was a product of the intimate 
relationship the French shared with its Caribbean subjects.  France’s attempt to deny their 
subjects full entry into modernity resulted in protest, revolt, and revolution in the name of 
racial justice, and resulted in the loss of Haiti.  
France, England, and Spain all had an early interest in trying to colonize the 
Caribbean islands and dominate the budding sugar industry.  Beginning in 1625, the two 
nations slowly gained control over the region.  At first they tried to work with the 
indigenous population of Caribs, but by 1641, the local populations had been “expelled” 
and enslaved Africans were bought in to work the growing number of sugar plantations 
on the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Dominica (DuBois 2004).  A robust 
triangle trade between Europe, the African coast, and the Caribbean Islands developed 
under the management of the The Compagnie des Indes occidentales (West Indies 
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Company).  The Company managed the plantation economies and bought in a steady 
stream of Africans and white engagés (indentured laborers) from France. A few decades 
later, France acquired the colony of Saint-Domingue in 1697 from the Spanish, which 
would grow to become the most profitable colony of France, earning the nickname la 
Perle des Antilles (The pearl of the Antilles.)   France invested heavily in the economic 
expansion of the Antilles, controlling trade between the colonies, which limited the 
economic power of the planters, who “chafed against these restrictions and against their 
limited capacity to change them” (Dubois, 2004:33).  By 1789, the colony of Saint-
Domingue had 509,642 enslaved Africans, compared to 26,666 freed coloreds (gens de 
coleurs) and 35,440 white colonists (Benot, 1987). 
Revolution  
Political dissent was rising in France, in turn was weakening the institutions that 
held the traditional sources of power and authority in the Caribbean in check (Knight and 
Palmer 1989: 26).  Most white French slave-owners were intent on keeping their 
plantation economy in order to maintain their economic and political power through the 
exploitation of African slaves.  France’s resistance to giving the plantation owners more 
autonomy, however, created pockets of resentment and disloyalty.  Moreover, the debate 
around slavery in 18th century France, brought about by the American and French 
revolutions, created a period of social upheaval that brought into question the conditions 
of citizenship and rights.  As abolitionists in France debated the necessity of slaves, white 
plantation owners grew worried at the prospect of losing their labor force.  They talked of 
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independence from France, which created unrest among the mixed race affranchis, or free 
coloreds (also referred to here as gens de couleurs) and African slaves, for different 
reasons (Dubois, 2005; James, 1989).  As the ideological rift grew between French 
abolitionists and French slave and plantation owners, a number of slave revolts erupted in 
the French colonies.  The French government was highly reactionary as it tried to passify 
the unstable colonies, first granting rights to freed coloreds and free-born blacks in 1790, 
then rescinding the rights in 1791 when enslaved Africans revolted in Saint Domingue, 
France’s most profitable colony.  The revolt pressed on for years before the French 
government’s decided to abolish slavery in 1794, which caused mixed reactions from the 
white plantation owners and freed coloreds.  The move was arguably done in part to 
maintain the allegiance of the freed coloreds as well as to potentially gain new, 
productive nationals from the newly freed Africans (Dubois, 2004).  Whites generally 
fled the island, while the freed coloreds either ignored the decree or instituted a forced 
labor system.   
Soon thereafter, pressure from the white colonists and mainland investors in the 
colonies convinced French leader Napoleon Bonaparte to work towards reinstating 
slavery in the colonies. When freed Africans in Guadeloupe and Saint Domingue heard 
rumors that they would be re-enslaved, more revolts were organized and French troops 
sent to the island to regain control (Dubois, 2004).  In Saint-Domingue, communities of 
escaped slaves, called maroons, were growing and “maintained open, armed conflict with 
the plantation society that surrounded them, claiming and defending their liberty” 
(Dubois 2004b: 54). Rather than aligning themselves with the free coloreds in order to 
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suppress the revolts and maroon attacks, plantation owners were often caught up in the 
racist rhetoric popularized by many Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume, Kant, and 
Hegel.   
The presence, circulation, and internalization of such racist rhetoric led to the 
white colonists’ demise on the island on Saint Domingue. Their staunch resistance to 
forming an alliance with the population of gens de couleur (who oftentimes aligned 
themselves with those in power and not racially) made it such that the white population 
was isolated and ill-informed as to how to suppress the slave revolts (James 1983, 
Robinson 2000). Furthermore, the white plantation owners, concerned with the situation 
in France and their futures, were often discussing the revolution within earshot of their 
slaves. When asked if they weren’t concerned about continuously speaking about liberty 
and equality in front of their slaves, “their passions were too violent. They ran with their 
weapons for nothing, lynching, assassinating, and mutilating the mulattoes and their 
political enemies; in summary, they showed the slaves the methods for obtaining or 
losing one’s liberty” (James, 1983: 72, my translation). Strangely enough, plantations 
owners and freed colored were very aware of the potential for a slave rebellion, but 
“despite all the talk of revolution, it was a shock when the slaves actually launched one” 
(Dubois 2004b: 59).  The revolt was 
 
…the most concrete expression of t he idea that the rights proclaimed in France’s 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen were indeed universal....the 
slave insurrection of Saint-Domingue led to the expansion of citizenship beyond 
racial barriers despite the massive political and economic investment in the slave 
system at the time (Dubois 2004b: 3). 
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With the support of their Antillean neighbors, the enslaved Africans of Saint-
Domingue waged a violent war with French troops, demanding political sovereignty.   
The Black Jacobins, as C.L.R. James would call them, learned of the possibilities for 
freedom arguably through the example of the French revolutionaries. Republicanism, 
ironically, was a guiding ideology for both the French and the Haitian revolutions. Yet 
deviating from an ideal practice of republicanism where racial equality (i.e., color-
blindness) would exist, the non-white populations held on to those divisions, expanding 
their reach and multiplying the categories. Caribbeans, due to their history of 
discrimination and enslavement, could not deny the power of racial categories; rather, 
they held on to them as a way to reclaim/re-brand their subjectivity. The task was 
therefore not to suppress, but to seek empowerment within race-based categories. This 
empowerment required that “whiteness” be a visible, unneutral category. In doing so, 
Caribbeans were able to fight not only the French or the categorical “European”, but the 
category of whiteness itself as antithetical to their existence.  On January 1, 1804, the 
enslaved Africans of Saint-Domingue declared Haiti a republic, the first and only Black 
nation to arise out of a successful slave insurrection.  
Growing Pains 
The Haitian Revolution created shockwaves around the world by challenging the 
common assumption that Blacks were incapable of self-rule.   Haiti became a symbol of 
black liberation and as such was both a beacon of hope and a threat to the institution of 
slavery in other nations (Nicholls 1996: 36).  In fact, in Haiti’s first constitution, it was 
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stipulated that all Haitians, no matter their shade, were to be called “black”, but that no 
white man (read: foreigner) could own land or property.  This was a hard line, however, 
and the newly formed government knew it could not afford to be seen as exclusionary.  
Haiti’s first ruler Jean-Jacques Dessalines tried to soften Haiti’s image by declaring that 
he would not intervene in the affairs of other colonies, in the attempt to establish good 
diplomatic and commercial relations with other nations, particularly with the nearby 
United States.  However, “pressure from the French government, whose diplomatic 
support the Americans needed in their dispute with Spain over the Louisiana purchase, 
the United States place an embargo upon commerce with Haiti in February 1806” 
(Nicholls, 1996: 37).   
Aside from Haiti’s external difficulties, the fledging country also faced internal 
divides.  From the time of the arrival of the first Europeans to the Caribbean, color was a 
central factor in establishing hierarchy of rule.  Three color-castes existed in the French 
colonies—the blancs, or white colonists (who themselves were divided into the grands 
blancs—wealthy plantation owners—and the petits blancs—the merchants and lower 
middle class workers), the affranchis, or free coloreds (also referred to here as gens de 
couleurs) who were generally mixed race, and the nègres, the (generally dark-skinned) 
black slaves.  This caste was codified in the Code Noir, published by France in 1685, that 
established the rights, rules and relationships between the color-castes.  Though free 
coloreds were often the victims of racial prejudice and discrimination, they were more 
inclined to align themselves with the economic interests of the white colonists.  After the 
revolution, white colonists fled, leaving the free coloreds with a significant amount of 
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power and land.  Despite the rise of a new black elite, members of which derived their 
power from their role in the revolution, the generally lighter-skinned Haitians maintained 
dominance.  Thus the color-caste hierarchy remained intact, and “the hostility between 
the two groups were frequently such that each would prefer to invite foreign intervention 
in the affairs of Haiti than to allow its rivals to gain power” (Nicholls 1996: 8).  
Furthermore, the elites often ignored the rest of the Haitian peasant, largely rural farmer 
population, upon the backs of whom the wealth of the country was generated.  In the 
attempt to become a respected nation as soon as possible, the Haitian elite—black and 
mixed race—sacrificed civil society and continuously made decisions that served the 
political interests of the state at the expense of local production.  Essentially, Haiti 
recreated the colonial system of master-slave it had just overthrown. Farmer explains, “ 
the new elite insisted that the emerging peasantry produce commodities for an 
international market, but the peasants—the former slaves—wished to be left alone to 
grow foodstuffs for themselves and for local markets” (Farmer 1994: 74).  The 
disequilibrium between the elite bourgeoisie minority and the peasant farmer majority, 
between political and civil society (Trouillot, 1989), combined with exploitative foreign 
interests created a situation of instability in Haiti that helped make possible the US 
Occupation of 1915 to 1934, which subsequently paved the way for the Duvalier 
dictatorships that bought the country to its knees.   
For the first two decades, France did not recognize Haiti as an independent nation, 
and as long as France refused, no other country would either.  Moreover it wasn’t in these 
nations best interest to do so.  The new republic was, as Paul Farmer puts it, a “pariah 
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nation,” and its vulnerability exposed it to unfavorable market exchanges.  The lack of 
recognition didn’t prevent countries like Great Britain or the United States from trading 
with Haiti, though the United States quickly dominated imports; according to Farmer, “by 
1821, almost 45 percent of imports to Haiti came from the United States; 30 percent were 
of British origin, and 21 percent were French” (Farmer 1994: 78).  After briefly annexing 
the neighboring colony of Santo Domingo from 1822 to 1844, Haiti realized that they 
needed to expand their market presence in order to survive as a country, and this was 
impossible without international recognition of sovereignty.  France had finally agreed to 
recognize the country’s independence, but not without a price.  In 1825, in exchange for 
diplomatic recognition, France demanded that Haiti pay an indemnity of 140 million gold 
francs (later reduced to 90 million gold francs).  (The United States, for its part didn’t 
recognize Haitian independence until 1862.)  Haiti, in no condition to pay such an 
exorbitant amount, was required to borrow money from France in order to pay off the 
indemnity.  Haiti made payments to France until 1950.   
US Occupation 
Saddled with a heavy debt, unequal market relationships, and internal 
racist/colorist politics, the Haitian government became increasingly unstable.  New 
governments took over by coup every few months or years.  Between August 1911 and 
July 1915, Haiti went  through six presidents, of which four were killed in office 
(Trouillot 1990).  Around this time, the United States was solidifying its influence in the 
region.  With the newly built Panama canal, and a new naval base in Guantánamo Bay, 
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Cuba, the United States wanted to secure the North American region for its own political 
and military interests.  In fact, the US was enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, a policy put 
into place by President James Monroe in 1823 declaring that European interference in 
North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression.  In 1904, President 
Theodore Roosevelt added an addendum to the Doctrine, named the “Roosevelt 
Corollary” that gave the US its own permission to militarily intervene in any Latin 
American country.  Upon the brutal assassination of Haitian President Villbrun 
Guillaume following his order to have 167 political prisoners murdered, it was this 
corollary that the US invoked to invade and occupy Haiti for nineteen years.   
The US occupation is seen very differently by those studying Haitian history or 
US diplomacy.  Two months after they invaded, the US marines put into place a 
Convention that gave the US full authority for ten years.  This was done without any true 
input from the Haitian people or leadership.  When Haitian leaders protested and 
rebellions became more frequent, the US disbanded the Senate and extended the 
Convention an additional 10 years (Farmer 1994; Trouillot 1990).  During the occupation 
from 1915 to 1934, the US sought to modernize Haiti and make it a safer place for 
foreign investment (Nicholls 1996).  Many public works went underway, including the 
building of hospitals, schools, roads, and other infrastructure.  In order to do so, however, 
the American military instated a system of corvée, or indentured servitude.  Haitian 
peasants were put to work in these public projects, but paid little, if at all, and in many 
cases were physically abused.  Some reports compared the corvée to the re-establishment 
of slavery.  The United States also took the liberty of re-writing the Haitian constitution.  
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The 1918 version eliminated the provision that no foreigner could own Haitian land.  
Another major change was the centralization of government administration.  Prior the 
occupation, Haiti’s affairs were distributed along major coastal cities such as Cap-Haïtien 
and Gonaïves.  Following US intervention, the government became centralized in the 
capital Port-au-Prince.  The other cities lost major sources of revenue as ports, and this 
precipitated the influx of peasants, more than ever forced to find paid labor instead of 
being able to live entirely off their land, in the capital city.       
Paul Farmer asserts that the US Occupation, “was not, as its apologists suggest, 
the sudden manifestation of a new U.S. interest in protecting the Haitians from their own 
corrupt rulers.  It was rather the continuation of a pattern established in the nineteenth 
century, and in many ways the logical succession to a brand of imperialism that had 
already taken root throughout Latin America” (Farmer 1994: 90).   When one examines 
the US’ stated motives alongside the history of its relationship with Haiti, it is not 
difficult to see that the US operated purely with its own interests in mind, despite some of 
the “good” work it did in modernizing the country.   
It can be surprise some that the US would have such a vested interest in Haiti, 
particularly with its history of unstable governments.  My own mother, a Haitian woman 
raised under Francois Duvalier’s regime, actively dismisses the notion that the US had 
any reason other than altruism to intervene in Haiti either directly or indirectly.  US 
policy documents reveal however that altruism was far from the minds of government 
leaders in Washington (Dash & Arthur, 1999).  For example, Paul Farmer summarizes 
US policy objectives during the Cold War as follows: 
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1. The overriding objective is to deny Haiti to the communists. 
2. In short-term political terms, the U.S. desires to assure Haiti’s support of the 
U.S. on matters of importance in the OAS, UN, and other international 
organizations. 
3. The U.S. has the continuing objective of protecting private American citizens 
and property interests in Haiti. (Famer 1994: 109) 
  
Although the intensity of US interest did undermine Haiti’s capacity to form other 
diplomatic relationships, attempts to profit from Haiti’s primarily import market were 
made by other countries.  In fact, during the lull in between the US Occupation and the 
Duvalier dictatorships (covered in the following section), France sought to re-establish 
diplomatic relations with Haiti.  On September 24, 1945, the two countries signed a 
cultural accord that allowed France to find a stronger foothold in Haiti by installing 
French cultural institutions such as the Institut Français and Allliance française (which 
had stopped operating in 1938 as a result of World War II breaking out in Europe and the 
rise of Vichy France); expanding the number of French catholic clergymen, professors, 
and professional technicians; and perhaps most relevant to this research, granting 
scholarships for university and artistic study in France (Arthus, 2008; Bechaq 2010).  The 
document was written to foster cultural exchanges between the two countries, “but 
without a true reciprocity from the Haitian side,” wrote historian Wein Arthus,  
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it is difficult to talk of cultural exchanges.  It is more of a question of a policy put 
into place by France, a costly one, with the sole purpose to export--or keep in 
Haiti--its language and culture, knowing that 'the French language gives rise to 
French habits; French habits give rise to the purchase of French products.  Those 
who know French become clients of France (Arthus, 2008).   
 
Indeed, though there was some effort to solidify a working economic and cultural 
relationship between the two countries, the instability of the Haitian government, the 
necessity to repay the debt owed to France from the indemnity forced upon the new 
country in exchange for diplomatic recognition, which resulted in the significant lowering 
of Haitian import taxes in order to generate the income to pay back, and the stubborn 
economic policy of the US, undermined this relationship.  However, France did succeed 
in cultivating a generation of educated Haitians who saw France as a premier destination.  
French anthropologist Dimitri Bechacq, who wrote his doctoral thesis on the Haiti elite 
living in France, argues that the cultural accord of 1945 planted a lasting seed in the 
Haitian imagination of France as an elite—in both the adjective and noun form—
destination.  “No matter the successes or failures of Haitians invested in the migration 
process,” Bechaq writes, “it remains that the members of different Haitian social classes 
share an image of France, manifestations of which exist today” (Bechaq 2010: 9, my 
translation).  The accord paved the way for one of the most significant waves of Haitian 
migration to France during the reign of the Duvalier family. 
Duvalier Dictatorships 
 The US occupation ended rather hastily, with the US Marines pulling out without 
ensuring that the Haitian government was prepared to once again shoulder the 
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responsibility of self-rule after a series of puppet presidents.  Haiti did manage to recover 
somewhat, particularly under the rule of President Dumarsais Estimé (from August 1946 
to May 1950) and Paul Eugène Magloire (from December 1950 to December 1956.)  
 The man who would declare himself “President for life” and rule Haiti with fear 
for fifteen years grew up during the US Occupation.  Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier 
witnessed with acuity the impact of US hegemony on the Haitian people, particularly as it 
related to nationalism and color consciousness.  Duvalier subscribed to the ideologies of 
the “movement indigèniste,” that fought against US cultural imperialism through Haiti 
nationalist expression, and “noirisme,” a racialist ideology that elevated darker-skinned 
Blacks over the lighter-skinned mixed race folk.  While these movements in and of 
themselves are founded on a resistance to the traditional power structures and bring the 
Haitian people—the peasants—into the foreground, they were in actuality used as form 
of political pandering between the Black middle- and upper-class bourgeoisie and the 
mixed race urbanites.  The pandering was effective, however and Duvalier obtained the 
support from the black middle class, along with approval from US forces that helped him 
rise to power.     
            Duvalier was initially seen as a military puppet, to be easily controlled (Dash & 
Arthur, 1999; Trouillot, 1989), but within his first few months of office his true colors 
shined through.  One of his first business items was to create his own personal security 
force, infamously nicknamed the Tontons Macoutes.  These “boogeymen” were 
responsible for ensuring the Haitian people’s loyalty to the new president.  Duvalier 
became increasingly paranoid of losing power and used his macoutes to infiltrate every 
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level of society.  Although macoutes had an official uniform, a navy blue jumper that 
struck fear in any who caught site of them approaching, many macoutes were also 
undercover.  Naturally, these macoutes were even more dangerous than their more visible 
and brazen brethren.  Any report of political dissent, even a casual comment against 
Duvalier’s regime, would ultimately result in a person’s, or even a whole family’s, 
death.  During family discussions I would often hear my mom say, “what Haitian family 
wasn’t touched by Duvalier?” and by touched, it was obvious she meant experienced 
death at the hands of a macoute.  
            As the years passed and the terror and bloodshed increased, the international 
community remained largely silent.  In fact, the US even provided $40.4 million in 
funding his first four years in office, often as unconditional grants (Farmer 1994).  The 
US continued to meddle when power transferred from Papa Doc upon his death in 1971 
to his 19-year-old son Jean-Claude Duvalier, nicknamed “Baby Doc.” Many hoped that 
the son, being so young and potentially susceptible to influence, would be a relief 
following the state of terror his father had created, but unfortunately Baby Doc followed 
his father’s path and upheld the totalitarian power of his office. Trouillot writes, “the 
greatest difference between the two regimes lay in the deepening of relations between the 
state and holders of capital at home and abroad, and the increased support of the U.S. 
government…a totalitarianism with a human face, one that rested on increased economic 
dependence, particularly on a subcontracting assembly industry tied to the United States” 
(Trouillot 1990: 200).  Baby Doc demanded more money, and the loans offered by the 
World Bank and IMF required Haiti to become more liberalized.  These structural 
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adjustment policies favored export manufacturing, and international companies came in 
and built factories in and around the capital, trying to capitalize on a cheap and docile 
labor force.  This led to the dramatic growth and overcrowding of the capital as peasants, 
no longer able to sustain themselves through farm work, took up jobs manufacturing toys, 
baseballs, and apparel.  Yet, according to Farmer, this “industrialization did little to arrest 
an economy in free fall” and as Haiti’s debt grew, so did the amount of people in poverty.  
In the 1970s, the first waves of Haitian “boat people” arrived on the shores of Florida and 
nearby Caribbean islands, demanding political asylum.  For various political reasons 
however, the US government classified these Haitians as economic refugees and denied 
them entry or easy access to a green card (Laguerre, 1984).  
 Eventually the situation deteriorated to a point of no return for Jean-Claude 
Duvalier.  A series of large protests and uprisings eventually became too much for Baby 
Doc to handle, and with the help of the US, he fled the country in 1986, eventually 
ending up in Paris, France.   
The rise and fall of Aristide 
For four years following the fall of Baby Doc, Haiti was ruled by various military 
juntas who seized power every few months.  During this period, a Haitian Catholic priest 
named Jean-Betran Aristide became extremely vocal in denouncing the violence and 
instability.  Aristide had already called attention to himself under the Duvalier regime and 
was subsequently exiled for three years to Montréal.   He returned in 1985, more 
determined than ever to fight against the endless displays of corruption that impoverished 
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the members of his congregation.  In 1988, Tonton Macoutes under the direction of the 
ruling Haitian army stormed his church and fired shots into the crowd, killing at least 
thirteen people and wounding dozens of others, and burned down the structure to the 
ground.  He was excommunicated from his religious order that same year, which paved 
the way for his bid for the presidency.  As a Haitian from a poor background, Aristide 
was seen as the people’s choice, tired as they were from elites constantly jockeying for 
power.   In late 1990, Haiti finally managed to hold their first democratically fair 
elections, electing Aristide with 60% of the vote.  Unfortunately, he was overthrown in a 
coup eight by yet another person from the Army, General Raoul Cédras.  Aristide was 
exiled to the United States where he stayed for three years.  In protest of the military 
coup, the UN placed a trade embargo on Haiti, which created a severe economic crisis.  
Working class and poor Haitians began fleeing the country in droves, and the first boats 
landed on US shores around this time.     
With the support of the US, Aristide returned to power in 1994, but with several 
explicit warnings.  First, he was not to engage in class warfare, pitting the bourgeoisie 
against the proletariat masses, but to bridge the two.  Second, he was to work more 
closely with Parliament and cede more power to them, thus decreasing executive 
authority.   Lastly, Aristide was to support a more neoliberal economic policy.  Although 
the US threatened to cut off US monetary support from Haiti if Aristide did not 
cooperate, Aristide made several gaffes that ultimately led the US, along with 
participation of Canada and France, to oust him from office and exile him, first to 
Jamaica then to the Democratic Republic of Congo where he ended up living for seven 
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years (Farmer, 2004).  First, Aristide nominated a close friend as Prime Minister, René 
Préval, passing over a number of other possible candidates and showing clear favoritism.  
When new elections were held in 1995, Préval won, but Aristide ran once again in 2001 
and once again took office.  He waged a campaign to demand France to repay the 
indemnity Haiti was forced to pay.  He calculated that with inflation, the debt amounted 
to approximately 21 billion.   France for the most part ignored Aristide’s demand1 but 
Aristide made it a central issue, making himself very unpopular with international press.    
In his second time in office, Aristide made a number of political errors that were 
used against him by the United States and international donor institutions to first freeze 
aid to the already impoverished country, and later remove Aristide from office.  The 
circumstances for Aristide’s forcible (and arguably unjust and illegal) removal from 
office lay beyond the scope of this dissertation, but this history is important in 
understanding to what extent international powers undermined Haiti’s sovereignty.  
Support for Aristide within the country remained strong, particularly amongst the poor.   
In 2006 Préval was re-elected to office, where he served out his term.  The 
economic situation in Haiti made some small improvements, all of which were wiped out 
in the 2010 earthquake.    
Goudougoudou 
The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, will forever be remembered 
as one of the world’s deadliest disasters.  For 35 seconds the earth shook and 
reduced a nation—already struggling with the historical weight of slavery, 
                                                
1 In 2010, some activists calling themselves the “Yes Men” created a fake government website and 
uploaded a video of a very official looking person reading a statement that France would indeed pay the 
money back.   
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underdevelopment, imperialism, and intense internal divisions—to rubble….It is 
no exaggeration to say that the earthquake permanently changed Haiti. 
--From Tectonic Plates by Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales   
 
Many scholars agree that that the earthquake's devastation was not merely a result 
of shifting tectonic plates.   The earthquake merely collapsed the already fragile social, 
political, and economic scaffolding in place.  Scholar Anthony Oliver-Smith writes that 
"a disaster is made inevitable by the historically produced pattern of vulnerability, 
evidenced in location, infrastructure, sociopolitical structure, production patters, and 
ideology that characterizes a society" (Oliver-Smith 2010: 33).  Several realities came 
together to create the disaster: 1) undermining of rural economy and the development of 
Port-au-Prince as a industrial center, forcing peasants to move to the capital, 2) 
unregulated housing development, leaving the poor to live in shantytowns, and 3) lack of 
infrastructure or access of clean water or electricity for the vast majority of population.      
On the other hand, the earthquake brought the Haitian diaspora into the light as a 
vital resource toward Haiti’s recovery.  It is well known that the most important “use” of 
the diaspora is the sending of individual monies to family and friends.  According to the 
Inter-American Development Bank2, about $1.5 billion US dollars are sent back home 
through wire transfers, making up more half of the Haitian government’s gross domestic 
product (Sutton & Chaney, 1989; Zephir, 2004).  After the earthquake, the World Bank3 
estimated that there would be a 20 to 25% increase, aided somewhat by Western Union 
                                                
2 http://www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2010-01-28/keeping-remittances-flowing-to-haiti,6481.html 
3 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/05/17/haiti-remittances-key-to-earthquake-recovery 
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and Money Gram reducing their fees4 during the 2010 year.  Remittances (the formal 
name given to money that is wire transferred to family and friends, that often greatly 
supplements, if not substitutes for, income) have been the cornerstone for development 
efforts in Haiti, but because the money is sent to individuals, it only benefits the local 
economy by increasing certain people’s purchasing power, but does not fund the 
necessary infrastructure in order to support the government and other institutions such as 
hospitals and schools.  This financing can also become a crutch; as one reporter 
summarizes in regards to money wired home by the diaspora,  
 
Without their assistance, there would have been many more "boat people" trying 
to escape the misery; the level of violence and crime would skyrocket even more 
than it has.  However, in a way, the diaspora is funding Haiti's “welfare system”. 
It's not helping the Haitian people to stand on their own two feet (Uttley, 2005).   
 
A number of scholarly and newspaper articles appeared between 2010 and 2012 
(Lundy, 2011; Macintyre, 2011; Maclaren, 2010; Paraison, 2010) lauding the potential of 
the diaspora and suggesting new ways to include the diaspora in Haiti’s future.  This 
discourse around diaspora however is somewhat particular; not every country has a 
population that could be identified as a discrete group, let alone mobilized to invest in the 
country’s future.  In the introductory chapter, I discussed the politics behind the term 
diaspora.  In the following section I expand on the relationship between diaspora and the 
countries of settlement.   
                                                
4 http://www.irinnews.org/report/88397/haiti-us-remittances-keep-the-homeland-afloat 
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THE RISE OF A DIASPORA 
Through a deeper understanding of Haitian history, it is possible to better 
contextualize the waves of migration that pushed Haitians to other Caribbean nations, 
North America, Europe, and Africa.  Haiti’s constant political and economic upheaval 
often left its citizens with few alternatives, and many sought their fortune abroad if they 
had the means to do so.  Several patterns of migration emerged as a result, that often 
corresponded to specific moments in Haitian history (see table 1.)  Migration patterns 
were structured by geographical distance, socio-economic status, and the immigration 
policies of the destination country.  Thus, the kinds of communities that emerged in the 
various cities to which Haitians migrated often had specific characteristics that shaped the 
relationships formed with other ethno-racial communities, and the kind of engagement 
with both the country of settlement and Haiti. 
In the early 20th century, it was common for elite families to send their children to 
study in France.  Towards the 1950s and 60s, entire middle- and upper-class families 
migrated to France as a result of Duvalier’s regime of terror (Béchaq, 2010; Jackson, 
2011a; Laguerre, 1984).  François Duvalier, or Papa Doc, had a distinct hatred for Haiti’s 
elite population, who were typically racially mixed and lighter skinned(Trouillot, 1994).  
France, then, became a safe haven for Haitians who were middle class and educated.  
According to the first official demographic study of the Haitian population in France, Les 
Haïtiens en France by Roger Bastide, there were around 500 Haitians living in the 
French metropole during the Duvalier dictatorship.  However, by the 1980s, the 
economic and political situation in Haiti had deteriorated significantly and the country 
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went through several oppressive military regimes, and Haitians with more limited socio-
economic status migrated in large numbers to the Dominican Republic and other 
surrounding Caribbean islands (including Guadeloupe, a department of France), the 
United States and Canada.   
 
PERIOD/WAVE SOCIO-POLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
 
MIGRANTS’ 
PROFILE 
DESTINATION 
1915-1934 US Occupation of Haiti Massive emigration 
in rural areas 
Peasants’ resistance 
Cuba, Dominican 
Republic 
 
 
1934-1950 
 
Search for better education Upper Middle Class France, Canada, 
West Africa 
1957-1963 François Duvalier regime Politicians, 
Professionals 
Educated Elite 
Upper Middle Class 
West Africa, 
France, Canada 
1964-1971 François Duvalier self-
proclaimed President-for-life 
Middle Class 
Politicians 
West Africa, 
France, Canada, 
U.S. 
1971-1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier 
replacing father as President-
for-life 
Massive emigration 
of middle class & the 
working class poor 
U.S., the Bahamas, 
Canada, Dominican 
Republic  
1987-1994 President Aristide election 
(1991) coup d’état after 9 
months 
Massive emigration 
of working class poor 
U.S. (mainly 
Miami), Bahamas, 
Dominican 
Republic 
1995-2009 Political Turmoil 
Economic hardship 
Massive exodus from 
working class poor to 
middle class 
from rural towns 
Mainly U.S. & 
Canada, 
Wave to French 
Guyana 
 
2010-2012 Weakened government and 
infrastructure following the 
earthquakes 
Working class poor 
and some middle 
class 
Mainly U.S., Brazil, 
but all borders are 
deliberately 
tightened  
Table 1: Adapted from “Wave of Haitian Migration” (Casseus-Eybalin, 2008) 
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According to a 2009 US Census report, there are approximately 830,000 people of 
“Haitian ancestry” within its borders, with 376,000 living in Florida, and 191,000 living 
in New York and the rest living in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut (Albert, 
2010).  The Canadian census estimates that approximately 100,000, Haitians live in 
Montreal.   In France, there are about 30,000 living in the department of Ile-de-France (in 
which the capital city of Paris is located) according to the 2009 census data (INSEE, 
2009; Local, 2004).  These estimates are more than likely grossly inaccurate, since they 
do not take into account the vast number of Haitians that are undocumented, and current 
migration patterns have bought a larger number of working class and poor migrants to 
France.  Many scholars believe that there are as many as 2.5 million Haitians living 
outside of Haiti.  The Haitian government early on recognized the significance of this 
outside population, and Aristide nicknamed this population the “tenth department” and 
created an official ministry within the Haitian government in 1994.    The nickname no 
longer applies since there is now an actual new tenth department (so Haitians living 
abroad would be the 11th department), but the institutionalization of the diaspora points to 
awareness of the importance of the group in government affairs and the future of the 
country.  
Haitians in the US 
Haitians were subjects of interest during a period of intense research on the 
experiences of immigrants and the challenges of integration.  The US government made 
several significant changes to its immigration policy over the course of three decades that 
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dramatically changed the fabric of the country.  In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act was passed that eliminated race as a bar to immigration or citizenship, but it wasn’t 
until 1965 that an amendment was passed that abolished nation origins quotas, in 
preference for limits on immigration per hemisphere (120,000 in the Western hemisphere 
and 170,000 in the Eastern.)  In the 1980s, two more acts were passed: the Refugee Act 
of 1980 redefined the category of refugee and increased the limit from 17,500 to 50,000; 
and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that was aimed to curtail illegal 
immigration by punishing employers who hired undocumented workers, but it only 
served to create a new market for forged documents and increased presence of 
undocumented workers.  The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the immigration limit to 
700,000, but also established a preference for skilled laborers and family reunification, 
which led to “chain migration” as individuals brought their spouses, parents, and children 
into the country.  As a result of all these policy changes, the number of immigrants in the 
US jumped from 9.7 million to 19 million between the years of 1960 and 1990 (United 
States Foreign-Born Population by Country of Birth: 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990, 2011).  
Today, immigrants make up 13% of the US population, a number that is somewhat 
disproportionate to the amount of attention immigrants receive in the media and by 
politicians concerned with their presence in the US.    
A robust canon of research exists documenting the experiences of Haitians in the 
United States.  In fact, some of the earliest ethnographies focused on the community in 
New York that blossomed in the late 70s and 80s (Keely, 1978; Sutton & Chaney, 1989) 
and were followed thereafter by studies on Haitians in Florida (Stepick, Grenier, Castro, 
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& Dunn, 2003; Zephir, 2004) and Illinois (Woldemikael, 1989).  Other ethnographies 
followed up with the second generation (Portes, 1996; Rumbaut & Portes, 2001). 
In 1960 there were only approximately 5,000 Haitians in the US.  By 1970, there 
were about 28,000, and by 1990, the number had jumped to 225,000.  As more working-
class and poor Haitians arrived to US shores, their image in the media worsened, 
contributing to their difficulty in articulating a more unified identity that reflected their 
transnationalism (Basch et al., 1993).  Government instability in Haiti forced thousands 
to flee, only to encounter a number of hostile policies in the US that stigmatized them and 
established them as “unwanted.”  Stepick summarizes that between the “U.S. Coast 
Guard attempting to intercept boats of Haitians before they left Haitian waters, the 
disproportionate incarceration of undocumented Haitians who made it to U.S. shores, and 
the highest disapproval rating of any national group for political asylum requests,” 
Haitians in the United States have had no shortage of discrimination over the past several 
decades (Stepick et al., 2003).   Perhaps one of the better known cases of egregious 
profiling was done by the Center for Disease Control [CDC], which identified Haitians, 
along with homosexuals, hemophiliacs, and intravenous drug users (“heroin addicts”) as 
the groups with the highest risk to pass along the HIV virus.  Haitians living in New York 
were sufficiently outraged to stage a massive protest.  In April 1990, about 50,000 
Haitians flooded the streets of lower Manhattan and Brooklyn to demand the CDC to 
remove the category of Haitian from their criteria (Faison Jr., 1991).   The CDC did 
eventually backpedal but the stigma followed Haitians for decades.   
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Haitians in the United States also had to contend with racial and ethnic dynamics.  
From its birth, Haiti had a particular racial consciousness that grounded them in 
Blackness as an identity—in fact, one scholar argued that the 1804 Haitian constitution 
was the first document that conceived of Blackness as a social construction rather than as 
a biological fact (Gaffield, 2007).  In the United States, however, it was clear that to be 
Black was to be at the bottom of society’s totem pole, and many Black immigrants, 
conscious of their multiply situated identities, manifested different attitudes towards their 
African American counterparts.  Although some new arrivals identified with the struggles 
of the time, others chose to distance themselves from African Americans so as to 
maximize their chances of success in the United States (Kasinitz, 1992; Stepick et al., 
2003; Waters, 1999).  Haitian immigrants for example would emphasize their ability to 
speak French or their education as a point of distinction from “other” Blacks.  This 
caused tensions within certain neighborhoods where these communities rubbed elbows, 
such as in Flatbush, Brooklyn, NY or Hollywood, FL.  Ethnic distinctiveness grew in the 
1980s and 90s (Kasinitz, 1992) as increasingly more immigrants identified strongly with 
their ethnic identity, bringing more attention to the diversity of Blacks in the United 
States, but also prompting more research on immigrant communities and their 
descendants.  A number of sociological studies were conducted that pitted Black 
immigrants against African Americans in their quest to gauge assimilation.  For example, 
a study sought to understand why children of immigrants had higher rates of educational 
success than their African-American peers, implying that there was something cultural, 
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rather than structural, that created divergent success rates.  This kind of ethno-racial 
“war” was criticized by Jemima Pierre, who reflected that, 
 
the discursive use of Black immigrant “ethnic” and “cultural distinctiveness,” 
while admittedly reflecting an important recognition of the heterogeneity of the 
United States Black populations, is in fact predicated upon a repackaged “culture 
of poverty” discourse that serves to reaffirm the overarching racial order” (Pierre, 
2004). 
 
Regardless, these discourses contributed to the strengthening of diasporic communities in 
the United States.  These communities were further supported by other institutions that 
acted as extensions of (or substituted for) the state.  Mooney, who studied the Haitian 
Catholic diasporas in Miami, Montreal, and Paris, examined how religious spaces--in this 
case the church--function as “mediating institutions,” “established institution of the host 
society [that] attempts to speak, or mediate, on [a community’s] behalf with the local and 
national governments” (Mooney 2009: 9).  Mooney argues that “Haitians' religious faith 
provides them with narratives of hope in situations where they have little status or 
political voice” (Mooney 2008: 9).  These religious spaces mediate the experiences 
between Haitians and their respective State agencies, each characterized by distinct 
ideologies.  In the US, the notion of the "melting pot"—even if more of an ideal than a 
reality—permits a greater level of cooperation in the Haitian community of Miami, the 
most successful of the three diasporas in permitting social and economic mobility, 
according to Mooney.  
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Haitians in France 
Haitian migration to France has been understudied in comparison to the streams 
towards the United States and Canada, but their history is quite revelatory.  The Haitian 
migrant population in France has gone through several class-based demographic shifts 
over the past century.  In the early 20th century, it was common for elite families to send 
their children to study in France.  Towards the 1950s and 60s, entire middle- and upper-
class families migrated to France as a result of Duvalier’s regime of terror (Béchaq, 2010; 
Jackson, 2011a).  François Duvalier, or Papa Doc, had a distinct hatred for Haiti’s elite 
population, who were typically racially mixed and lighter skinned (Trouillot, 1994).  
France, then, became a safe haven for Haitians who were middle class—educated and 
well off.  According to the first official demographic study of the Haitian population in 
France, Les Haïtiens en France by Roger Bastide, there were around 500 Haitians living 
in the French metropole during the Duvalier dictatorship.  However, by the 1980s, the 
economic and political situation in Haiti had deteriorated significantly, and Haitians with 
more limited socio-economic status migrated in large numbers to the Dominican 
Republic and other surrounding Caribbean islands (including Guadeloupe, a department 
of France), the United States and Canada.   
Although official estimates of the number of Haitians in Ile-de-France (the 
department in which Paris is located) to be roughly 30,000 as of 2009, other sources 
place that number closer to 60,000, including the undocumented (INSEE, 2009; Local, 
2004).  Current migration patterns have bought a larger number of working class and 
poor migrants to France.  When I spoke with René Benjamin, who served as a bridge 
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between Haiti and the Haitian community in Ile-de-France, he explained that families in 
Haiti pool together their resources in order to send one family member.  Besides being an 
obvious financial feat, it can prove difficult to complete all the necessary paperwork 
because of missing or falsified birth certificates and limited visas.  Nonetheless, there is a 
sizeable population, yet until the earthquake Haitians were rarely seen or mentioned in 
the national media or in academic discourse on “Black France” or the Afro-Caribbean 
populations in France.  Much has not changed since the disaster.  Today when Haitians 
are discussed it is usually in a context of aid, a discussion about Haitians “over there” and 
rarely those already in mainland France.   
Moreover, when looking at the demographic of those who actively work in 
Haitian associations, it can be revealing of some of the major issues they face.  First the 
population has aged with very low levels of renewal.  Some of the largest waves of 
Haitian entrants, generally lower-to-middle class, came in during the 60s and 70s as 
students.  At that time, Haiti was in the full throes of a dictatorship, so many students also 
engaged in long-distance political activism, doing what they could to raise awareness 
around and help get rid of Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier.  As the political climate shifted 
from a dictatorship to political unrest to economic instability, the students, now middle-
aged professionals, became more focused on providing and supporting social services.  
Migration to mainland France, however, slowed as the cost became prohibitive, and less 
scholarship opportunities were available.  The age disparity has made many organizers 
conscious of finding ways to encourage intergenerational dialogue and youth 
participation.  Gender make-up tells another story.  Known figureheads in the community 
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are predominantly men, although statistics show that Haitian migration to France is made 
up of 44% men and 55% women (INSEE, 2009).  The lack of women involvement has 
shaped the kinds of issues addressed and the way they are addressed.  There is a heavy 
focus on education and healthcare with very little focus reproductive health and agency.  
Individuals and organizations such as the Association des Femmes Haïtiennes 
(Association of Haitian Women) that have attempted to address this gap have not been 
taken seriously. 
I will go into more detail about the Haitian population in France in the following 
chapter, but it is important Haitian independence from France did not lead to any true 
form of sovereignty for the defiant nation; the Haitian people were exploited internally by 
the elite ruling class and externally by European nations and the United States.  From the 
nation’s inception, the precedent for dependency was ensured, and this has played the 
pivotal role in the problematic dynamic between the Haitian people, the Haitian state, and 
foreign nations.  At the root of all this is the relationship between France and Haiti, a 
relationship whose import in popular literature on Haitian history is often confined to 
colonialism.  Although France indeed plays a lesser role than the United States in Haiti’s 
affairs today, the legacy of elitism and the complicated split between the Haitian people, 
the Haitian diaspora, and Haitian leaders stems from the days of French colonial rule and 
continues to play a subtle role in Haitian politics (Trouillot 1989).   
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CONCLUSION 
The diaspora has shown throughout the years their capacity to influence and shape 
Haiti.  For better or for worse, Haiti’s future is tied to the future of its diaspora.  It is the 
love for Haiti that motivates Haitians and their descendants to mobilize and invest from 
afar.  Yet being a “diaspora” signifies more than belonging to a global community of 
displaced individuals.  The way one understands themselves as a diaspora (or not) and the 
power that the term has to mobilize is context-dependent.  One must be aware of the 
politics of place that shape one’s identity as fundamentally as other social categories 
(Brown, 2005).  In other words, one must talk about diasporas in plural form, recognizing 
that each are distinct.  When I first became interested in studying Haitians in Paris, it was 
born out the realization that there was something different about the Haitian diaspora in 
France in comparison to the New York diaspora with which I was more familiar.  
Discursively, it is often easier to refer to a singular Haitian diaspora, as if it was a single 
community that could be mobilized in times of need.  Only recently has scholarship 
sought to unpack this singular way of perceiving the diaspora as more studies have come 
out on the particularities of the Haitian experience in the Dominican Republic, the 
Bahamas, Guadeloupe, and France (Béchaq, 2010; Brodwin et al., 2006; Jackson, 2011b; 
Louis, 2012; Mooney, 2009).  I follow in the footsteps of Regine O. Jackson and the 
contributors to her excellent anthology Geographies of the Haitian Diaspora to be aware 
that “indifference to the diversity of diaspora spaces could reproduce the 'homogenizing 
effect' of older theoretical approaches and erase important structural and cultural 
difference in the experiences of Haitian diasporans” (2011: 31).   
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There is more work to be done on being intentional in thinking through how Haiti, 
other nations, and the diaspora within those nations will work together on rebuilding the 
beleaguered nation.  Individual remittances are indispensible, but the collective power of 
those remittances, if channeled into organizations or political action committees, could 
have a wider range of impact. Hometown associations, situated at the juncture of the 
nation-state, the international community, and the people, can be effective tools in this 
endeavor when they are given the appropriate tools to be successful.  Their capacity to act 
and successfully carry out their missions depends not only on the competencies, 
resources, and networks that individuals bring to the table, but on the ability of the 
organization to leverage the sum of those things in both national and diasporic public 
spheres.  This investigation focuses on conveying how important these pieces are by 
providing an account of the challenges when they are missing. In the next chapter, I 
examine the relationships within and between hometown associations in France. 
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Chapter 3: The Ups and Downs of Organizational Life  
One of my earliest experiences in Paris that actually spawned my interest in 
studying the Haitian diaspora in France occurred in the summer of 2006.  I was attending 
the Caribbean day carnival, sponsored by the City of Paris.  I had waited anxiously for 
the Haitian float to pass so that I could proudly wave my flag and dance in the streets 
next to the truck.  To my deep disappointment, a Haitian float never appeared, and on my 
way home I wondered how Haiti could have not made an appearance alongside other 
Latin American nations with both small and large populations in France, such as Trinidad 
and Tobago and Brazil.  I found out later from René Benjamin, founder and director of 
the organization Haïti Développment, that Haiti had been represented in the past, but 
more than likely communication had broken down between the leaders in the Haitian 
community and the French Caribbean community—as it periodically has done in the 
past—and therefore the effort to have a Haitian float that year had probably been 
abandoned.  
My experience at the carnival became an ethnographic metaphor for the reality of 
the Haitian population in France as a group that exists as simultaneously present and 
absent—present in the sense that they do enter the French national discourse, but almost 
always in reference to problems in the country itself.  Their absence from the national 
imagination as neither a threatening immigrant group, like North African migrants, nor an 
Afro-Caribbean group, unlike Guadeloupe or Martinique, creates a situation where 
Haitians fall through the ideological cracks.  Haitians are not alone in this, however; 
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South Asian immigrant groups, such as the Sri-Lankan Tamil or Pakistanis, are rarely 
featured in the media (Breeden & Wong, 2011).  However if we explain away a 
community’s invisibility due to a small population size, or a high number of immigrants 
being undocumented, we miss the bigger picture of understanding how other systems at 
work create hegemonic structures that privilege certain experiences and standpoints over 
others.  In France, for example, the dismissal has allowed for greater discursive space 
being occupied by North African migrants, to the detriment of understanding the distinct 
experiences of other immigrant communities.   
It is this multi-level invisibility—and arguably, neglect—that frames this chapter.  
Here, I will delve into the core of my research, examining the internal dynamics and 
external influences of Haitians and their organizations.  My aim is largely descriptive, 
profiling the main organizations with which I worked, and the introducing the people 
who were instrumental to my fieldwork experience.  I analyze some of their personal 
attitudes towards their work within the organizations as well as their experiences in Haiti 
and in France, all of which are developed within intersectional contexts of race and class 
ideology, pressures of assimilation, and cultural identity.   As I try to weave their stories, 
I will draw on the analytical frames presented in the introduction, namely subject 
formation, diasporic citizenship, and transnationality, in order to contextualize the 
motivations and actions of the research participants.   
I have chosen to give a certain amount of attention to the challenges between 
members and within organizations because these issues—and the attempt to resolve 
them—formed a major part of my experience within this community 
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struggles of “being diaspora”.  As a researcher, though, I could have been drawn to the 
conflict more than necessary, whether it was that people thought that was what I wanted 
to hear, or because that was what I thought (misguidedly) I was meant to write about.  
Regardless of the reasons, it structured my experience, and at several points I became 
concerned that my entire dissertation would be filled with dramatic stories.  Upon further 
reflection, however, I was moved to try to understand why there was so much conflict, 
beyond the immediate circumstances.  I found that people’s individual stories had some 
common threads and clear ties to broader issues, and thus I have structured this chapter 
around making those connections clear. In the first section I will discuss the history of 
formal organizations in France in order to “set the scene,” so to speak.  Understanding at 
the outset the differences in the ways French associations are conceived of and the role 
they are seen to play in the French nation-state can make it easier to see how those 
differences manifest themselves in Haitian hometown associations.  In the second 
section, I will profile the organizations and institutions that were central to my research, 
and describing their dynamics that I argue are a manifestation of the pressures they 
experience in managing their identity and responsibility as a diasporic community, pulled 
in multiple directions without a clear sense of where they might be most needed.    
ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE IN FRANCE 
   In France, nonprofit organizations, which include associations, cooperatives, 
mutual banks, and even certain kinds of insurance companies, have long held a position 
of deep importance (Salamon & Anheier, 1992).  Prior to the institutionalization of 
 86 
nonprofit organizations in French law, they were regulated by a highly centralized French 
state.  As a Roman Catholic country, France deviated from other Catholic nations such as 
Italy by replacing the Church with the state in public institutions.  Institutions such as 
schools and hospitals, and the provision of social services such as care for the sick and 
poor, were regulated by the French state itself (Archambault, 2001).  France subscribes to 
the political ideology of etatism, or statism, as opposed to deriving its sovereignty from 
civil society.  In a country that is statist, like France or Germany, “the state constitutes a 
separate and superior order of political governance that derives much of its legitimacy 
from a well-developed bureaucratic elite, as well as from a long history of authoritarian 
political rule” (Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).  The implications of this for 
nonprofits are significant; whereas the nonprofit sector in non-statist countries served to 
complement the state in taking care of its citizens, in statist countries nonprofits often 
dealt with the issues that the state overlooked or neglected (Archambault, 2001).  Early 
19th Century associations revolved around labor rights, and were thus seen as a threat, 
viewed as anti-republican and sectarian.  In 1810 Napoleon banned any association with 
more than twenty people as a way to control and suppress any uprisings.  This restriction 
wasn’t lifted until the 1901 law that guaranteed the right of citizens to create associations.  
Following the legalization of French associations, France broke with the Catholic Church 
and established itself as a secular state in 1905, which also permitted the creation of 
“cult” or ostensibly religious organizations.  According to Lindsay and Hems, the French 
nonprofit sector, 
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emerged as the result of the ideological struggle between republicanism and the 
Catholic Church over the rights of the individual. Until 1901 the legal right of 
individuals to associate in groups was heavily restricted and only allowed by 
specific permission of the government. The creation of associations or association 
declareée was therefore seen as the final victory of the Republic over the Catholic 
Church in France (Lindsay and Hems 2004: 267).   
 
The 1901 law defines associations as an, “agreement by which two or more 
people pool, permanently, their knowledge or activities for purposes other than sharing 
profits”5 (Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association, 1901).  Although 
defined broadly, organizations closely reflected the historical moment in which they were 
born, and were often treated as an instrument to carry out a specific project (Regourd, 
2007).  In the early 1900s, a large majority were labor-based organizations, including 
labor unions, which reflected at the time large population and political upheaval due to 
World War I and the subsequent interwar period that brought in an immigrant-based 
work force.  This was followed by a period of strong communist sentiment in France in 
the 1940s and 1950s.  Decolonization occurred in the late 1950s and 1960s ushering 
some economic stability (in France, at least), and as a result organizations were being 
created by the new middle class who were no longer focused on labor but on more social 
issues.  New kinds of associations cropped up: “for environmental defense and 
protection; for the concerns of feminism, notably the fight against restrictions on birth 
control and the prohibition of abortion; and for international development and Third 
World countries” (Archambault, 2001).  These broader issues dovetailed with the 
growing global nonprofit sector towards the end of the 1970s (Archambault, 2001; 
                                                
5 The original text reads, « Convention par laquelle deux ou plusieurs personnes mettent en commun, d’une 
façon permanente, leurs connaissances ou leurs activités dans un but autre que de partager des bénéfices. » 
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Werker & Ahmed, 2008), and encouraged a continued partnership between the 
government and the private sector.   
The 1980s witnessed a major shift for associations for a number of different 
reasons.  In 1981, a reform was passed that allowed immigrants to also create 
associations.  This was followed by the 1982 decentralization act that empowered local 
communities to act in their own interests, thus distributing the social responsibility of the 
government onto civil society.  There was a dramatic increase in the number of 
nonprofits created between 1960 and 1990—the number jumped from 16,000 to close to 
60,000 (Archambault, 2001).  The expansion of this right for migrants certainly 
contributed to the increase.  Research has shown that migrant organizations and their 
transnational connections are built most often by migrants who are more established in 
the country of resettlement (Caglar, 2006; Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003), although 
recent arrivals may often benefit from such associations.  Migrant associations opened up 
new possibilities for community building and expanding collective agency within France. 
This was particularly significant for the Muslim population in France.  As an example of 
the impact, one study did a survey of sixty-six Islamic associations, two of which were 
created between 1960-1969, eleven between 1970-1979, and 53 between 1980 and 1991 
(Kastoryano & Diop, 1991).   The goals of these organizations ranged from strengthening 
political representation to religious gatherings.  Unfortunately, such organizations, both 
cultural and religious in nature, were met with a large amount of suspicion and outright 
hostility as anti-republican and an impediment to integration within the French state 
(Hamidi, 2003).  Those with anti-immigrant politics saw organizations created by 
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immigrants “as places where immigrants stick together, develop bonds with each other 
apart from the rest of society, and as places that foster communitarianism rather than 
integration” (Hamidi, 2003).  The awkward relationship between the state and these 
immigrant associations manifests itself in different ways, whether via the overemphasis 
of their adherence to French values, or in their difficulty in obtaining state funding.   
Certain linguistic or political dances are required to be seen as good French 
citizens while maintaining group membership rights.  For example, one of the board 
members of the federation Plateforme des Associations Franco-Haïtiennes (PAFHA, I 
will go into more detail later in this chapter), Vladimir Lessage explained his decision to 
change the name of his association, ARCHE.  ARCHE originally stood for Association 
Religieuse et Culturelle d’Haiti et son Environment (Religious and cultural association of 
Haiti and her environment.) Vladimir explained that he had difficulty obtaining funding 
from government entities because, “they would see the word “religious,” point and say, 
what is this?”  He then changed the words to Association pour le Rayonnement Culturel 
d'Haïti et de son Environnement (Association for the spread of Haitian culture and her 
environment), strategically changing the words while keeping his acronym “brand.” 
Although Vladimir was comfortable using tactics to maximize his chances of 
funding, few associations actually manage to secure outside monetary resources.  
Associations are strictly dependent on member support, either through member fees, 
private donations, or volunteers.  Funding was the primary concern for every association 
I spoke to.  Lindsay and Hems report that although public funding makes up close to 60% 
of total funding for associations, “less than 1% of the 880,000 associations in France 
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receive 43% of this public funding” (Lindsay & Hems, 2004).  There was some money 
available through local government (mayoral) offices, but generally successful proposals 
occurred in cities already aware of and engaged with their populations’ needs.  For 
Haitians located in the surrounding suburbs such as Saint-Denis, Massy-Palaiseau, 
Argenteuil, Aubervilliers, or Cergy, local governments were more likely to offer small 
grants.  This was especially true following the earthquake.  The following section will 
delve into the specifics of Haitian presence in France, and the ideological and political 
context in which they organize.  
HAITIAN EXPERIENCES IN FRANCE 
Every last Friday of the month, Maison d’Haiti (Haiti House) would host an event 
open to the public.  Sometimes it was a film screening, other times it featured a guest 
speaker or a roundtable on a provocative topic.  This one particular Friday, the event was 
a discussion on the role of Haitians in French history.  I arrived fairly early, and sat by 
myself waiting for others to show so the program could begin.  Since many of the guests 
are regulars, my presence was fairly remarkable, and I wasn’t surprised when a woman in 
her mid-30s approached me, curious.  She introduced herself as Marlene, opened the 
conversation up with, “I don’t think I’ve seen you here before, where are you from?”  I 
gave her my rehearsed spiel, saying that I was a New Yorker student of Haitian origin 
(“étudiante newyorkaise d’origine haïtienne”), and she lit up immediately: “I lived in 
New York!”   
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With very little prompting from me, Marlene told me her story, as if nearly 
desperate for someone to hear it.  She was born in Haiti, but left when she was 8 for 
France with her parents.  She spent from ages 8-17 in France.  She told me how much she 
loved it.  When her father, who was working in Africa with UNESCO, lost his job they 
decided to move to New York.  She acquired US citizenship, completed the rest of her 
education in the States, getting her Masters and Doctorate degrees in French and Spanish 
from CUNY Graduate School, and then taught at CUNY Queens, Hunter, and Hofstra.  
Marlene hated her time in New York though, always feeling like she never fit in.  
Haitians in New York rejected her, one reason being she only spoke French (never 
learned Haitian Creole) so they thought her bourgeoise6.  She was tired of people hearing 
her accent and asking, where are you from?  Knowing she would never be able to 
integrate, she decided to go back to France, remembering fondly her experiences there.  
Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that she’d lived in France for over 8 years, she could no 
longer claim French citizenship and needed to start at the bottom in the process.  Her lack 
of papers made her life as equally difficult as it had been in the States.  She wasn’t able to 
obtain an apartment, and had been living in state-sponsored “hotels” that provided 
emergency shelter for those who were lucky.  Luck was relative, however, and Marlene 
described the condition of these hotels, repulsed by the broken toilets, roaches, and dirty, 
co-ed shower stalls.  Although she felt much more comfortable socially to be in France, 
                                                
6 Language is extremely marked in Haiti.  The two official languages of the nation are French and Haitian 
Creole, but linguistics have long described the relationship between the two as “diglossic,” where the 
language that is most widely spoken is given less prestige than the other.  Being fluent in French implies 
that you had enough money to afford a great education, and only speaking French may give others the 
impression that you are flaunting your privilege.   
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she was excluded from full participation in the public sphere due to her lack of 
citizenship.  She was at the Maison d’Haiti hoping to develop a relationship with 
someone who might be able to give her a job, thus opening up a path towards citizenship. 
Marlene’s story contains several elements of the more common experiences of 
Haitians who settle in France: a French-heavy socialization, difficulty connecting with 
other Haitians, a complicated relationship with the United States, some form of exclusion 
in France.  There is little opportunity for any migrant group in France to develop parallel 
nationalisms (i.e., Haitian-American), or social or cultural identifications (i.e., Black) 
without ideologically rejecting French national identity.  France proudly proclaims itself 
a republican and universalist nation-state, implying that it is color-blind and anti-
communitarian.  Any claims to non-French identity or membership in an ethnic or 
religious community run in opposition to the dominant paradigms of France.  These 
identities can be read as a form of resistance to a unified national identity, particularly in 
France, where hybrid identities or explicit racial and ethnic identities (and the 
communities built around them) are heavily frowned upon, if not directly undermined by 
law or public policy.  Of course, this does not prevent such claims from being asserted, 
but when one does, it can create tensions both within the individual (e.g., where do I 
belong) and within society (e.g., where does his/her allegiance lay). 
The development of the cultural and political subjectivities of Haitian immigrants 
and their descendants can offer interesting insights into how exclusionary national 
identity and restrictive state practices shape the possibilities of identity and community 
formation.  These possibilities are shaped by the histories of the countries of origin and 
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settlement and their bilateral relationship.  They are also an outcome of the present 
moment of transnationality that has been facilitated by advances in technology and 
increased migration.  People have been able to manage a wide range of identities that 
cross space and time, and can be even contradictory.  Identity politics not only plays a 
key role in the decision to participate (or not to) in an organization, but also shapes other 
kinds of practices that reflect the extent of their integration or exclusion in their 
environment.  
The Historical Role of Haitians in France  
It is with great difficulty that one traces the impact of an event of such 
significance as the Haitian revolution in French history.  The work of anthropologists 
Roger Bastide, Francoise Morin, and Francois Raveau is testament to that fact.  In their 
ethnography on the Haitian community in France (1974), the first of its kind, they 
explicitly state that it is migrants who change, and not French culture.  They establish a 
continuum of this acculturation, arguing that Haitians serve as an intermediary group 
between Africans who retain most of their culture and Antilleans who have been reduced 
to a “folk” version of their African ancestry (Bastide, Morin, and Raveau 1974).  The 
scholars hypothesize that  
 
Haitians should permit us to better understand at once the nature of culture shocks 
(since it comes from a mixed culture, that will respond in a manner different from 
a pure culture, or those from transitioning societies) and the nature of shocks that 
we can say are racial, but would be better called colorism (since we will find 
ourselves in the presence of a range of blood mixtures (1974: 12, my translation).   
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A number of observations can be drawn from their analysis.  The scholars 
acknowledge but trivialize Haiti’s history, focusing merely on the civilizing impact that 
France had on Haitian culture.  Second, they reject an analysis of race and racial 
construction in favor of focusing on the biological/phenotypical differences amongst the 
different Black populations as a better indicator of the types of experiences immigrants 
will encounter.  Third, they essentialize Antillean, Haitian, and African culture and their 
communities and place them on a vertical scale in relationship to each other, implicitly 
supporting the effects of creolization.  Their arguments are particularly surprising given 
that they drew on Fanon and Cesaire to support their thesis yet did so with little critical 
analysis.  In quoting Fanon (2008), for example, the authors focus on how Antilleans are 
discriminated against because of their color, but they do not interrogate what “color” 
signifies.  Black communities in France are merely victimized by some ambiguous hatred 
and at a loss because of their incremental physical and cultural distance from their true 
origins. 
The method of analysis used in the ethnography on Haitians in France is not the 
exception, but rather representative of the ways in which the more problematic aspects of 
French history are turned on their head and re-packaged so that France disappears in the 
background as an innocent party.  For example, France attempted in 2005 to pass a law 
that would mandate schools to teach the “positive aspects of colonization”(Henley 2005).  
To teach colonialism in a positive light would deny the struggles by Black people to 
fashion their subjectivity apart from Western modernity.  Rather, it becomes a debate 
around how well ex-colonials treated the French gift of civilization.  This is clearly seen 
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in the media aftermath following the 2010 Haitian earthquake.  The French public 
engaged in polarizing debates, asking if France owed Haiti following a particularly 
devastating colonial and post colonial history after having become the first Black republic 
in the world, or even whether the country deserved aid given its continuous history of 
political and economic strife.  These discourses of restitution or merit reflect France’s 
racial ambivalence (Hale 2006; Bhabha 1994) towards Haiti and the Haitian diaspora, 
revealing an inability to address the particular experiences of exclusion and invisibility 
for Haitian migrants, and a broader struggle with its national identity as a former empire 
and now a color-blind multicultural state (Bonilla-Silva 2009).  Furthermore, the debate 
reveals how Haitians, multiply positioned as ex-colonial, poor, politically corrupt, and 
Black, can easily be marginalized or excluded as unlikely or unworthy citizens. 
It is important to recognize that “historical relevance does not proceed directly 
from the original impact of an event, or its mode of inscription, or even the continuity of 
that inscription” but rather the ways in which history is unearthed or revisited can reveal 
underlying operations of power that inform current day debates (Trouillot, 1997: 10).  
Racial discourses in France have been invariably shaped by the Haitian revolution, even 
if this impact can only be read in its silencing.  Most notably, the Négritude movement 
was heavily influenced by the Haitian revolution and the Haitian scholar Jean Price-Mars, 
who sought to affirm Haiti’s African roots and criticized the Eurocentric attitudes and 
behavior of the elite.  Negritude theorizing emerged in the 1930s, led by Francophone 
Antilleans Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas, and Léopold Senghor from Senegal, West 
Africa.  Negritude was a cultural response to a sense of alienation and fragmentation that 
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emerged from France’s policy of cultural assimilation (Lewis 2006). This policy is 
related to the ideology of French republicanism, which is premised on the political and 
cultural unity of the state. France permitted anyone (in theory, at least) to become French 
citizens, provided that they became culturally French as well. This in itself was premised 
on the belief of the superiority of the French (and Western) culture and civilization. The 
Negritude movement, in turn, celebrated African civilization, and sought to re-establish a 
black identity while rejecting cultural assimilation (Lewis 2006; Munro 2004; Wilder 
2009). Haiti served as an inspiration for (psychological) revolt and identity, particularly 
for the Martinican Césaire and the Guyanese Damas. Césaire asserts Haiti as where 
“Negritude first stood up” (Césaire & Breton, 1939: 24), referring to the Haitian 
revolution. Moreover, the 1915-1934 American occupation of Haiti helped foment a 
major literary and artistic proliferation around “Haitianism”—Haitian cultural pride—that 
heavily influenced the Antillean scholars (Munro 2004). Damas, for one, was profoundly 
influenced by Price-Mars.  As cited by Munro, “Damas concludes that Negritude is not 
an introverted, racially exclusive movement, but has essentially universality aims, and 
that it owes this fundamental aspect of its vision ultimately to Price-Mars” (Munro, 2004: 
6). Haiti, thus, set a precedent for Black cultural pride that inspired generations.  
In France, however, race and racism continue to be a contentious subject, let alone 
any discussion of Black pride.  Although I tried to discuss race with Haitians, the 
conversation was often dismissed because I was an American, and therefore unnaturally 
“obsessed” with race, which didn’t apply to people in France.  I therefore rarely discussed 
race or racial consciousness with my research participants.   
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Interestingly, I did manage to discuss race in France with non-Haitians.  In fact, 
my first hour in France was colored (pun intended) by an act of racial solidarity.  I was in 
line at customs in Charles de Gaulle airport, when someone tried to cut the line in front of 
me.  A woman I’d never met before defended me against this person by grabbing my arm 
and pulling me forward, telling the person “she’s my cousin.”  That moment of clear 
racial solidarity, given that we were the only two Black women in the line, made her 
intriguing and we exchanged contact information to meet up later.  Aurélie was born in 
Cameroon but mainly lived in the United States and France, switching countries every 
few years.  She kept saying how hard it is to be in France as a foreigner and as a black 
person.  She’d struggled to get a job because her post-secondary education was in the 
States, and therefore employers discriminated against her.  Furthermore, because it is 
customary on a French resume to place a photo, she felt that her skin color was another 
strike against her. Her frankness and insistence surprised me—she clearly had a difficult 
time adjusting in France.  Indeed others, when prodded, would readily share such 
instances of racial discrimination, but it was understood only in terms of racism, 
generally divorced from racial identity—a racism without race (Mullings, 2005).  
I met a journalist at an SOS Racisme event name Max.  SOS Racisme is the most 
well-known anti-racism organization in France.  When Max heard what I was 
researching, he invited me for coffee and offered me a hefty helping of his opinion on the 
anti-racist movements in France.  He was particularly critical of SOS Racisme as an 
association that is a politician factory, citing the example of Harlem Desir, a former 
president of SOS Racisme who eventually became a member of the European Parliament 
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for the Socialist Party of France.  SOS Racisme did little to advance what Max felt was 
necessary in France—a serious engagement with multiculturalism and cultural diversity, 
a phrase he used over and over again.  It isn’t about race, he argued, but the history of 
groups of people that was jettisoned through colonization.  He preferred not to think 
about present inequality as built off of racism or colonization, because then it doesn’t 
allow people to take responsibility for their future.  Instead, Max felt that we should be 
able to talk about the past, present, and future simultaneously.  This conversation was 
certainly much deeper than average, but even in its depth, it revealed the anxiety and 
discomfort many in France have to discuss race without seeming racist.  There is a fear of 
moving backwards, or perhaps more appropriately, not moving past the past, that 
precludes discussions around race and racism, as well as gender and sexism.  
 Invisibility and Exclusion 
In correlation with state exclusion, Haitians in many instances have chosen to 
remain an invisible community, for various reasons, and with various consequences.  For 
example, I spoke to one informant who was a professional dance artist, who had moved 
from Haiti to France in the 1980s.  He had worked the performance circuit and now 
worked at a dance studio in Seine St. Denis.  He explained to me a fellow Haitian had 
approached him and asked him to participate in a business venture that required some 
money.  The dance artist lent him a large sum, which was never to be seen again.  He told 
me, “I don’t deal with Haitians anymore, bunch of crooks!”  I met others who offered 
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stories with similar themes of betrayal and distrust of all Haitians, and their active 
decision not to associate with other Haitians.   
Conversely, incoming migrants with no family or friend connections in France 
were at a loss to find other Haitians to help them adjust to French society and 
bureaucracy.  Unless they were fortunate to be put in contact with René Benjamin, newly 
arrived migrants were left to find their own support and resources.  In a conversation I 
struck up in a music store, I met Gerald who told me it had taken him 2 years before he 
found Pegguy, the storeowner.  Gerald had had to navigate the hostile French 
bureaucracy on his own.  Once he found Pegguy, Gerald was finally able to meet other 
Haitians.  Pegguy, told me, “It’s hard to find one Haitian, but once you find one, you can 
find them all.”  This reality can be quite isolating for new arrivals looking for support and 
resources.  Haitian self-imposed invisibility is also structurally supported by the 
ideologically republican-based French state, which makes it difficult for immigrants in 
general to carve out their own space.  
The difficulty to create space can also create a situation in which the spaces that 
do exist are heavily protected.  I would qualify Pegguy’s comment and say that once you 
found one Haitian, you may indeed find all of them, but you might also be discouraged 
from fraternizing with one group over another.  The kinds of cleavages that were formed 
often reproduced the similar kinds of class, color, and religious divisions that existed in 
Haiti.  For example, although I made a deliberate decision to focus on those active in 
hometown associations, this decision was made extremely easy by the fact that religious 
and secular groups didn’t often mix.  People in the association network did remark on 
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how they tried to draw church communities to their events through internal networking or 
via promotion on the radio, but it was rare to see that kind of crossover.  The membership 
demographic of an association would also reveal certain levels of power and access that 
came out in uncomfortable ways, that I will discuss later on in this chapter.  
The experiences of Haitians students are another subject of discussion since they 
made up a significant percentage of the overall Haitian population in France.  Due to my 
age and having attended Paris X in 2006 during my study abroad, I was able to meet a 
number of young Haitians who were in Paris on a student visa.  Their perspectives on 
France were varied.  A few were enjoying their stay in Paris and had a desire to remain a 
little longer to at least work for a few years.  A much larger number, I must admit, could 
not wait to take the next plane back to Haiti, or at the very least the United States.  One 
26-year-old male law student wanted to be able to enact real change for his people back 
in Haiti, and maybe go into politics.   He also complained of being desperate to find a 
Haitian woman to date, since those in France had no desire to date Haitian men (but I 
suspect this statement was a cleverly disguised pick-up line as well). 
The ambivalence of these Haitian students can offer insight as to the apparent lack 
of a self-defined community of Haitians.  There is obviously the transitory nature of some 
of these students not born in France, whose stay is contingent on their ability to renew 
their visa; once expired, they must make the decision to stay under a work visa, go back 
to Haiti, or perhaps try their luck in the United States.  Those students that did want to 
stay however, acknowledged the opportunities they were offered in France that they 
would have never had access to had they stayed in Haiti.  For one older female student, 
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she told me there was no turning back, and that she was ready to settle down in France, in 
spite of the several incidences of racism that she had to personally deal with.  I did meet 
one young college student who had two Haitian immigrant parents but had been born in 
France, and felt very comfortable in France—in fact she loved it.  Because her parents 
never spoke Haitian Creole at home, nor did they talk about Haiti, her identity, she 
claimed, was more pan-African than anything, and even described her latest room re-
decoration that included a lot of earth tones and animal prints. 
While students are an oft-discussed population, there was also an interesting 
friction between Haitian artists and musicians and those in business, medicine, or other 
similar professions.  I spent a significant amount of time with the association Collectif 
2004 Images, an organization that sought to promote the artistic production and 
expression of Haitians, both in Haiti and in the diaspora.  I frequently attended plays, 
dance performances, and concerts that featured well-known Haitian artists such as Mimi 
Barthélémy and Erol Josué.  Larger, cultural events were attended by a wide swath of the 
community, but the general manager of the Collectif 2004 Images, Anne Lescot, would 
often complain of the detrimental attitude many had towards Haitian culture and artistic 
production:  “The Haitians in France don’t take art seriously.  They just use it to achieve 
their means.  They’ll play a Haitian movie in order to fundraise, but they won’t support 
the artist himself for the sake of his art.”   
Although I feel that it has proven difficult in all diasporic communities of 
Haitians to have a high level of engagement with arts and culture, I would argue that 
these cleavages and tendencies towards fracture broadly reflects the kind of community 
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(or more appropriately, the kinds of communities) that exists in France: one that is more 
focused on integration with the dominant society rather than historical memory and 
ethnocultural self-preservation.     Thus, collective memory appears to be almost entirely 
absent in comparison to other Haitian diasporic communities like Montreal.  In early 
summer of 2012, Elizabeth Yohn, a young graduate student who was doing her master’s 
thesis in History on the Haitian religious communities in Montreal and Paris contacted 
me.  Struggling to meet community members, she’d hoped I could help her find good 
contacts in Paris.  Over lunch, we swapped stories, sharing what we’d observed in our 
respective research.  In my fieldnotes about that meeting, I wrote:  
[Elizabeth] made this interesting point about how deeply important history was to 
the Quebec-Haitian population, in spite of there being a very limited 
history.  Many books and articles have been written on this history, in spite of it 
being light.  She expected there to be a similar relationship to history in France 
and was surprised when she discovered that there wasn't.  "History just doesn't 
matter to them," she said with a shrug.  And indeed, part of the reason for their 
absence in the literature on the Haitian diaspora was because of the lack of 
ownership over the history between France and the Haitian diaspora.  But the 
question is why, when [Haitian] history is so utterly important to Haitians, and 
when France is clearly a major player in Haitian history, is there so little interest 
in contemporary movements between the two countries?   (June 18, 2012) 
 
Perhaps it is not as Elizabeth states that “history just doesn’t matter,” but that, 
unlike Canada or the United States, there has not been the same amount of “space” made 
available for immigrants to weave their narratives in with the new nation’s narratives.  In 
a country that has actively sought to protect its national identity at all costs, there is little 
room or tolerance in France for other histories.  What makes the situation worse, 
however, is the notion that Haitians only have themselves to blame for this lack of 
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history.  Without the broader understanding of how immigration and development 
policies in France have shaped, and in some cases undermined, Haitian community 
formation, it can be easy to point fingers at one another.       
On a deeper level, the lack of cultural spaces and the inability (or lack of desire) 
to integrate keeps the Haitian population in a liminal state. Anthropologist Paul 
Brodwin’s work on Haitians in Guadeloupe is useful in getting a better sense of what 
may be happening in France.  He uses a model of diasporic subjectivity that is contingent 
on the people’s immediate environment and that “subject formation depends on processes 
of both exclusion and agency” (Brodwin, 2001).  As a result, Haitians migrants, including 
students, are often more interested in what is happening in Haiti than what is happening 
in Paris.  This observation is reinforced by the weekly Haitian radio show “Kon Lamby”, 
whose topics are quite often focused on Haiti, and report less often local news on 
Haitians living in France.  In the next section, I discuss how Haitian hometown 
associations are another important space and way for Haitians to mediate their exclusion 
by building a community based around being from the same city.   
HAITIAN HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT 
Haitian diaspora organizations have actively tried to come up with more 
sustainable solutions to help Haiti, moving beyond remittances while casting suspicion on 
international development agencies.  Haitians both within Haiti and living abroad have a 
fairly long history creating civil society organizations (M. Edwards, 2009), particularly 
cooperatives.  In Haiti, the first cooperative was established in 1937, a few years after the 
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end of the U.S. Occupation (Shaffer, 1999).  By 1973 there were 61 cooperatives, mainly 
in agriculture and microcredit, and by 1990, over 300.  These cooperatives were for the 
most part created by and within the Haitian peasantry (Marcelle Smith, 2001), and 
offered an alternative to the packaged American democracy that was pushed onto the 
Haitian government that has historically struggled to bridge the “state” and “nation” (the 
people) (Trouillot, 1989).  Outside of Haiti, organizations served in several capacities: as 
political platforms to address what was happening in Haiti at the time; as means to 
maintain social networks via hometown associations; as community builders; as social 
service organization for offering assistance to other Haitians; and as a media outlet for 
events occurring within Haiti and the diaspora (Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 2001; Laguerre, 
1998; Zephir, 1996).  Above all, such organizations served as the bridge between Haiti 
and their new country of settlement, regardless of the level of direct involvement with the 
home country.   
Many researchers have examined organizations created by those who have re-
settled in a new country, often musing on what makes a successful hometown association 
(Casseus-Eybalin, 2008; Howes, 1997; Orozco, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; 
Ramakrishnan & Viramontes, 2010; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; Schuller, 
2007a; Vertovec, 1999b).  Manuel Orozco, who carried out a study on Mexican 
hometown associations, cites the following criteria for organizational effectiveness: 
capacity building, organizational nature (how an organization is structured), partnership 
and collaborative capacity, long-term durability, and impact (Orozco, 2003).  Orozco’s 
list, while on target, does place the emphasis on the organizations themselves, and less on 
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the context in which they are acting.  It is not enough that an organization is able to 
develop a partnership with other institutions, but it must have the framework to be 
considered a legitimate partner in the first place.  Based on the particular struggles of 
Haitian hometown associations, I would add to this list “institutional framework,” that 
distributes the burden of success or failure to other actors that could have a significant 
impact, such as the host country.  Organizing in France or Europe requires a different 
relationship to the state and sources of funding than exists in the United States, which has 
a very strong private sector for funding small organizations.  In fact I argue that it is this 
difference that has undermined the development of a diasporic community, which in turn 
weakened the base upon which Haitians in France would be able to influence the tone or 
agenda.  Their silence is read as assent when in fact they do have particular concerns that 
are rendered invisible because of the dominance of the Haitian diaspora in North 
America.   
 In spite of not being necessarily as closely knit as other diasporic communities in 
North America, the Haitians in France generally had very few degrees of separation.  As 
one young male told me during one of my earlier fieldwork experiences, “Once you meet 
one Haitian, you meet them all!”  For Haitians involved in associational life, they are no 
exception.  The movers and shakers of the community were well known, from the ones 
who were the community's elders like Daniel Talleyrand, Nicole Tardivel, and René 
Benjamin, to those who were part of a younger generation (between 30 and 55 years of 
age) of activists.   
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Many associations have a social aspect built-in, often organizing social and 
cultural functions to raise money for projects in Haiti, such as building a school or 
sending supplies.  Social benefits and fundraisers are an important part of Haitian 
organizing, particularly for hometown associations, because outside funding is very 
difficult to obtain.  Based off of ethnographic fieldwork conducted from 2011-2012, the 
vast majority of associations are either self-funded—that is, the association leader puts 
his or her own personal money into funding a project—or are entirely reliant on 
membership fees and dues.  The next most popular source of funding is the local (French) 
government such as city halls.  The January 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti’s capital 
was a watershed moment for the Haitian diaspora in France, since it opened up never-
before-seen avenues and amounts of funding that permitted many associations to finally 
implement projects they’d had on the proverbial back burner for years.  This catastrophic 
event also motivated many to create new associations; According to the Journal Officiel 
d’Associations, the French government’s publication of creations, there was a 100% 
increase in the number of associations created with ties or projects in Haiti specify time 
frame7.    France was pushed to become heavily involved in giving recovery aid to Haiti.  
Their policy, which had shifted the year before, proved to be advantageous for 
associations, but in the context of their history, French development policy has not 
                                                
7 All associations are required to formally register with the state, and the state publishes this information in 
the Journal Officiel d’Associations.  I did a very basic keyword search of “Haiti*” and crosschecked in the 
descriptions that the organization was indeed working for or in Haiti.  Between 2000 and 2010, some 400 
organizations were created dedicated in some form or fashion to the Haitian community.  Presently there 
are around a hundred active Haitian hometown associations in France.   
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changed much, and the repercussions of this can be felt in the aftermath of the funding 
blitz.  This will be further discussed in the next chapter.   
My experiences within the network of Haitian associations interestingly traced the 
historical evolution of various important and lasting associations.  One of my first 
interactions with the Haitian community in Paris was visiting with René Benjamin, the 
president of Haïti Développment (HaiDev).  I had received his contact information from 
someone at the Haitian Embassy with an assurance that René was the person to speak to 
if I wanted to know more about Haitians in Paris.  I called him, made an appointment, 
and took the train down to his apartment in a southwest arrondissement of Paris.  When I 
got to the door, a younger woman greeted and ushered me into his living room, telling me 
to wait for René there.  Once she’d disappeared, I looked around the large living area, 
evidently used as both a den and a workspace.  A large table in the middle was covered 
with papers, and on the far wall was a small computer desk with a large monitor and 
more papers.  I’d barely had time to soak the scene in before he appeared behind me.  A 
short, slender, and spry light skinned man with a warm smile greeted me, sat me down, 
and pulled up a chair.  I stammered out my purpose for the visit: Could he tell me about 
the Haitian community in Paris?  Specifically, where were the Haitians?  (At age 20, my 
line of questioning was very basic.)  He was extremely welcoming and told me about his 
long-time experience in France and working with other Haitians in Paris.  He had come to 
France in the 1950s as a young man to study and worked for a very long time in 
finance.  Like many Haitians who travel abroad, he saw his time in France as temporary, 
and remained involved in Haiti through groups.  According to the testimonial published 
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upon his death in 2009, he created an organization in 1961 to encourage other students to 
remain active in Haitian politics and development (Andre, 2009).  Yet as the socio-
economic and political situation worsened in Haiti, more and more lower-middle and 
working-class poor Haitians began arriving in France.  Confused, I asked, how could 
poor Haitians afford to come to France?  How did they manage to get past airport security 
without the necessary paperwork?  He replied that families would often cobble together 
the money to buy the plane ticket over years.  Documents such as birth certificates and 
passports were also often forged.  Many Haitians would enter France under a legitimate 
visa and would face problems registering with the Office français de protection des 
réfugiés et apatrides (The French bureau for the protection of refugees and stateless 
persons, or OFPRA) because they would lack the appropriate paperwork.  Laughing, he 
told me one story of a man who used the same birth certificate of a member of his family, 
so he ended up being registered in France under a woman's name.  When it came time to 
renew, it was a mess because he needed to try to get a copy of his original birth certificate 
that is actually quite difficult to do since municipal governments don't always keep track 
of births.   
René realized that he needed to expand his mission beyond working with students 
to help less fortunate newcomers find their footing in France.  He created Haïti 
Développment to bridge the gap between the Haitian community and the French 
state.  René and volunteers would assist newly arrived Haitians with paperwork, and help 
them find housing and employment.  By the 1970s, René's organization was proving 
services for up to 2000 Haitians a year (Royal, 2010).  The French state recognized his 
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significant contribution and generally funded his association.  He had a special spot for 
young Haitian women who often struggled even more to obtain these basic 
necessities.  Following his wife's death he felt that it was a win-win situation to welcome 
at any given time two or three women into his home for nearly free lodging.  Sadly, as he 
grew older, René was not as able to keep up its mission.  By the time he passed in 2009, 
HaiDev was no longer doing the same work.    
Collectif Haïti de France 
In 1986, René founded the Collectif Haïti de France (The Collectif).  Concerned 
by the turmoil in Haiti following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Rene and others 
decided to bring together eighty organizations in a collective to address issues in Haiti 
particularly around human rights (“Historique du Collectif Haïti de France,” 2010).  As 
the situation in Haiti grew more precarious, especially with the election and subsequent 
ousting of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the collective grew and became an important 
space for Haitians and the French to come together and organize politically.  The 
Collectif quotes two longtime members on their site who described that time period: 
 
Jean Michel: After the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1991, the 
Collective had been very active.  The collective held meetings every week.  The 
idea quickly arose of helping those who, within Haiti, fought against the 
dictatorship, especially those trying to liberate the media.  The Collective decided 
to raise money to buy radio transmitters.  For a time, a clandestine radio was in 
operation in the Port -au-Prince. Such solidarity action required a lot of discipline 
and a partitioning within the Collective.  I participated in raising money for the 
radio. 
 
Bernard: In the early 90s, when I was in a long period of unemployment, I got 
involved with the collective in the creation of the Aisohaf (Aide et Soutien aux 
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Haïtiens de France, Help and Support for Haitians France) with l’Association des 
Etudiants Haïtiens de France (Association of Haitian Students of France), Gisti 
(Groupe d'information et de soutien aux émigrés, information and support for 
immigrant group) and Haïti Développment, to help new refugees to prepare their 
application for asylum. Cimade (an ecumenical social service organization that 
helps refugees and asylum seekers) let us use their office on rue de Grenelle 
where we treated 5,000 cases.  We held our drop-ins on Saturday morning. 
Information passed like wildfire in the community and those who need papers 
began lining up at five o'clock, like in Haiti! Street vendors were probably 
wondering what was going on!  
 
In general, Haitian associations during that time period were very 
politicized.  New arrivals were often young student activists who were frustrated by the 
political upheaval and economic deterioration of their beloved country.  Many had also 
intended to go back to Haiti, so it was in their best interest to strive for stabilization.  
Haitian diasporic communities globally were mobilizing and demanding justice. 
Etzer Charles, the former Haitian Ambassador in the United Nations for 
Education, Sciences, and Culture (UNESCO) and the former charge d'affaires d'Haïti en 
France, both in the 1990s, told me how, in response to a growing pressure from certain 
Haitian groups in Paris who were determined to see Aristide returned to office, occupied 
the Haitian embassy with his full blessing.  It was one of the most overt demonstrations 
by Haitians living in France. 
Aristide was finally allowed to return8 in 1994, but he was a very different 
man.  His return came with many conditions imposed by the United States and 
international donor organizations that influenced his administration's vision and 
action.  The situation in Haiti continued to face many hurdles, and thus Collectif Haïti de 
                                                
8 This permission being granted not by Haitian authorities, but by American authorities; an indication of 
how thoroughly Haitian sovereignty was undermined. 
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France in the late 1990s decided to expand their focus from human rights and government 
accountability to development.  The Collectif thus began to assist other organizations in 
their achieving their projects.  This put them on their current path, where the Collectif 
today functions as a federation of associations across France organizing in support of 
Haiti.  Their mission is to put organizations in touch with each other in order to create a 
broad base from which members could draw support and potentially collaborate on their 
projects.  According to their website, their main objectives are to "inform, organize, 
support, advocate, and collaborate"(“Historique du Collectif Haïti de France,” 2010).   
The organization today boasts eighty member associations and 150 individuals and 
continues to grow and be active in Haiti. 
La PAFHA 
The Plateforme des Associations Franco-Haïtiennes (PAFHA) was a 2002 
offshoot of the Collectif.  René was actually the first president of the organization, where 
he stayed for two years.  The goal of PAFHA was very similar to that of Collectif Haïti 
de France, to create space for organizations to come together in cooperation.  PAFHA 
however wanted to bring awareness to the role of Haitian associations in France, and 
increase their visibility within the Haitian diasporic community in France.   
PAFHA’s main event is the Journée des Portes Ouvertes, which was inaugurated 
in 2003.  The event was conceived of as a way to help Haitians and non-Haitians alike 
discover the work of organizations based in France working in and on Haiti.  The day-
long “open house” also features discussion panels, performances, a book salon and art 
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gallery, music, and food.  Also every year, PAFHA sets up a booth at the annual French 
culture and music festival, Fête de l’Humanité.  The three-day long event has 
Woodstock-like (or Austin City Limits-like) atmosphere, with a couple of stages for live 
music, tents for holding debates, and hundreds of booths set up in the middle for 
organizations.  The Fête is a major fundraising opportunity for PAFHA, and they focus 
on selling Haitian food, drink (various kinds of arranged rum), and souvenirs, all while 
blasting konpa music.   
Throughout the year, PAFHA also holds other events that are geared towards 
knowledge sharing.  Known as Journées d’education, or Days of Education, a member 
association of would put together a discussion panel on a topic of interest, inviting 
outside speakers to offer different perspectives and advice.  Past topics included working 
with architectural firms and the role of the diaspora in Haiti’s higher education.  These 
Days provided an opportunity for associations (members and non-members) to network 
amongst each other, or brainstorm new ideas for projects.  In 2011, PAFHA piloted their 
first training aimed at providing technical support for projects based in Haiti.  The 
training was held both in Haiti and France, in order to improve the chances of securing 
funding and to set expectations with those in both countries about the proposal, 
execution, creation of a budget, and evaluation of a project.  This was necessary because 
often the difficulty in working transnationally from France was that those entrusted with 
the project locally didn’t always have the knowledge or resources to follow certain 
protocols (such as having a separate bank account to keep track of expenses or keeping 
records of communication) that are required when one is operating as a nonprofit.  
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Conversely, many in France didn’t always know the best procedures to follow.  It is 
relatively easy to create an organization, but not evident how to keep one in operation, 
and the trainings were a way to mediate this.  They were extremely well received in both 
countries.      
Particularly in 2010 and 2011, there was often talk of mutualisation, or the 
sharing of goods, services, equipment, lodging, etc to maximize their utility and cost-
benefit.  The president of PAFHA, Gary Fleurimont, was sensitive to the tendency 
towards individuality amongst hometown associations.  He saw PAFHA as an 
opportunity to “mutualize” the efforts of disparate organizations that could otherwise 
flounder without greater support.  General consensus from PAFHA members was that the 
federation provided a much-needed space for them to operate within.  Membership 
certainly did not guarantee success, but it created a small community that was otherwise 
difficult to find if one was not a member of a religious organization.   
INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
PAFHA as a federation was deemed necessary by those with associations, yet 
PAFHA readily admits the difficulty faced in its creation.  PAFHA writes plainly on their 
website: 
 
A long period of exchanging ideas was necessary to create the conditions for 
mutual recognition between the association partners. Too much mistrust and 
prejudices have hampered previous experiences. We had to try to dissipate power 
on a sounder footing.  
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I often heard from PAFHA’s president Fleurimont similar language, an admission 
of feeling a combination of frustration and hope that many in the associative life express 
at some point. One of the most common themes of discussion at association gatherings 
was what was “wrong” with Haitians.  The list often included being only interested in 
social events (as opposed to more culturally-oriented events); wanting free food or money 
without having to “work” for it, or; preferring to create a new organization rather than 
work with (and by their estimation, for) another one. There were also other less 
judgmental responses.  For example, Roosevelt stated that the main two problems of the 
Haitian community was the fear of being Haitian and the lack of intergenerational 
dialogue.  Often criticized (or at least pitied) by the media, various governments, even by 
history, many Haitian nationals often internalized these comments and parroted them 
back as fact.  It was easy to enter into this self-deprecation, tempered only by prideful 
references to the Haitian revolution.  This bipolar engagement with Haitians and Haitian 
identity fosters an environment of shame, and parents may be less inclined to encourage 
Haitian cultural identification within their children.  More broadly, this arguably 
undermines community building in an environment that already is hostile to expressions 
of non-French nationalism.  
Another internal issue that was openly acknowledged was the differences in the 
class and color makeup between the associations.  Early Haitian migration patterns to 
France favored the middle and upper class, and then later the working class become more 
present.  The division between the classes is reflected in the association factions.   
Collectif Haïti de France from the beginning had established connections with French 
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individuals who were invested in some capacity in Haiti.  The close collaboration 
between Haitians and the French led to a diverse organization that was often (and is 
currently) headed by white French persons.  The Collectif also gathers associations from 
across France, whereas the vast majority of Haitians settle in the department of Ile-de-
France in which Paris is located.  PAFHA, on the other hand, is vastly made up of 
Haitians whose dates of settlement ranged from the 1950s to only a few years 
ago.  Members are also solidly middle-class, often from central and southern Haiti.  This 
difference came across quite visually when I attended their respective general assemblies 
(meetings held annually for all members).  After having been around and volunteered at 
PAFHA for quite some time, I had taken for granted that people looked like me, that is, 
darker skinned.  When I attended the Collectif's general assembly, I was actually taken 
aback by the number of white French and lighter-skinned Haitians present; I hadn't 
expected the difference to be so stark. While there are many other factors for the various 
rates of success or failures among associations, at least one person expressed his opinion 
that the higher rates of success among member associations of the Collectif might be tied 
to race.  Alexandre Fleurime, president of UniVers Haiti and member of PAFHA, mused 
that because many of the organizations are headed by white French people, they might be 
perceived as more trustworthy by French and international donors, and thus able to obtain 
more money.   
The capacity to obtain financing and have a successful association (in that a 
project was executed) can be seen as a marker of one’s own worth as a Haitian national, 
as a “diaspora,” and even as a professional.  Hometown associations often represent more 
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than simply a desire to “give back” and invest time in Haiti.  Often the association was 
merely an extension of one's cultural (and to a lesser extent, social) capital.  Bourdieu 
defines cultural capital as individual embodiment of "external wealth" (e.g., culture, 
education).  Cultural capital can be linked to an institution (in for example the case of a 
university degree), thus creating the possibility for conversion into economic 
capital.   Social capital on the other hand is the “credit” earned from the resources 
acquired from membership in a group (Bourdieu, 1986).  Unlike cultural capital, the latter 
is based on the building of a network.  Arguably Haitians desire to acquire cultural capital 
because it offers them a route to prestige that can be as easily recognizable as a university 
degree. 
This is something that is particular to France in comparison to the United 
States.  I discussed this with Raymond Kernizan, president of the Groupe de réflexion et 
d’action pour une Haïti-Nouvelle (Reflection and Action Group for a New Haiti, 
GRAHN)-France.  Raymond had the unique experience of having moved about a great 
deal.  He has lived in Canada, the US (Miami), the Netherlands, and France.  He'd been 
in the Netherlands for quite some time before his job had transferred him to France, 
where he has been for the past decade.  He'd left Haiti when he was young, realizing that 
he wasn't going to get what he wanted from the country, and he left with no intentions of 
returning to live.  In France, he was never really integrated into the Haitian activist 
movements of the late 90s.  He knew the movers and shakers, but had been so busy with 
work that it made it difficult to participate more.  When he'd finally decided to create an 
association, partnering with various Haitians internationally, he knew he wanted it to be 
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different from other kinds of associations by the breadth of their vision.  According to 
Raymond, associations tend to have local, small projects, and the Groupe de réflexion et 
d'action pour une Haïti nouvelle (Group of reflection and action for a new Haiti, or 
GRAHN) was about large projects that addressed the systematic issues in Haiti.  
Raymond gave me his opinion on why creating organizations matters in France, more 
than in the United States: 
 
In France, success here is about the size of your library, how many books you 
have in your house, how many books you've published.  In the United States it's 
about the cars and the house.  You can literally see your success.  All you have to 
do is point to the large SUV in your driveway.  The US and Canada are much 
more materialistic, and that is made possible by the kinds of salaries that one is 
able to get there compared to France. You can barely make anything in France, 
the doctor barely makes more money that a government official.  You have to 
show your success in other ways, by writing a book, or being the president of an 
association. 
 
The prestige that comes from being head of your own organization can be just as 
readily understood as having a university degree.  In a conversation with Vladimir 
Boereau, he stated that people respect you when you present your business card, and the 
title says “president.”  It gives you more credibility when meeting with potential 
funders.  Yet I would argue that a focus on cultural, and not social, capital is detrimental 
to the associative community as a whole.  This is not to say that social capital isn't being 
generated, but the lack of attention in cultivating the necessary networks that give capital 
its “credit”, and the dilution of the network with “presidents” without care given to 
collaboration and cooperation is overall detrimental to the Haitian diaspora in 
France.  Bourdieu advises the reader,  
 118 
 
If the internal competition for the monopoly of legitimate representation of the 
group is not to threaten the conservation and accumulation of the capital which is 
the basis of the group, the members of the group must regulate the conditions of 
access to the right to declare oneself a member of the group and, above all, to set 
oneself up as a representative (delegate, plenipotentiary, spokesman, etc.) of the 
whole group, thereby committing the social capital of the whole group (Bourdieu, 
1986).   
 
Sound advice, but arguably one of the main issues for those that wanted to be 
considered leaders and organizers in the Haitian community was that they were reluctant 
to share such power and influence, and thus undermined as a whole their influence.  The 
question then becomes, why is it that in so many cases among Haitian associations, 
personal prestige and influence has taken precedence over the collective benefit?   
This is neither an easy question to address, nor one that could produce a simple, 
clear-cut answer.   The factors that appear to matter the most are class and history.  Class 
divisions make up a large part of the foundation of Haitian society.  Class is often talked 
about in the elite bourgeoisie versus the “people”—the farmers, the merchants, the day 
laborers, etc.  There is however a small middle class in Haiti that aspires to be (or 
consider themselves a part of) the elite in Haiti, although they do not possess nearly the 
same amount of capital.   The produces a problematic mentality where the middle class 
identifies more with the elites than it does with the working class and poor.  Structures of 
solidarity among Haitian farmers are well known and have existed since the country’s 
birth—konbits, or collective work groups, are considered the bedrock of Haitian society.  
One is hard pressed to find similar networks of solidarity among the middle class, and 
among the elite, whatever solidarity exists it is to maintain power and wealth generally at 
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the expense of their fellow less-fortunate countrymen.  Therefore class mentality is a 
major factor in analyzing community action amongst Haitians, and contributed to some 
of the internal and external conflicts in organizations.   
Conflicts are a normal part of human interaction, and can be a source of 
information about broader, underlying issues that exist within a network.  This was 
exemplified in the fallout between the Collectif Haïti de France and PAFHA.  The 
Collectif was actually a member of PAFHA even though PAFHA was an offshoot of the 
former.  However this wasn't always clear in how the organizations interacted with each 
other.  The Collectif saw itself as a partner, not a member.    A rupture occurred in 2011 
between the two organizations, the details of which I learned second hand.  Essentially it 
involved a lack of clarity and communication as to who was responsible for running the 
association training program, put into place that summer.  There were back and forth 
emails sent that resulted in the Collectif Haïti de France walking away, although 
PAFHA’s reaction was more baffled than annoyed.  These kinds of inter-association 
tensions were really unfortunate since it only served to reinforce factionalism while 
losing sight of the broader goal of community building.   
Conflicts also existed between the member organizations and the structure of 
PAFHA.  Many associations resented being part of PAFHA, claiming that it rendered 
them invisible and that the PAFHA functioned too much like its own organization rather 
than being a kind of network.  This was part of the confusion when PAFHA received 
their first major grant in 2010 from the Fondation de France.  The president of PAFHA 
Gary told me that a lot of the organizations assumed that the money would be re-
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distributed amongst the member organizations.  When it became clear that that was not to 
happen, many became irate with PAFHA and accused them of a lack of transparency and 
of being in competition with their respective organization.  This was more a result of the 
lack of information and education about how organizations function, and the legal 
constraints an organization may face when given a grant, but this knowledge did not 
make communication any easier between parties.     
Members did their best to fulfill PAPAFHA’s mission of encouraging 
collaboration and skills sharing between organizations, but this was easier said than done.  
Josette Bruffaerts-Thomas, president of Haïti Futur, told me about having met two 
people working on two schools not even a mile from one another.  She had tried to put 
them into contact with one another, but they never followed through, and both projects 
were incomplete because, according to Bruffaerts-Thomas, neither person was willing to 
give up being the project leader.    
During a period of restructuring in 2009, PAFHA decided to try a number of 
strategies to address the lack of cohesion and full participation.  They increased the board 
member size to 13, in order to give the core participating organizations a vote.  They also 
created new positions within the organization, in order to increase accountability amongst 
the members.  Everyone on the board was given a title of “vice-president” of a specific 
committee, whether it was international relations, social events, or community 
development.  This was a blatant attempt to give members a sense of importance and 
place within the organization, but also empower them to act on behalf of not only their 
personal organization, but the Federation as well.  Many of the board members had 
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business cards, ordered through PAFHA, that on one side, listed their vice-president title 
and on the other their own organization, where their title was usually president. The 
business card embodied their dual role within the Federation, but could also been seen as 
a literal representation of the challenge to be in one role without sacrificing the visibility 
of the other.   
Many board members felt that their own organizations were suffering because 
they were spending so much time on work for PAFHA.  Roosevelt, staff at PAFHA 
admitted to me, “We have too many meetings, at least 2 per week, and so people get 
really tired.  They spend a lot of time at PAFHA.”  Even PAFHA’s president’s 
association, Embarquons pour Haïti, was suffering, virtually inactive because of his 
investment in the federation.  This imbalance was a frequent topic of conversation during 
meetings.  Many members were strapped for time and could only attend so many events, 
and would often prioritize PAFHA events over those put together by the member 
organizations.  Organization leaders felt that it was only fair to expect support from other 
members.  Location was a big factor—many organizations were located in various 
suburbs of Paris, often an hour or more by train, whereas PAFHA headquarters was in the 
Monmartre neighborhood.  The unmet expectation of supporting each other’s events 
contributed to the tensions between members whose organizations were struggling to find 
funding.   
The model of the federation also presented an issue, given that it was almost 
entirely run by volunteers with the exception of Roosevelt, who was part-time, and 
Regine, a program coordinator whose position was made possible by the grant awarded 
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by the Fondation de France.  The burden this presented is made clear in the planning of 
the Journée des Portes Ouvertes (JPO) in 2012.  In June, members of the PAFHA were 
becoming increasingly stressed in planning the upcoming July open house.   The French 
government had recently given PAFHA the ability to hire two interns.  PAFHA decided 
to assign one intern to work on the JPO since it was the organization’s main event and 
took a large amount of planning and preparation.  Most of the other members, unpaid 
professionals with day jobs, could not spare the time necessary to put together the event, 
so generally the burden of responsibility fell onto the president, Gary, and Roosevelt, one 
of the two paid staff members of the organization.  That day, Roosevelt was particularly 
overwhelmed with the amount of work that needed to get done.  Apparently because 
PAFHA had an intern this year to work exclusively on the JPO, the rest of the member 
associations (namely, those on the board of PAFHA) took a back seat, less involved than 
the previous year.  Roosevelt said,  
 
See, if I could have the associations take care of certain activities, say, you are in 
charge of the roundtable discussion, you are in charge of the food, it would mean 
a whole lot less work for us.  But what happens, they assume because we have 
salaries, they [the Board] no longer need to work, so we [paid staff] are doing 
twice the amount of work than we did last year, and no one is responding to 
emails. 
 
He continued to vent his frustration, explaining to me:  
 
We are always in emergency mode.  We don't think long-term.  That's a major 
problem at PAFHA, people don't ever sit down to think about what they are 
doing, where they are going.  People say that I get involved too easily, but 
because we are always in mode urgence, we aren't able to take advantage of other 
opportunities because we aren't in the loop.  
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I then asked Roosevelt what it meant to work at PAFHA.  It was clear he had 
thought a lot about the question, and identified several things he would change about the 
way it was governed.  He also had a lot to say regarding the associations themselves, 
namely asking, “What is an association without a project?"   He continued:  
 
The difference between PAFHA and CHF [Collectif Haïti de France] is that 
PAFHA, people often need help with their projects themselves, they come to 
PAFHA with a more personal agenda, and don't have the capacities 
themselves.  At CHF, people already have their proper projects in place, and they 
come to CHF with the goal to mutualize their projects, learn from other 
associations. 
 
This issue was something I was able to witness firsthand while volunteering at 
PAFHA.  One day I happened to be present for a meeting between Roosevelt and a 
woman who was looking for help with her proposal in order to find funding for her 
project.  As I listened in, I gathered that she was either trying to financially support a 
school or specifically launch a food program in that school, but it was clear that the 
woman had not thought of some of the more critical parts of her project such as cost and 
where the food would come from, nor had she even consulted or confirmed with the 
parents that their children could or would participate in the program.  Roosevelt had to 
walk her through a lot of the more basic aspects of her program's implementation.   I 
found out later from Regine, the program coordinator, that the woman does the bulk of 
her work by herself, and doesn't really like or know how to delegate tasks.  This meant 
that she probably had little to no support in Haiti, and was at a disadvantage in terms of 
being able to address needs or get information without having to go to Haiti herself.  To 
complicate matters further, the woman took a problematic stance towards Haitians 
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making many disparaging remarks about those still living in the home country.  Her 
patronizing stance entitled her to blatantly lie on the phone as she called potential donors 
(include the mayoral office of her district), making sidebar comments to those of us in the 
office about how easy it would be to get the money, a somewhat common attitude coming 
out of an awareness of the financial opportunity (i.e., disaster capitalism) that the 
earthquake presented.   
EXTERNAL CHALLENGES 
Beyond the internal pressures, hometown associations face external challenges, 
namely Haitian state negligence, a lethal mix of dependency and distance leading to an 
unequal international division of labor, feeding into the post-disaster urgency yet 
inevitably returning to the status quo, and the pressures of integration.  
State negligence 
The research of scholars I have cited earlier such as Orozco, Guarnizo, and Fagen 
all assert that the success of an organization is dependent on their relationship to the state.  
Without certain institutional supports, such as through funding, contracting, offering 
material assistance or maintaining a registry, small organizations can be lost in the 
shuffle.  This is a disadvantage because such organizations are more likely to have 
connections to local communities, especially in places where populations might be 
underserved.  In Haiti, for example, large nongovernmental organizations and 
multinational companies tend to establish themselves in the capital, Port-au-Prince.  
Although they are certainly able to reach a larger number of people, this also leaves other 
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cities and town underserviced, contributing to a centralization that was directly tied to the 
overpopulation of Port-au-Prince and greater degree of casualties on January 10, 2010.    
For hometown associations, support from home and host countries would offer a path 
toward legitimacy.   
Larger associations in France like the Collectif Haïti de France and PAFHA 
communicate with several different bureaucracies and state institutions in order to draw 
on the various forms of support these institutions, both in France and in Haiti, can 
provide.  There appeared to be a strained relationship between Haitian institutions and 
Haitian associations, as far as involvement and accountability were concerned.  During 
my time in Paris, two ministers from the Haitian government visited the Haitian diaspora 
in Paris: Laurent Lamothe from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and Edwin 
Paraison from the Minstre des Haïtiens qui vivent a l’étranger (Ministry of Overseas 
Haitians, or MHAVE.)  Though their visits were received with much fanfare and drew 
large crowds, they generally left a feeling of having only offered lip service without 
saying anything concrete.  This lack of any real attention or ability to hold Haitian 
government officials accountable further pushes the Haitian diasporic community of 
France to the margins of the discourse around Haitian investment.       
The Haitian Embassy and Consulate 
The main institutional links between the Haitian diaspora in France and Haiti are 
the Haitian Embassy and Haitian Consulate.  During my first trip to France in 2006, it 
seemed logical to begin my quest to find the Haitian community in Paris at the 
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Embassy.  I dropped in without an appointment, and I remember being very impressed by 
its opulence—plush carpets on the stairs, a deep navy blue with gold trim on the walls.  I 
was greeted by a woman and asked her if there was anyone I could speak to regarding my 
inquiry.  She told me to wait and she would send someone who would be able to help 
me.  A few minutes later, I was introduced to Garrincha St. Germain, a junior 
secretary.  He ushered me into a large conference room and we talked at length about my 
puzzlement regarding the lack of a visible Haitian community in France.  He referred me 
to René Benjamin, and before I left we exchanged numbers.  At our next meeting, I 
prodded Garrincha for information, but there seemed to be little to tell, and I became 
increasingly frustrated by how little the Embassy was doing.   
For example, Garrincha told me about the Festival of Francophonie, an annual 
event celebrating the French language spoken in countries across the world.  At the time, 
it seemed obvious to me at the time that Haiti would have been at the forefront of this 
Festival, with all of its notable literary scholars, writers, and poets, and a continued 
importance placed on mastering the French language, even if this was problematic; yet 
they were not included that year.  When I asked why, Garrincha shrugged, “There was no 
money in the budget.”  I pressed him further.  “What do you mean no money?  Where is 
the money coming from?”  “The Embassy's budget comes from the Haitian government,” 
he replied.  "We never get enough to do much of anything.  People complain all the time 
that we should do more, but if we don't have the money for it, then what can we do?”   
The effect of such limited resources had an impact on others who were trying to 
organize for Haiti.  I’d met a Martinican named Philip Cook during a random trip in 
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February 2012 to the Maison des Associations (Center for Associations, a place for any 
and all associations in that district to have a meeting place, office space, or simply a 
postal address).  I asked the front desk whether there were any associations registered that 
worked on Haiti, and the person gave me Philip's number.  I called him and made an 
appointment for the following day.  He had an impressionable appearance—he was short 
yet slender, with fine features, light brown eyes and locks that were wrapped around his 
head in a turban style.  He had been born in Martinique but had spent all of his life in 
Paris, and though he worked as a graphic designer for luxury brands, he dabbled quite a 
bit in films.  A film artist friend had invited Philip to accompany him to Haiti to conduct 
interviews in schools and orphanages.  He traveled on the inaugural flight of Air Caraibes 
between Paris and PAP.  He enjoyed his time there but seven days after his departure the 
earthquake struck, and all his new friends perished.  As he said this, his voice audibly 
carried emotion and his eyes misted.  He was hooked on Haiti from since then.  He had 
held an event in October 2011 at the Cigalle to support Haitian painters and artists. The 
event's success encouraged him to try again in 2012, but this time he wanted to sponsor 
four painters from Haiti to come to France and put on an art show with them present.  He 
attempted to obtain the backing of the Embassy; “Not for money,” he assured me, “I just 
wanted them to be listed as a sponsor so more people would come.”  According to him, 
the Minister of Cultural Affairs at the Haitian Embassy, Regine Estimé, refused to give 
her endorsement, and Philip felt it was because she assumed money was being 
asked.  When he asked around, Philip heard that Estimé only supported well-known 
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artists of the Haitian diaspora.  This information left Philip feeling frustrated and 
annoyed.   
These two ethnographic examples show a clear domino effect of the lack of 
resources and their impact on various parties involved, from the Haitian government, to 
government agencies, to associations, to individuals.  Difficult decisions are made that 
have a direct impact not only on what can be accomplished, but also the feelings that one 
gets about the Haitian community.  The influence and reach of organizations can only 
extend so far without additional support through networking and partnerships.   The 
Haitian embassy was the subject of repeated criticism for failing to be a resource for 
Haitians living in France.  As a couple of people I spoke with explained, newly arrived 
Haitians may not know about the various small organizations, but they do know about the 
embassy, and thus it’s only natural to expect the Haitian embassy to be seen as an 
important resource for the Haitian population in France.  The lack of communication 
between government institutions—both in France and in Haiti—and Franco-Haitians 
themselves was frequent topic of conversation at various events I’d attended, but often 
more than anger or frustration, I encountered apathy.  This emotion was more dangerous 
because it decreased the chance of state agencies and ministries being held accountable to 
the people they were meant to serve.  This was well-exemplified by the receptions of both 
the ministers of Affairs etrangèrs et des cultes (Foreign Affairs and Worship), Laurent 
Lamothe, and of Overseas Haitians (MHAVE), Daniel Supplice, during my time in 
France.   
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The Ministries 
The visit of any Haitian government official was always met with a mixture of 
reserved enthusiasm and skepticism amongst those who attended.  My own excitement 
was tempered by the verbal pat-on-the-shoulder by PAFHA members who told me, 
“They all say the same thing.”  Still, I looked forward to visit of Laurent Lamothe in 
January 2012, and apparently many others had too; by the time the event was underway, 
it was standing room only.  
A number of people were given a chance to speak before introducing Laurent 
Lamothe, as a way to give community members a chance to have their specific concerns 
heard and potentially addressed by the minister.  Remarkably, the minister and his 
entourage weren’t even present on stage for the remarks made in the beginning, given 
more fuel to the complaints afterwards that the visit had been more for show than to 
actually take any concrete action.  Gary from PAFHA spoke first, and in a voice filled 
with nerves, took Lamothe and the Martelly administration to task for not doing enough 
for those living in France.  Gary cited the lack of a Haitian ambassador to France for 
months, the difficulty of obtaining a passport or visa to travel between France and Haiti, 
and the unresolved issue of offering double nationality as his main points of concern.  He 
implored Lamothe to involve the diaspora in the development of Haiti, quipping, 
“Martelly said that Haiti is ‘open for business.’  Haiti must be open for the diaspora.”   
Another member of PAFHA, Jocelyn, gave a briefer speech, focusing on other 
difficulties the diaspora faces in maintaining contact with Haiti, notably the high calling 
rates and wire transfer fees to Haiti, which was met with a great amount of applause in 
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solidarity with his frustration.  Elodie Télémaque followed, introduced as a voice for the 
women who “are accused of not being present”, calling attention to the gender imbalance 
with respect to the representation of the Haitian community.  Indeed, by visual accounts, 
the audience was at least 60% male.  She left the issue at that, however, and chose to 
focus on the conditions of return for Haitians.  She desired to see more jobs in Haiti open 
to the diaspora—a contentious topic between diasporic Haitians wanting to return and 
work in their country and the Haitians who never left yet struggle to find employment, 
often in direct competition with those with international diplomas and credentials.  She 
also called for the improvement and expansion of infrastructures such as transportation 
and postal service, and a desire for greater security for those visiting.  The last point is in 
reference to the large amount of kidnappings that were happening in the early 2000s and 
post-earthquake was regaining some steam.  However, this concern always struck me as 
presumptuous even as it was perfectly reasonable, because it implied a class difference, a 
certain entitlement to protection that the diaspora deserved over their fellow countrymen.   
The president of the Federation de la Diaspora des Haitiens en Europe (the 
Federation of the Haitian diaspora in Europe, a generally inactive group—I couldn’t get a 
hold of anyone who was involved during my research) gave a rambling speech that was 
basically a plug for his website.  As he wrapped up, however, he did ask why since his 
election Martelly hadn’t visited France.  He thumped the podium, “All diasporas need to 
be taken seriously, because without the diaspora, Haiti will be…hmmmm!”  Haiti‘s 
potential fate was a future better left unspoken.   
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The last speaker before Lamothe was given the stage was Michaëlle Jean, the 
former Governor General of Canada from 2005 to 2010.  Born in Port-au-Prince, Jean 
and her family had fled to Canada under persecution by the Duvalier regime.  There, she 
came to lead an active life, becoming an activist for survivors of domestic abuse and 
establishing shelters across Canada; creating several films and documentaries with her 
filmmaker husband Jean-Daniel Lafond; and rose to national recognition with a 
pioneering career in journalism, where she worked for Radio-Canada and the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation and became the first black person on French-language 
television in Canada (Azzi, 2012).  In 2005 the Canadian Prime Minister nominated her 
to the office of Governor General.  In this role, she became known for her empathetic 
nature and ability to connect with her audience, a talent she displayed at the event as she 
opened up her talk with, “mwen pa ka la pou pa pale krèyol! (I can’t be here and not 
speak Creole!)” –a declaration that was met with much applause.9  She focused on Haiti’s 
strengths and places where there was room for growth, namely in the sustainable tourism 
industry.  A great speaker, she carried the audience on a tide of emotion, imploring, “We 
cannot continue to define Haitians by their resilience, but must move towards action, 
move towards growth, and away from conflict.”  Focusing on our reason for being here, 
she underscored, “We cannot validate the plan of rebuilding Haiti without supporting the 
state.”  Her speech roused the audience and was met with great applause.   
                                                
9 Language was an interesting topic of discussion, and will be expanded upon in a later section of this 
chapter. 
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Finally the Minister took to the stage, walking on more like a well-known 
celebrity than a respected politician.  Indeed, he was—the Lamothe family is well known 
and influential in Haiti.  Son of a professor and a painter, Lamothe showed early promise 
as an intellectual and athlete.  He earned his bachelors and masters degrees in Florida, 
and at 26, co-founded Global Voice Group, an international telecommunications 
company.  Drawing on his political and social network in Haiti, he eventually became a 
special advisor to President Martelly, and co-chaired the Presidential Advisory Council 
for the Economic Development and Investment in Haiti with former US President Bill 
Clinton.   This set Lamothe up to take the position of Minster of Foreign Affairs and 
Worship in October 2011, and then less than a year later he was appointed to the office of 
Prime Minister.  His rise to power, though quick, was less than surprising for most 
Haitians who are familiar with the tight network of elites in Haitian political affairs.   
Upon his arrival to France, Lamothe had made a declaration to the media that the 
purpose of his visit is,  
 
to strengthen commercial, diplomatic, cultural relations with the French 
government, is to have a policy of proximity with the Haitian diaspora living in 
France.  Taxi drivers, the association of taxi drivers that we will meet tonight [the 
purpose] is to show sensitivity, is to show that the new Haitian government wants 
to know more about their lives, what they do, on how they can help Haiti in a 
more efficient manner.  We want the Haitians who live in the diaspora return to 
Haiti [because] we have a human resources problem, a problem of resources that 
are not well established, so we lose our wealth. We want the diaspora to return to 
Haiti to help us develop this country.10 
 
                                                
10 http://www.haitilibre.com/article-4772-haiti-politique-message-de-laurent-lamothe-depuis-la-france.html 
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At the event held in his honor, Lamothe systematically addressed the main areas 
of concern for Haitians in Haiti, in particular highlighting President Martelly’s plan to 
ensure that all children are enrolled in primary school for free.11  He also addressed 
security, saying that he was reinforcing the police force in Haiti, and justifying rebuilding 
the Haitian army (the mention of which was met with decidedly mixed reactions) in order 
to deal with counterfeit goods and ensure the “protection of economic security,” citing 
that $2 million a year is lost between the Haitian and Dominican Border alone.  He also 
mentioned that by 2014, the Cap-Haïtien airport (in the north of Haiti) would become an 
international airport, and there would be direct flights available between Paris and Cap-
Haïtien by 2015.  He mentioned his earlier meeting with the only professional Haitian 
association in France, l’Association Des Taxis Haïtiens de Paris (Organization of Haitian 
Taxi Drivers in Paris), and certain church communities, but he did not address any 
specific concerns of the diaspora feeling neglected or uninvolved. He brought his speech 
to a close saying that ti pa a ti pa (little by little) Haiti would rise again.  Throughout the 
minister carried an easy swagger throughout his speech, speaking in creole and making 
jokes here and there, he connected little with the audience.  At the end of his twenty 
minutes on stage, only half the audience stood to applaud his speech.   
Although both Lamothe and those who spoke shared a similar desire to see the 
diaspora more included in the future of Haiti, there was a lack of concrete plans about 
how that would be accomplished.  The Franco-Haitian diaspora wanted for the doors of 
                                                
11 Public education in Haiti is free, but there are often fees associated with enrollment, mostly for books 
and uniforms, that still make school prohibitive.  
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Haiti to be opened wider for them, for the paths of communication to be cheaper and 
easier, for the bureaucracy to be more efficient, and for the utility of the diaspora to be 
appreciated.  Both sides wanted the diaspora to return to Haiti, but the Haitian 
government seemed unsure as to how to prepare the way.  Neither the visit by Lamothe 
nor the visit by Daniel Supplice, the Minister of Overseas Haitians, offered any 
clarification.      
The second visit by a Haitian minister was co-organized by the Mairie de Pantin 
(the mayor’s office of the city of Pantin), where Gary serves as a representative.  The 
meeting was held in Pantin’s city hall, an old but very regal building.  The meeting got 
underway as the minster Daniel Supplice and members of the Embassy, Gary Fleurimont 
and Liam Vertus walked in and stood in front.  As Gary introduced the minister, we all 
got up, albeit a bit hesitantly, it seemed to me.  The minister said, “Bonjour”, we 
responded, and after an awkward beat—no one on the dais knew quite what to do—and 
the Minister decided to shake everyone's hand in the audience.  Gary then gave a brief 
introduction of his political life and general information about the diaspora's involvement 
in Haiti, and his hopes and aspirations for the meeting.  He presented a medallion of the 
city and a photography book of Pantin.  The minister presented his gratitude, but 
mumbled quite a bit and no one clapped after he was done.  The microphone was then 
passed to Liam Vertus, who in a manner full of exaggerated importance, presented 
themes that he thought were important to focus upon during the meeting, namely  
1. Diaspora participation in elections by 2015, tiered by specific regions (Europe, 
US, Canada, Caribbean) 
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2. Economic recovery with a plan for government accompaniment  
3. Structure to accommodate the diaspora share knowledge 
4. Reduction in passport processing times 
 
When Liam was done, another board member, Geoling Moise, then tried to start 
the audience questioning off, but the minister interrupted that process saying he would 
reply to the points brought up, precisely because they were points that he felt were not as 
important as other matters.  He appeared frustrated, his tone somewhat impatient, first 
pointing out that the political involvement of the diaspora would not be possible before 
the voting system in Haiti was fixed, and that there were “more important things to be 
done.”  The minister referenced an earlier meeting he’d had with French ministers in 
charge of the electoral process and found out that electronic voting is an extremely 
complicated process, and that even with the possibility of being able to vote from outside, 
French absentee ballots are counted only after all those in France have been counted.   
General voting rights by Haitians, he stressed, were more important that trying to count 
the votes of Haitians living overseas.  He then went on to say,  
 
We need to define the relationship between Haiti and the diaspora: who is 
Haitian?  What do they do?  Where are they?  The MHAVE is currently working 
on answering those questions, in order to allow the diaspora to share their 
knowledge.  I know what Haiti needs, but I don’t know what you can do.   
 
In these moments, he appeared to almost hold the diaspora with disdain.  It was 
perhaps in response to the general tone set by the minister that Liam asked him a question 
referring to “your government,” to which the minister corrected, “our government.”  
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Supplice eventually softened his tone to be more inclusive:  “We can spend 30 years 
outside of the country but when something bad happens to Haiti we feel bad, when 
something good happens, we feel good.”  Towards the end of his discourse, he stated, 
“There is no such thing as 50% Haitian, 50% French.  Thus we must ask once more, what 
is the role of the diaspora in Haiti?”  
This shift from us-them to “we” did not prevent Supplice from being critical of 
the diaspora, complaining, “the biggest critique of Haitians overseas is the multiplicity of 
associations.  I can’t visit every city that has Haitian associations.  I want to be able to go 
to one place and see representatives from all these associations [in one place]…Haitians 
must stop creating associations and create large nongovernmental organizations or 
foundations.”  The audience, made up of a number of people with their own associations, 
wasted no time in defending themselves and offering critiques of their own.   
The first audience member at the microphone, Jean Claude, deliberately asked his 
question in creole because “I want to speak in creole with my minister, since I can’t 
speak French at all.”  He went on to explain that he built a school in Fond-de-Negres and 
installed street lighting in the neighborhood as well, but that his main concern was 
security.  He was afraid to return to Haiti in order to monitor the progress of the school 
because of fear of being robbed or kidnapped.  Jean Claude demanded that the Ministry 
and Haitian government put into place tighter security measures for Haitians traveling to 
Haiti.  Addressing a different concern, Vladimir described how difficult it was to renew 
agreements with the Ministry of Social Services.  “How will you help the diaspora work 
through this?” Vladimir challenged.  Supplice balked a bit at the questioning, quoting a 
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proverb that “money gives you the right to be heard” (l’argent vous doit à la guele), 
perhaps implying that it gives you a right to express your opinions but not necessarily get 
things done in your way.  The conversation somehow turned to a comparison between 
Haiti and France, and the Minister offered the fact that France has 230 consulates in 
countries across the world, yet there was no General Consul in France.  “How do you 
want another country to respect you when you don’t even have proof you are a citizen of 
Haiti with a birth certificate?”   Again, the minister took on a tone that appeared to 
demean both Haitians living abroad and at home.  The minister framed as Haiti still 
trying to play catch-up to other countries, and was expressing borderline embarrassment.   
Later on that evening, as we were all headed to the metro to go home, I walked 
next to Roosevelt and asked his opinion of the event.  He shrugged.  “I wasn't expecting 
much, but I got the answers I needed.”  He observed that both Lamothe and Supplice 
acted as if they were the entire ministry (and in fairness, this was probably the case), 
imploring folks to “come see me” with their problems.  At the same time, Supplice had 
been dismissive of smaller associations, asking that more federative structures and 
national NGOs be created.  The likelihood that something concrete could or would be 
done was fairly small.  Roosevelt reasoned that the Haitian government was actually 
purposely abandoning a portion of the population, the diaspora, and leaving them to their 
own devices in France.  NGOs, he said, were structures that had the capacity—both 
material and human resources—to act, and thus it put the onus on the associations to have 
the means to do so, yet if the state didn’t provide some support, it was almost 
guaranteeing small, hometown associations to fail.  While Martelly did say that Haiti is 
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“open for business” he was also simultaneously undermining the agency of individuals 
and communities to act for their own freedom, and leaving it open to others, foreigner 
agencies, NGOs, and companies, to pull Haiti out of its depression.  The privileging of 
state interests over national interests follows a pattern that has existed since Haiti’s early 
days (Trouillot, 1989). 
Moreover, I would argue that neither minister saw the diaspora as equal partners 
in helping Haiti, but as another source of revenue and human capital.  The diaspora was 
not seen as a permanent community of people with specific concerns within France that 
could be addressed by a more secure partnership between France and Haiti.  What was 
underlined was the fact that the Haitian diaspora is very much focused on Haiti—perhaps 
to the detriment of community building and networking in France—and that Haiti only 
cared about the Haitian diaspora insofar as their value and worth to Haiti.  I argue that 
without the support to create the necessary foundation within their country of settlement, 
fostering community building and networking, it make it more difficult for hometown 
associations to be collaborative and thus more effective in their initiatives in Haiti.   
Distance, Division of Labor, and Dependency 
Organizing transnationally might be expected, but it is far from easy.  Hometown 
associations struggle to find a balance in the division of labor when organizing between 
two or more countries.  More often than not, the partner organization becomes dependent 
on the overseas organization, generally financially but also logistically.  One the biggest 
challenges was trying to find a way for the project to become self-sustaining, but that 
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often takes time that wasn’t afforded to organizations because of funding cycles.  Some 
managed to create this perpetuity, but it was more often the result of fortunate realities 
more than simple know-how.   
Following my time in Paris, I spent three months in Haiti in order to meet with 
some of the partner organizations of PAFHA member associations.  For those 
associations that were successful, this was in part due to their ability to maintain open 
communication with their partners, and have confidence that when the leadership wasn’t 
in Haiti, they would still be able to manage.  Haïti Futur for example, was one such 
success story.  Haïti Futur was started by Tamara Bruffaerts-Thomas and her husband 
Jean-Claude Bruffaerts.  Josette had been trained to be a teacher at the elite teaching 
school Elie Dubois, but somehow ended up in consulting, coaching, and teamwork 
building for businesses.  Her job takes her in a lot of different places in France including 
the overseas territories, which pays for her ability to go to Haiti up to 5 times a 
year.  This mobility clearly influenced the way she approached her work in associations, 
and gave her the ability to be innovative while still addressing basic issues upfront.  
Josette had started in 1994 with Guano, an organization dedicated to educational support 
in Haiti.  She established partnerships with several schools in and around her hometown 
of Camp-Perrin, and as one of her earlier projects had tried to implement a laptop 
program for students, but it didn't work because electricity and internet was 
unreliable.  In 2001 Guano became Haïti Futur, and its early focus was on offering 
teacher and student scholarships and building libraries and computer labs.  Following the 
earthquake, Josette successfully applied for a grant from the Fondation de France to 
 140 
install infrared “smart boards” in up to 30 schools.  Josette moved beyond simply 
providing the technology and created first and second grade year-long curricula for the 
teachers in order to maximize their use of the boards.  “The teachers' don't have to be 
innovative or creative, they can simply teach,” she stated.    When I pressed her further, 
she explain, “Teachers may often work another job and wouldn't have time to prepare for 
class. Plus they are not allowed to take home the laptop to which the infrared smart board 
is connected.  They basically just flip open the book, see what the lesson is, and take it 
from there.”  On her trips to Haiti, Josette personally helps install the boards and shows 
the teachers how to use it in several practice sessions, which also helps familiarize the 
teachers with the content of the book.   
Over the two years that Josette had worked on the program, she’d done her due 
diligence to think of ways to make the project as sustainable as possible without her 
presence.  I visited a school in Haiti that used these smart boards, and was really blown 
away by how excited the children work and how effective it seemed.  The principal of the 
school was a long-time friend of Josette’s, and had been excited to test the boards.  
Electricity can be erratic, so the board and accompanying laptop is powered by a 
generator.  The teachers apparently loved working with the board as well, because it 
exposed the children early to the kinds of technology that might otherwise be 
inaccessible.  Josette did not need to be present for the project to function, but she was far 
from absent, and did her best to visit the schools and meet with the periodically. 
For other organizations, distance was a greater hurdle to overcome.  I’d gotten to 
know Roseline during my time working with PAFHA, and she’d also attend the pilot 
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training for member associations.  I learned about her struggles with her project, but had 
the opportunity to gain a new perspective during my visit with Celine, the project 
manager in Haiti.  Their association, France Haïti Solidarité was created in 2006 in 
France, with a sole project to build a dormitory for children in the Marchand Dessalines 
area.  A common problem in Haiti is the lack of accessible schools for children in the 
mountains or far from a town.  Many often are required to walk for an hour or more—
each way—in order to get to school.  France Haïti Solidarité’s (FHAS) project wanted to 
make life easier for the children who attended schools in Marchand Dessalines but lived 
dozens of miles away by building a dormitory at a halfway point.  The building would be 
a second home for the children during the week, offering children after school help and 
general education, and hopefully even a source of food or income.   
Celine had some experience as a project manager, trained in France at the Conseil 
Générale.  She tried to levy her experience to obtain funding for the project.  She 
remarked that funders often seemed to qualify it as either too big or too small, and 
international nongovernmental organizations were not interested. She worked with Marie 
Charles and Odile, the only other members of FHAS to obtain grant money from a 
municipal government in France and from another nongovernmental organization, 
Coopération Française.  
Reflecting on her experience, Celine said, “When you are in the diaspora you 
have projects in mind. It's only when you arrive on the site that you see the reality of the 
situation.”  Though they had successfully obtained a space and had started building, 
unexpected issues developed.  Following the passage of Hurricane Isaac, part of the back 
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fence came down.  She had tried to develop ties with another French organization, Payi 
Savoie Solidarité, who already had ties to Marchand Dessalines, but it didn't work out 
(she didn't elaborate why). Celine expressed reluctance to work with outside partners, 
i.e., non-haitians, preferring to work with other Haitians to get the job done.  I asked 
about the relationship to France and French people. She sort of dismissed the French in 
particular as “hypocrites” saying, “even if they say they are in solidarity, deep down it’s 
not true.  At the same time it cannot be said that the French don't try to help,” she 
qualified. “They gave FHAS 40,000.  The French help, we just have to organize 
Haitians.”  She also expressed frustration with funders, scarred by an experience with the 
multinational communications company, Digicel.  FHS has hosted a fundraising event 
that resulted in a promise of 10,000 gds (equivalent to 238 USD) by Digicel.  According 
to Celine, all the papers had been signed but at the last minute Digicel pulled out, and 
FHAS lost all the money they had poured into the unsuccessful event. 
Other organizations were subject to issues of constant re-direction and adaptation 
because of any number of issues.  The general secretary of PAFHA, Conceptia, detailed 
how easy it was to have a plan in mind, only to get derailed and re-directed to serve 
different, more immediate needs of the people she worked with in Haiti.  Conceptia 
comes from a religious family, and had worked in a service capacity for a lot of her adult 
life.  She felt compelled to work in Haiti because she knew the country and the people, 
and hadn’t wanted to help other countries without knowing anything about the history or 
culture of the people.  In 2000, she went to Haiti to determine the needs of her hometown 
in La Colline d’Acquin, and focused on schools.  In her first efforts, she sponsored about 
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sixty children across seven different schools.  Unfortunately, when the schools found out 
that someone in the diaspora was sponsoring some of the students, they started to charge 
more for the student’s tuition.  As a result, Conceptia started her own school and hired the 
teachers.  She eventually turned it over to trusted friends who managed the school as best 
as possible, but they eventually ran out of money to pay the teachers.  Conceptia started 
other development projects, such as soil irrigation, goat and pork raising, and most 
recently a health clinic.  She is quite conscious of trying to work with the local 
government and followed the appropriate channels to be recognized as a nonprofit by 
Haitian authorities, but expressed a lot of frustration with the mayor’s office constantly 
losing her paperwork.  The earthquake also set her back as far as her projects were 
concerned, since the money she had raised for them had to used to purchase food.  Even 
though her hometown hadn’t been affected, there was a lot of internal migration to her 
town, and food became scarcer.  
On the Ground 
My time in Port-au-Prince also coincided with a month-long trip by Frederique 
Louissant, who was there to represent the organization Tèt Ansanm that was headed by 
Thechluque Dubique.  The organization was based in Gressier, the hometown of several 
PAFHA members.   
I didn’t know what to expect when I first drove through Gressier.  I was surprised 
at just how close to the water we were—along a good portion of the drive, I stared out at 
the bay, marveling at how blue the water was, seemingly unaffected by pollution.  The 
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view was punctuated by small stretches of roadside boutiques, food stalls, and beachfront 
restaurant-hotels.  I was meeting Frederique at a restaurant-hotel named Valou Beach.  
I’d met Frederique a few times in Paris at PAFHA headquarters and volunteered at his 
side briefly during the Fête de l’Humanité.  He was infamous for getting around Paris on 
a trotinette, a foot scooter.  As one of the few people at PAFHA who wasn’t Haitian—his 
parents were from Martinique but he’d been raised in mainland France—I’d admired his 
commitment to the hometown association Tèt Ansanm (krèyol for “Work Together”).  
Tèt Ansanm’s main (and it appeared, only) objective was to install solar-powered 
lampposts along a stretch of road in Gressier.  The association held two fundraising 
events during my year in Paris, but they were largely unsuccessful.  The president of the 
association also tried crowdfunding using the French site “Kiss Kiss Bank Bank,” but 
that, too, fell short of their goal (albeit, both were lackluster attempts).  That is why I was 
so impressed to discover that Frederique had travelled to Haiti on behalf of Tèt Ansanm 
to move things along with the project.  Yet, as the driver turned onto the road identified 
in the project, it seemed to me that lampposts were not the most important things the 
community needed given the poor state of the road itself and number of homes in partial 
ruin, patched together with tin, wood, and grey plastic tarps marked “USAID: From the 
American People”. 
Frederique greeted me customarily with a kiss on each cheek, and told the driver 
to park the car on the side of the road next to Valou Beach.  He wasted no time in 
updating me about the activities of Tèt Ansanm since his arrival three weeks prior, and 
took me on a tour of the small community, greeting people left and right along the way.  
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A group of children followed us around, curious about the new arrival.  Frederique had 
invited me to visit that day specifically because there was a meeting scheduled with the 
members of Tèt Ansanm.  It was an excellent opportunity for me to meet the others and 
witness how Tèt Ansanm operated.  The meeting was scheduled for 4 pm at a nearby 
cabana house, and at 4:15, the first few showed up.  By 5 pm, thirteen people were 
present, and the meeting was in full swing.  Frederique took charge of the meeting.  As he 
spoke, I quickly realized a major problem.  Frederique spoke in excellent French, 
punctuated by a few kreyòl nouns and verbs he’d picked up, like “moun” (people) and 
“mete” (put).  The occasional kreyòl, however, could not compensate for the high level 
French he spoke, and it became apparent to me that the silence that met Frederique when 
he would ask a question was not a result of disinterest, but the lack of full comprehension 
of what was being said.  Given that I could manage well enough in kreyòl, I tried to 
tactfully translate the question so that Frederique could get a response, and it worked; 
people immediately piped up with responses.  I wondered how Frederique had gotten by 
for nearly a month speaking only French, and why Frederique, and not other local 
members, was in charge of the meeting.  
The experience with Tèt Ansanm in particular, both in France and in Haiti, served 
as a metaphor of the challenges in developing and sustaining the relationship between the 
Haitian diaspora and the Haitian people.  The power dynamics are difficult to manage 
and the ambivalent place of the diaspora as steward and servant, exploiter and exploitable 
can lead to a lot of frustration on all ends, and make desperately needed projects more 
vulnerable to abandonment or failure.   
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to set the stage for the claim that there is a distinct 
socio-political formation amongst the Haitian diaspora in France, one that has significant 
consequences upon Haitian diasporic community formation and their transnational 
participation in Haiti’s future.  The distinct history between Haiti and France, and its 
current manifestations can help us better understand the specific set of challenges that the 
Haitian diaspora faces while negotiating their national and transnational identities.  
Diasporic engagement is mediated by a number of factors: country of origin, country of 
settlement, the respective governments, family, international interest and support, media 
attention, etc.  As a result, associations and their operations are as much of a reflection of 
their country of origin and personal diasporic investment as they are of the range of 
possibilities available to them in the country of settlement.  In order to have effective 
recovery, rebuilding, and development projects for Haiti, one must understand not only 
Haiti’s history and current situation, but also the challenges for the diaspora and how 
various levels of structure, from civil society to the State to international development 
community mediate the relationship between the association members and their ultimate 
mission in Haiti.  
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Chapter 4: The Invisible Poto-Mitan 
One Sunday morning in Austin, I decided to listen in on the Haitian community 
radio show Kon Lambi that was streamed from Paris.  Started in 1993, Kon Lambi 
remains to this day quite popular amongst Haitians in France as well as in Haiti.  The 
hosts of the show are also members of PAFHA’s inner circle.  The show is hosted by the 
station Frèquence Paris Plurielle that specifically features shows with activist, political, 
and cultural themes.  On this fateful day, the show feature as its guest the first elected 
Haitian députée, who also happened to be a woman.  The interviewer, Gadner, was 
asking her the typical questions of her vision for her constituency in a French 
suburb.  She gave general responses along the lines of helping the community, but she 
did mention that she wanted to have a special focus on women.  She commented, “I think 
it's important to also address the special concerns of women in—” 
“Ah no, no” interjected Gadner. “We cannot engage in divisive policies.”  
I laughed out loud, almost incredulous, but then thought better of the emotion.  
Gadner’s reaction was unsurprising for a number of reasons.  In France, feminist 
movements have been slow to address the intersectionality of social categories that 
mediate gendered experiences.  In fact, in May 2011 I attended a colloquium at the 
Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques (CNRS) in which Kimberlé Crenshaw gave 
a talk entitled “Paradoxes of Post-Racialism” that focused heavily on intersectionality, 
and the discussion that ensued afterwards revealed that the audience found the theory 
revolutionary—20 years after it had been introduced.  As a result of this delay in 
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understanding systems of oppression, laws are passed that fixate on gender parité 
(material equality) without addressing institutionalized sexism.  For example, French 
lawmakers passed in 1999 a law that supported equal access amongst women and men to 
elected offices,12 yet according to an OECD report published in December 2012, French 
women earn 13% less than men, an increase from 9.5% in 2000, reflecting a widening of 
the income gap between men and women (Aide à l’appui de l’égalité hommes-femmes et 
de l’autonomisation des femmes Mars, 2011).  In such a context, it is easy for Gadner to 
see an explicit discussion of women as “divisive” since the fact of her election proves 
that the law works and there is no gender problem, and any further discussion around 
women and feminism is unproductive, regardless of other systemic issues that still exist 
and becoming more pronounced.   
Gadner’s protest also points to issues related to women and gender in Haiti.  
Haitian women are widely revered as the poto mitan, the central pole that supports the 
structure of the family and forms the backbone of society.  The daily experience of 
women in Haiti however is far from supportive.  As anthropologist Cheryl Rodriguez 
summarizes,  
the women of this nation are particularly invisible and unknown. Gender, 
powerlessness, and danger form a tragic intersection that frames their daily 
realities. Women…tak[e] on multiple responsibilities for family stability and 
survival, yet womanhood renders women vulnerable to brutal poverty, 
unspeakable violence, and exploitation (Rodriguez, 2010).   
 
                                                
12Loi constitutionnelle nº 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative à l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes 
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Thus similarly to France, although there are actually a number of women in the public 
sphere, and Haiti even briefly had a female president and prime minister, the daily 
struggles of women are rarely acknowledged or addressed.     
I had not set out to research gender in a systematic way, but teachable moments 
found me, enough to warrant special attention around gender and the ways it intersects 
with other social categories—race, class, and diaspora.  Here, I am using diaspora to refer 
to a quality of being, rather than a process.  When diaspora was first popularized in the 
1950s and 60s as a theoretical concept, it was meant to be inclusive, focused on 
movement and the relationships of a displaced people to “home.”  In the emphasis placed 
on inclusiveness, difference—whether national, racial, class, or gender—was rendered 
secondary.  Lok Siu has paid special attention to gender as a site where diasporic 
populations “contest, forge, and reaffirm diasporic identifications” and argues that 
gendered practices can provide a certain insight into community formation by “showing 
how they negotiate their differences and create a sense of collectivity” (Siu, 2005b).  The 
moments I witnessed—from the radio show, to an awards ceremony, to my brief work 
with LGBT organizations in Haiti—more often revealed the ways in which gender and 
sexuality was taken for granted rather than actively engaged.  Having a gendered 
analytical lens thus becomes critical to understanding the multi-layered nature of the 
Haitian diaspora in France (Anthias, 1998).  Ultimately we must fight against the 
persistent silencing of the marginalized amongst the marginalized in order to fully 
appreciate and wield the power of diaspora for the benefit of the home country.   
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This chapter will explore the ways that gender and sexuality has structured 
organizing within the Franco-Haitian diasporic community.  I will draw on the theoretical 
framework of Haitian feminism, a branch of feminist theory that focuses on experiences 
of violence and looks at feminism as a human rights issue.  From small, inappropriate 
conversations within the office, deliberate silences on the importance of women in 
organizing, and taboo discussions of homosexuality, my analysis of gender and sexuality 
occurs between the lines, but can hopefully contribute to a fuller picture of the challenges 
of community organizing within the Haitian diasporic community in France, as well as 
consider the implications of an intersectional diasporic analysis on development.  
Within this chapter, I also aim to highlight my own experiences of being a young 
female researcher within this patriarchal environment.  Although I have come to 
appreciate so many of the men and women who contributed to my project, every year I 
grappled with whether I wanted to pursue this topic because of my constant experiences 
with sexism.  Much of it was related to my own growth as a young woman uncomfortable 
with her appearance and sexuality, and I’m sure my naiveté attracted a certain kind of 
undesired attention.  Yet part of my hesitation in writing this chapter was related to the 
fact that in writing about this topic, I could no longer simply play the role of the 
ethnographer—observer and storyteller—but would now become an engaged subject, 
exposing my flaws and neuroses for my readers to judge.  Yet this is the challenge 
presented by autoethnography—the exposure of one’s positionality in the work, making 
the ethnographer a visible, constant presence in the text and the bearer of a particular, 
situated knowledge that cannot be universalized as definitive knowledge about the Other.  
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The necessity for autoethnography is best explained by Donna Haraway: “all eyes…are 
active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways of seeing…there is 
no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and 
machines, there are only highly specific visual possibilities…” (Haraway 1988: 190).  
Therefore, I will be applying the lens of feminist ethnography in my analysis as I grapple 
not only with gender and sexuality as it plays out within the Franco-Haitian diasporic 
community, but with my own positionality and complicity within this context. 
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF GENDER EQUALITY 
There is a pretty strong awareness around the lack of women leaders and 
community organizers, but efforts to redress this have been slow or incomplete.  A 
particularly telling example was the failed effort to organize an event for International 
Women’s Day in 2012 by PAFHA.  One of PAFHA’s more active members, Geoling 
Moise, had tried to put this on the event agenda the summer prior.  At a meeting of 
volunteers, he passionately advocated for something to be done on this day, stating that 
“the women were the poto-mitan of the household and they should be honored!”  At the 
time, I was pleasantly surprised that there was some forethought going into such an event, 
but March 8, 2012 came and went without anything special planned.  When I asked 
others about what happened, the blame was placed squarely on Geoling who allegedly 
had a tendency to dream big with little execution.  Still, this did not account for the lack 
of enthusiasm around hosting such an event.  It reflected more an old tendency to rely on 
women to do the work of self-promotion, rather than a co-operative effort.  It was this 
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exact issue that contributed to the rise and fall of the best-known organization of Haitian 
women in France.   
Violande Toussaint, founder and former president of Associations des Femmes 
Haitiennes (AFH) recalled the struggle to be recognized within the community.  At its 
height, the organizations had a regular group of 30-60 women and families who attended 
the meetings.  Unfortunately, the work became too difficult for Violande to sustain since 
she had her own personal health and emotional issues to deal with, and no one stepped in 
to take over.  Violande, when I spoke to her, was still in charge of AFH, but they hadn't 
put together an event in years.   
AFH had as a goal to promote the personal and professional development of 
women and families in the Haitian community.  Violande’s mission was to help socialize 
women so that they could be independent and know how to function in a new country.  It 
was a way to fight against the insularity that she’d observed within the Haitian 
community, especially for women who had fewer resources and opportunities to explore 
their new home.  In the beginning, the organization focused on offering French language 
classes, citizenship advice, and legal support.  They also held events such as field trips to 
French castles and excursions on the river Seine.  For her, these trips were important to 
help Haitian families integrate and learn the history of France.  “People have a tendency 
to stay within themselves," she explained.  “It is their obligation to get to know the 
country they are living in.”  Violande eventually wanted to start a micro-credit finance 
project in order to encourage small businesses creation, but the other person on the 
leadership team hadn’t gotten around to looking at the proposal.    
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In spite of this important work, she described being seen as a “nuisance” by other 
male-led organizations.  According to Violande, they accused her of trying to start a 
“man vs. woman thing” to get “her little power.”  Once her intentions were made clear, 
Violande felt that other organizations only called AFH when they wanted a greater 
female presence, or for “women” holidays like Mother's Day and International Women's 
Day; they relied on AFH to carry out the work of gender that other associations weren’t 
doing, and after that, the organization was ignored.  Violande was clearly passionate 
about doing the work, but as is the case for many other organizations, she was unable to 
ensure its sustainability once she needed to step down.  The other, younger members of 
the association had recently moved to other countries, and her health became a bigger 
priority.       
For its part, PAFHA had a notable female presence within the board and among 
member associations, but remained a very masculine space.  Conversations occurred in 
the office that seemed quite inappropriate to me but were tolerated as harmless 
commentary.  My outspoken nature “outed” me as a feminist even though I never self-
identified as one, and I was sometimes provoked on purpose in this conversations.  For 
example, Roosevelt and Liam would sometimes become defensive when it came to issues 
of female-inclusion.  Roosevelt, for example, explained that the problem of the Haitian 
community in France was tied to the structure of the family.  Once the woman gets 
married, he explained with full confidence, she makes her immediate family her priority, 
that and her activities in the church.  She no longer is interested in participating in the 
associative life.  As I protested, he clarified,  
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There isn't a space for children because no one takes the time to really consider 
the reasons for why a woman is in the spot that she is in, the social structures that 
shape her role as woman.  So by default it is the men who take care of things.  
The men don't bring their wives or their kids to meetings. 
 
Roosevelt appears to take a seemingly sympathetic stance to explain the lack of women, 
but reinforces traditional gender roles.  PAFHA did make a conscious effort to be more 
accommodating to families during the Journée des Portes Ouvertes event by having a 
dedicated space for the children where parents could drop them off and visit from time to 
time while they enjoyed the rest of the event.   
These kinds of overtures, however, did not balance out the everyday sexism in the 
office.  One board member referred to PAFHA as his second wife, and that if he kept on 
coming home late after the long board meetings he would risk losing his first wife.  In 
another meeting, two young women were considering joining PAFHA, but expressed a 
lot of frustration following negative experiences with other associations.  Liam remarked, 
“You’re like a woman who’s had a bad breakup with a man.”  Explicit comments rarely 
elicited any reaction from anyone (aside from me.)  It was only in private conversations 
with some of the women that I would find out that certain things said or done did bother 
them, but not enough to make any commentary.  For example, Regine, the program 
coordinator, was always critical of Liam's behavior towards her and Conceptia, the 
general secretary of PAFHA.  Regine accused Liam of coming into the office, sitting 
down, and asking for coffee.  “I’m not a secretary!” Regine would gripe.  He would also 
make demeaning comments that appeared to question her intelligence and her capacity to 
be effective in her role.  Regine, generally good-natured and fun-loving, would fume for 
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an hour after work when I stopped by.  Whereas Regine resisted Liam’s attempts to place 
her in a service mode, Conceptia would usually give in to his masculinist ways and, for 
example, make coffee and serve it to him.  It wasn’t that she wasn’t aware of the sexism, 
but simply that it was pointless to challenge it.   
There were a few moments of resistance.  During a board election, the members 
were taking nominations for various roles, including general secretary and treasurer.  
Someone nominated Esther for general secretary, and she wondered out loud if it was 
because she was a woman.  She smiled to cut down on the frankness of the comment, but 
it seemed to ruffle a couple of feathers anyway, with others once again getting defensive. 
Aside from gender and the place of women, sex and sexuality were also discussed 
somewhat frequently amongst the people I spent time with, for two reasons.  First, 
coincidentally, a sex scandal broke out two days before my departure from the US to 
France in 2011, and second, my American identity often stoked people’s biases and 
stereotypes.   
DSK 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, president of the International Monetary Fund, had been 
accused of sexually assaulting a black female hotel worker named Naffisatou Diallo.  The 
affair dominated the airwaves and headlines for weeks, and proved to be excellent fodder 
for controversial commentary.  Many men, Haitian and non-Haitian French alike, felt that 
the Strauss-Kahn (referred to as DSK in the French media) was probably set up because, 
as one person put it, “what maid comes into a room, knowing its occupied and stays there 
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to clean?  And then how could any man force a woman (or man) to perform oral sex on 
them without putting their penis at risk of getting bit off?”  I learned the word for 
“conspiracy” my first week.  Any attempt by me to try and garner sympathy for the 
woman was quickly blown off with a dismissive “feminist” epithet.  The case revealed 
intense racism and sexism amongst the French, who attempted to discredit Diallo as an 
low-class African immigrant who was looking to get paid (Saletan, 2011).  As the case 
played out, Diallo’s testimony was deemed not credible because of several 
inconsistencies in her immigration story (“DA: Strauss-Kahn accuser cleaned after 
encounter,” 2011).  In order to stay in the United States, Diallo had applied for asylum 
using a fake story of abuse and persecution.  DSK’s defense tried to use this to question 
her moral character, but prosecution argued that her past mistakes didn’t mean that it was 
impossible she’d been raped.  There were many who sought to protect Strauss-Kahn, 
who, before the scandal broke, had been a viable contender for the French presidency.   
By the time the case was dropped due to inconsistent testimony by Diallo and an 
admission by Strauss-Kahn of inappropriate relations (but not rape), men felt all but 
vindicated, but it was short-lived as other accusers and sexual scandals came forth.   
“Oh, you’re so American…” 
Given that I was of Haitian origin, I had virtually no trouble negotiating 
ostensibly Haitian spaces—I was given free access, and I never felt that I was excluded or 
deemed illegitimate to participate in Haitian events as a Haitian.  When I would 
encounter the most amount of resistance was in discussions of male and female relations, 
when all the sudden, my identity as an American became a target.  As with race, anything 
 157 
that came across as communitarian or chauvinist was often decried as American.  Being 
American often seemed to imply anti-progress, a desire to undermine a broader cause by 
getting caught up in insignificant details.  Often I would be told that I felt a particular 
way (read: I was wrong) because I was American, i.e., prudish, conservative, feminist, 
easy.  One day in the office after a PAFHA committee meeting, Regine and I were 
talking about the evolving DSK scandal, and Alexandre and Roosevelt came in on the 
conversation.  It shifted to how “easy” American women were versus Haitian women: 
“You could never have a Haitian mistress, they wouldn’t have it.  American women are 
game for anything, they’ll do anything.  It’s so much easier.”  They had no qualms 
discussing this with me, an American woman.   
I was also in other situations in which my American identity was trumpeted out as 
a way to invalidate my opinion.  I was hanging out with an acquaintance around Les 
Halles when I witnessed a series of problematic behavior between several lesbian women 
and a man who was harassing them.  They made such a spectacle that others around them 
were leaving.  I made a comment on the situation to the person I was with, saying that 
this was harassment, but he completely disagreed with my assessment and said that I only 
thought that way because I was American and lesbian and feminist.  He thought it was 
wrong of me to impose such a heavy word on such a situation; rather, they were all just 
playing around.  To make the situation worse, at the exact same time that this was 
happening, a black man behind us had been stopped by four policemen, who proceeded to 
frisk and interrogate the man, but resulted in no arrests.  
A MODERNIST ASPIRATION  
Notions about gender identity and feminist conscious revealed the struggle that 
Haitians in France face in trying to integrate.  An explicit recognition of women via the 
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phrase “fanm se poto mitan” appears to conflict with the way gender and race are 
discussed in France.  The push for equality almost appears to make discussions of gender 
a backwards or pointless endeavor.  This attitude, however, seems to stem more from an 
influence of French attitudes on this question, especially given the way “American” is 
used as the counter-argument.  It reveals the ways that “transmigratory processes 
politicize and re-organize people in both home and host countries along gender lines” 
(Burton, 2004).   
Gender dynamics amongst the Haitian population revealed the ways that 
individuals—men, really—displayed evidence of their modernity.  Through particular 
performances, including challenging my feminist values and being crass, men were in 
fact attempting to show that they were beyond gender.  This relates to a larger well-
known problem in organizing that, in “focusing as they do on the generic ‘people,’ [social 
movements] have, by and large, been gendered as male even as they espouse 
gender­neutral politics (Chancy, 1997: 1).  My American identity was an easy prop to 
make reductive comparisons between countries.  Women and queer folk must negotiate 
how they can assert their rights without seeming “backwards” or undermining their 
belonging to the larger category of “Haitian.” To have a feminist consciousness was to be 
“American” and therefore not French, and therefore not worthy. 
It must be noted that I was frequenting a particular space, the PAFHA.  This is not 
to say that women didn’t organize.  On the contrary, I met many women who were not 
members of the PAFHA who had their own associations.  They tended to act more 
independently or were members of the Collectif Haiti France that had a much broader 
representation of women, Haitian and non-Haitian French.  Aside from the Association 
des Femmes Haitïennes, though, no other organization organized around gender.  This is 
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in stark contrast to organizing in Haiti, where a myriad number of organizations exist 
dedicated to female empowerment, and in fact it is part of a long tradition of collective, 
grassroots organizing in Haiti (Burton, 2004; Charles, 1995).  Better known ones include 
Solidarite Fanm Ayisyen (SOFA, Haitian Women’s Solidarity) and Kay Fanm (Women’s 
House).  In fact, women organizing both in Haiti and in the US-based Haitian diaspora 
was central to the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 (Charles, 1995).  
Carolle Charles argues that the conditions of oppression via state and domestic violence 
create a distinct reality that has led to a particular iteration of Third World feminism that 
she calls Haitian feminism.  Haitian feminism is described as a “defiant strain of Third 
World feminism in the West hinging on socialist reform, a belief in the universalization 
of human rights, and a steadfast dedication to the uplifting of women in nationalist and 
global agendas” (Chancy, 1997: 3).  Haitian feminism is transnational by its very nature, 
reliant on the bridges built within and between communities in Haiti and in the diaspora.  
It appears, however, that the particular history of feminist organizing in the United States 
created the necessary channels in order to build those transnational relationships.  It 
underscores the importance of locality when analyzing diasporic communities; the 
apparent lack of such relationships is tied to the socio-political environment of the 
country in which the diaspora is located.  In other words, in spite of the history of 
organizing in the Haiti, that cultural history is susceptible to influence and erasure in 
exchange for integration.     
The question of how social categories like gender intersected with national 
identities pushed me to ask the question of what is and isn’t considered authentically 
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Haitian when organizing and building communities.  As a bisexual US-born woman of 
Haitian origin, I had often thought to myself that my identity as Haitian was not only 
“sullied” by being born in the US, but by also not being straight.  Thus I often relied on 
other identities like being Catholic or tri-lingual in order to play up the legitimacy of my 
Haitian identity.  While I was in Haiti, however, I decided to investigate queer/LGBT 
movements in order to see how Haitian identity was negotiated from a queer lens.  
MASISI/MADIVINEZ 
I was 17 when I met a gay Haitian for the first time.  I will always remember the 
moment that my world opened up when I realized that being gay and being Haitian 
weren’t mutually exclusive.  Unlike places like Jamaica, where there is a visible and 
active sentiment of homophobia, in Haiti homosexuality isn’t something that is discussed.  
It’s not quite that there is a belief that it doesn’t exist, but more that in Haiti, there is a 
framework for it that at least gives it a chance to express itself. It wasn’t until I went to 
France, however, that I realized just how intriguing of a topic this could be. 
I had a fortuitous meeting with Anne Lescot, an anthropologist, filmmaker and 
cultural community organizer based in Paris.  During our first encounter, she asked me if 
I’d seen her documentary Des Hommes et Des Dieux; I had not.  She insisted I wait to 
watch it on the big screen, so it was several weeks before I had a chance to attend a 
screening of the film at a Literary Arts festival.  I was immediately enraptured by the 
images of a Haiti I’d never seen before, a queer Haiti.  Moving beyond the stale aerial 
shots of an overpopulated city or forlorn school children, Lescot and her film partner 
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Laurent Magloire offered an intimate and deeply touching portrayal of the lives of six 
queer men, documenting their relationships, their spiritual practice, their inner 
monologues, and their secrets.  When I got home hyped up on new ideas, I typed in all 
kinds of search terms into my browser—“gay Haiti”, “masisi”, “Haiti* sexuality”—but 
soon realized that in spite of the ten years that had elapsed since its release, Des Hommes 
et Des Dieux remained a one of a kind perspective on queer sexuality in Haiti.  Today, 
mentions of queer Haitian sexuality are often in reference to either vodou, where a 
number of deities are sexually fluid and gender-bending and where many of the hougans 
and manbos (spiritual leaders) and practitioners are queer; or epidemiology, addressing 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the disproportionate impact the disease has had on gay male 
Haitians.  What of the lives of queer Haitians beyond the hounfo (place of worship) and 
the hospital?   
Although Anne Lescot and film partner Laurent Magloire offer a beautifully 
rendered exposé of the lives of queer Haitians, they only scratched the surface of the 
complexity of being gay, lesbian, bisexual, and/or transgendered in Haiti.  There have 
been a number of local and international efforts to increase the medical and emotional 
support and visibility of LGBT Haitians, but the discrimination and violence that many 
faced only worsened after the January 12, 2010 earthquake.  A joint report by the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) and SEROvie, a 
Haitian organization that provides health services and seeks to empower “MSM, bisexual 
men, and transgendered people”, stated:  
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A group of lesbian and bisexually-identified women interviewed by SEROvie and 
IGLHRC reported that sexual violence and corrective rape were “definitely a 
problem” in the IDP [internally displaced persons] camps.  Gay and bisexual men 
reported that they had taken on a more masculine demeanor since the earthquake, 
altering their voice, posture, and gait —“mettre des roches sur nos 
epaules”(“putting rocks on our shoulders”)—in order to avoid harassment both 
inside and outside of the camps and to reduce the chances of being denied access 
to emergency housing, healthcare, and/or enrollment in food-for-work programs 
(Commission & SEROvie, 2011: 4).    
 
Despite some press around the plight of LGBT Haitians, sexuality and sexual 
violence of LGBT persons there continues to be of low (or no) priority of the Haitian 
state or large non-profit organizations in charge of distributing aid or health services.  As 
a result, visibly or suspected gay males may be turned away from health clinics due to 
individual discrimination, or be denied at food distribution because they are not 
accompanied by a woman head of household, a form of institutional discrimination.   
In the past decade, however, no less than three organizations have been created in 
Haiti that work explicitly with the LGBT population in Haiti.  In honor of the ten-year 
anniversary of Des Hommes et Des Dieux, this investigation will follow-up Lescot’s and 
Magloire’s work to offer a new perspective of LGBT lives in Haiti, one where the masisi 
and madivin are in the center, refashioning their identities in order to allow for “Haitian” 
and “queer” to exist side-by-side.  After a brief summary of the work on queer Haitian 
sexuality, I will describe the creation and evolution of queer activism in three Haitian 
organizations—SEROvie, FACSDIS, a lesbian, bisexual, and transwomen organization, 
and KOURAJ, a Haitian LGBT rights organization—and use them to lay out the present-
day realities for queer Haitians: their challenges in organizing, their accomplishments 
thus far, and the future they envision for themselves and a more open and accepting Haiti. 
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These organizations move beyond merely offering HIV/AIDS health services and use a 
variety of strategies in order to serve and protect the masisi (gay/faggot) and madivin 
(lesbian/dyke) of Haiti and directly confront Haitians and their attitudes towards and 
beliefs about homosexuality and transsexuality.  Each organization has their own 
approach, but in this paper I show that Haitian associations are developing new models of 
sexuality by creating spaces outside of vodou, denaturalizing the link between HIV/AIDS 
and homosexuality, and by challenging Haitian society’s silence and secrecy around 
sexuality and gender expression by re-inserting the masisi and madivin into the nation.  
They do so by using a nationalist discourse that rests on the local understanding of tout 
moun se moun, that all people are people, and if one is Haitian, regardless if one is 
homosexual, one is human.  These organizations do not seek to create a “gay Haiti” or 
parcel out sexuality in their subjectivity as a Haitian national and citizen, but aim to have 
masisi and madivin recognized for being, quite simply, Haitian.  
When Lescot and Magloire first started filming in Haiti, Lescot explained that 
there was absolutely nothing explicitly being done on or for the LGBT population in 
Haiti.  The filmmakers were fully aware of the uniqueness and importance of their film 
project.  They started filming in 1997, and within a year, the Groupe de recherche et 
d'action anti-SIDA et anti-discrimination sexuelle [research and action group against 
AIDS and sexual discrimination, GRASADIS] was founded.  GRASADIS worked with 
Family Health International in order to determine the HIV/AIDS infection rate among 
men who had sex with men [MSM] and offer community education and “technical and 
material support for organizations conducting interventions to reduce sexual transmission 
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of STIs and HIV” (Leonidas, 1983: 24 ).  These organizations, however, received very 
little support, and were not able to serve consistently the MSM population in Haiti. As 
the years passed and members of GRASADIS left Haiti for the US, the remaining 
member saw the need to revise their mission and contribute in a more effective way to the 
lives of Haitian MSM and transsexuals.  GRASADIS became SEROvie in 2007 (double 
check date).  Quoting from their profile from amFAR, SEROvie provides services to 
“MSM, bisexual men, and transgender people” and “has a dual focus on health and 
rights, seeking to empower its clients to break a cycle of discrimination, poverty, and 
HIV infection. To do this, [SEROvie] has used a variety of approaches— from condom 
distribution and radio shows to anti-discrimination programs in schools and peer 
education on the street.”  While SEROvie certainly filled a void, in the decade since the 
release of Des Hommes et des Dieux other organizations appeared on the scene with the 
desire to serve the MSM and LGBT population in Haiti, but often came from outside of 
Haiti with a very specific idea of activism.   
On November 30th, the well-known AIDS organization Housing Works, in 
partnership with Haitian AIDS activist Esther Boucicault, organized what was billed as 
Haiti’s first gay rights march in town of Saint Marc.  A dozen Haitian men wore white t-
shirts with bold pink lettering that read “Mwen se masisi, m ap vi lavi positif ak vih/sida” 
(I’m gay, I’m living a positive life with HIV/AIDS).  One news report described the 
moment:   
 
The gay group first made an appearance when they marched single-file into a St. 
Marc World AIDS Day concert Saturday night wearing their T-shirts. When they 
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received some boos, AIDS organization leaders took the stage and told the crowd 
that the men were part of the community. When Esther’s fiancé Cesar Vincent 
spoke, someone started heckling him. The emcee took the microphone and called 
out the heckler, saying, “Now you know what stigma feels like.” After the 
concert, eight of the gay men changed into drag and took to the stage. (“Making 
History in Haiti,” 2008)   
 
This was a momentous occasion, one that received a lot of press.  However 
according to Reginald Dupont, program coordinator for SEROvie, the undercover story is 
not as positive.  In fact, Housing Works had approached SEROvie’s president Steve 
Laguerre in order to collaborate, but when Laguerre tried to explain that it was necessary 
to take into account the socio-cultural reality in order to intervene, Housing Works 
decided to make their own “American” way, preferring “to shock, and from this shock 
see how to open things up” (interview).  Dupont explains:   
 
We [SEROvie] were against it [the march].  Not only was it discriminatory, there 
were assumptions…once they identify you as homosexual, they consider you as 
an infected person, if you are homosexual…  Therefore it was discriminatory.  
But these weren’t consenting people who were marching voluntarily, because 
there was along the way certain pressures in the sense that, they would offer 1000 
gouds (roughly $143) to go march…and maybe you would know this, that the 
situation in which people find themselves, 1000 gouds is something for them.  But 
the feedback was not at all positive, because normally there are certain amongst 
them, that were our [clients] that were contacted on our behalf and amongst them, 
there were some that tried to commit suicide afterwards…because in the 
community, the people who knew them, automatically they thought those people 
were infected, there were some people that took a violent position against them.  
So some tried to commit suicide.  Others had to leave the place where they were 
living to go elsewhere.  There were some that had their beauty studio, and they 
had to abandon it…” 
 
The assumption that Reginald points to, that Haitians will assume all gays are 
infected with HIV, is actually something that is constructed and perpetuated (whether 
intentional or not) by organizations like Housing Works, that purposely and 
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problematically lump together the two, insisting on shock value than education.  It is 
based on traditional models of LGBT organizing in the United States that have focused 
on demanding the state to bequeath certain rights to its gay, lesbian, transsexual and 
transgendered population, such as the right to marry, serve in the army, or change 
genders on official paperwork.  This model isolates sexuality as the only reason for the 
state to treat gays as second-class citizens, and assumes that once the rights are granted, 
everything else will fall into place.  In reality, this model only benefits those whose other 
rights are not infringed upon due to, for example, poverty, or race, or gender.  In other 
words, this particular rights model reinforces existing patriarchy, white supremacy, and 
homonormativity.  Rinaldo Walcott described this phenomenon as  “white queer 
homonormative racism” (2009), arguing that North American and Western European 
LGBT organization often set up a modernist framework that place acceptance of and 
equal rights for LGBT people as the height of modernity.  This teleological understanding 
of gay and trans rights suppresses alternative expressions and forms of sexuality that 
exist, and often enters into direct conflict with local cultural forms, as was clearly shown 
during Housing Works’ rights march.  Faithfully following this model of development in 
Haiti, Housing Works had an agenda and preferred to follow it through rather than be 
more sensitive to the everyday realities in Haiti.  The failure of the march as described by 
Reginald is in large part due to the fact that a solely rights based strategy would be 
ineffective in Haiti, where the state is often disorganized and at times almost powerless to 
protect its citizens.  Furthermore, Haiti is in the Caribbean, a region widely reputed for its 
internalized colonial forms of respectability, and firmly anchored notions of 
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heterosexuality and patriarchy.  I share Walcott’s concern as a person with a diasporic 
subjectivity: how does one offer an analysis that invariably “caught between white queer 
homonormative racism and Anglo-Caribbean homo-hatred” (Walcott, 2009: 4), or more 
appropriately, Franco-Caribbean homo-hatred and secrecy?   
As a US-born woman of Haitian descent, I recognize that my own positionality is 
awkwardly situated.  As Walcott points out in his own article, the position of being a 
diaspora, caught between North American white homonormative racism and Caribbean 
homophobia is complicated.  As much as I would love to see more protections given to 
LGBT Haitians, I also recognize that Haiti is currently politically unstable, and it will be 
difficult to hold the state accountable for the protection of their masisi and madivin 
citizens.  On the other hand, I am continually frustrated by the interventions of non-
profits and non-governmental organizations that come to Haiti determined to carve their 
own path, believing they finally have the solution, and then wonder from their isolated 
camps why things fail.  What I would want for Haitians is action that addresses the 
systemic issues (discrimination, health care) using local epistemology.  
Initiatives like KOURAJ’s LGBT bar and cultural center are extraordinary in their 
idealism and possibility, but I am torn between wanting to see a safe space for masisi and 
madivin to gather and enjoy themselves, and the imposition of the kind of western 
framework that thinks in “safe spaces” without seeing how these spaces interact with 
other spaces, and the nation in general.  I am very sympathetic to Diana’s point of view, 
where she said: 
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It’s hard for me to comment on how certain issues affect the LGBT community in 
Haiti because we don’t really know what this community looks like. What we 
know is that resources are scarce, there’s been a rise in SGBV since the 
earthquake, Haitian society is homophobic, and most people are unemployed and 
survive off less than a dollar or day. Advocacy is important, but let’s be honest 
about the root of the problem…The problems faced by LGBT folks in Haiti won’t 
be solved by giving them space to be gay.   
 
We must be more vigilant of the local forms of organization.  The discourses that shape 
what it means to be masisi and madivin in Haiti actually offer plenty of possibilities that 
can be marshaled into an effective campaign, as local organizations have done.  Yet we 
must continue to grapple with the tensions of the local and the global, and the 
unavoidable transnational exchanges that continue to create new possibilities that can be 
mapped onto tradition and history. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizing around gender is still emergent amongst Franco-Haitian organizations.  
At first glance, the rampant sexism within the diasporic Haitian community could be seen 
as the perpetuation of patriarchy so readily found in Haiti.   When one takes into 
consideration the French context and the reality of being a group struggles and strives to 
integrate, the sexism and the lack of women-based movements is revealed as a strategy of 
assimilation.  Discussions of gender, sexism, and feminism are stand-ins for discussions 
of nationalism.  When shifting perspectives from the diaspora to Haitians themselves, the 
tensions between nationalism and transnationalism are exposed.  A history of feminist 
organizing in Haiti becomes lost amongst Franco-Haitians; diasporic engagement with 
feminist and queer movements are seen as a threat to authentic Haitian identity.    We 
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realize how difficult, possibly even problematic, it can be to try to exchange, translate, 
and carry-over certain ideologies and agendas, all in the name of modernity.  
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Chapter 5: The Impact of National and International Policy 
I tried to calm my nerves before the meeting.  I was to meet Daniel and Alex from 
the Fondation de France to see if I could be a part of their research team and potentially 
get some funding for my impending trip to Haiti.  Anne Lescot, whose organization 
Collectif 2004 Images and website Réseau Culture Haïti both received funding from the 
foundation, had set the meeting up for me.  Everyone was clearly more relaxed than I 
was.  We walked not to far from the headquarters to a small square filled with tables set 
up by the surrounding restaurants.  We were seated, and once we’d ordered and received 
our food, the questions began.   
“What are you looking to do in Haiti?”  “How does it fit in with your research 
here in France?” “What have you discovered thus far?”  
I was on shaky ground since I’d given much thought to those same questions but 
hadn’t settled on any answers yet.  I knew I wanted to go to Haiti because the 
organizations I worked with in France were much more focused on doing service work in 
Haiti than in Haitian communities in France.  What I understood less however was why 
those efforts had produced thus far so few results; Daniel and Alex sought to understand 
the same. 
“We’ve funded a few organizations in the past,” said Daniel, “but they didn’t give 
us the results we’d hoped.  So little has been done.  That’s why we decided to fund 
organizations that had already been working for a long time because so many new 
organizations appeared after the earthquake and we didn’t know who to trust.” 
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They looked at me. “What can you tell us about Haitian associations in France?  
We need numbers.  Do you know how many Haitians participate in organizations? How 
much money they contribute to organizations versus sending back home?  How many 
projects are actually funded?  That’s the kind of information we need to know.” 
I stared blankly into their expectant faces, knowing full well I couldn’t answer 
their questions but recognized their importance.  I could hazard a few guesses based on a 
combination of anecdotal evidence and previous research on the Haitian diaspora in 
France, but I wasn’t in the position to do the kind of national survey it would require.  
They seemed sincere in their attempt to understand the problems for Haitian 
organizations to create and execute successful projects but the funders needed more 
information on how to do so.  In an email communication, Daniel wrote to me that the 
Fondation de France’s (FdF) mission was to (quoted in full, my translation): 
 
support other associations of the Haitian diaspora in its appeal to Haiti Solidarity 
projects following the earthquake. [The French Foundation] has supported several 
networks of associations (PAFHA, CHF, Haiti Culture Network, etc...), and 
associations. We [FdF] repeatedly tried to accompany and guide upstream projects. 
Despite this, the quality of proposals received was not up to our expectations and we 
have observed a number of difficulties that you also seem to have identified. Our 
focus today is to have a study identifying these problems and their causes and making 
recommendations where possible, including the following: 
• Reasons for the institutional weakness of diasporic associations (ability to 
assemble and prepare a project to raise funds and create partnerships, 
implementation, reporting…) 
• Blocks preventing them from better coordination on the ground between 
NGOs and the authorities share information 
• Divisions within the associated diaspora (PAFHA / CHF, etc.). 
• From a general point of view, it would be interesting to estimate how much 
the Franco-Haitian diaspora invests financially and how much passes through 
associations with respect to transfers to families. 
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• A quantitative nature of the funds they use e.g.- local, private, state, 
foundations, other NGOs, etc.… 
• The modalities of intervention associated diaspora, efficiency and relevance: 
medium duration, geographic area, geographical or thematic approach, 
providing technical expertise and financial support alone, average 
budget/project etc.… What distinguishes them from other development actors 
• The nature and quality of partnerships with local organizations (governance, 
which empower local associations over the associated diaspora and what 
participation / ownership of local populations) 
• The local relevance of their activities to the needs of the field 
• The support of the Fondation de France and the associated diaspora 
especially their platforms he improved practices? Does it move the lines? 
• What recommendations to donors to help encourage the improvement of the 
quality of intervention associated diaspora? 
• Trends at work. Can we observe developments on these issues, improvements, 
etc.? 
 
It was clear that FdF had given much thought to how to address these persistent 
problems in working with Haitian associations.  My concern was that the framing placed 
a large portion of blame on the associations themselves.  Too often Haitian associations 
are deemed incompetent, irrespective of context.   
Haitians in the diaspora, many of whom create and participate in local social 
movements, hometown associations and other transnational organizations often find 
themselves unable to meet the expectations of development agencies or their own people, 
yet are publicly encouraged to give back, either through traditional forms such as 
remittances or donations, or in more formalized fashion such as through a development 
project or running for public office.  Governments and large international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foundations laud diasporic associations in 
particular as Haiti’s best chance for recovery and sustainable development, yet these 
associations are given little in terms of material and institutional support, expected to first 
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prove themselves worthy before being funded.  When small organizations invariably face 
challenges, the issues are seen as self-made and personal, while historical and 
institutional contributions to the problem are ignored.  In previous chapters, I have 
outlined the historical contexts of France and Haiti, and offered in detail the internal and 
external challenges that Haitian hometown associations face while organizing 
transnationally.  In this chapter, I aim to highlight the complicated positionality of 
Haitian hometown associations within the broader development agenda, politics, and 
policies of so-called first world nation-states and international agencies. 
The 2010 earthquake spurred a new moment in the history of the Haitian diaspora 
in France.  Associations devoted to working in and for Haiti doubled in the two years 
following the earthquake, a large number of them created by Haitians who felt compelled 
for the first time to actively participate in Haiti’s development beyond sending 
remittances to their families.  The media also contributed to the push, with headlines such 
as “What Haiti Needs: A Bigger Diaspora” (Abrams, 2010) or “The Diaspora Can Save 
Haiti” (Uttley, 2005).  France for its part had been revising its policies around 
development aid to reflect a general trend toward sustainability and accountability 
between donor and aid-receiving nations.  In particular, France had recently adopted a 
“co-development” policy that explicitly sought to work with diasporic organizations 
linked to “strategic partnership” countries.  In the years following the earthquake, 
however, the key players in Haiti’s recovery haven’t been hometown associations or 
other kinds of transnational organizations headed by members of the diaspora; rather, 
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national governments and international development agencies have maintained status quo 
and continue to be given the most decision-making powers. 
At the global level, nonprofits have increasingly taken on the role of social service 
providers.  Although France’s co-development policy includes a conscious effort to work 
with local NGOs (that is, in Haiti) to avoid redundancy, their ability to be in a country as 
a decision-maker contributes to the nonprofit industrial complex (INCITE! Women of 
Color Against Violence, 2007), where the national agendas of developed countries and 
NGOs are given priority over the local governments of “partner” countries.  This is 
underlined by the fact that foreign aid to developing nations often bypass government 
coffers and go directly to nonprofits.  In his recent book After the Quake, Paul Farmer 
noted that only 1% of the total donated aid went to the government.  This undermines the 
operational capacity of the Haitian state, which then contributes to the image of Haitian 
leaders as incompetent, even by members of the diaspora themselves.  Thus, they are 
more likely to create and/or support social service nonprofits than try to find ways to 
reinstate and reinforce Haiti’s right to self-rule. 
Haiti is sometimes referred to as the “republic of NGOs” (Kristoff and Panarelli 
2010), with the second highest number of nongovernmental organizations per capita after 
India.13  With every natural disaster NGOs have multiplied, bringing much needed relief 
but often at the cost of political and economic sovereignty.  The NGO problem is a 
polarizing topic amongst Haitians. The acronym often conjures contradictory images of 
                                                
13 www.thenation.com/article/170929/ngo-republic-haiti 
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benevolence and abuse.  Furthermore, the logic that an organization run by Haitians 
knows what is best for Haiti can problematically hide ways that those same organizations 
inadvertently reproduce problems of inequality and mismanagement created by large 
international NGOs.  What kind of relationship, then, exists—and even can exist—
between large international NGOs (INGOs) and bilateral/multilateral aid government 
agencies such as USAID or Agence Française de Développement and Haitian hometown 
associations? How have different state institutions and INGOs supported, complimented 
and/or undermined hometown associations?  
I first will detail the history of development aid, which in the European context is 
actually an outgrowth of migration policy.  I will then profile the two main agencies that 
have had the greatest influence on aid.  Using data collected from France’s official 
development agency, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the private funder 
Fondation de France, I examine the evolution of French policy regarding aid to Haiti, 
both via official development aid (ODA) and through Haitian hometown associations.  I 
will pay special attention to how much aid has been funneled through hometown 
associations compared to other means, which organizations and in what sectors, how 
successful the overall policy appears to be and ultimately whether it is a sustainable 
endeavor.   
RELUCTANT NATION OF IMMIGRATION 
[To be] ‘French is to relate vertically to an ideal image of the French nation, not 
to find common ground with other immigrants who have embarked on this 
process of ‘becoming French’” --Dominic Thomas, Black France 
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Understanding the structure of aid from France to Haiti is about understanding 
history of development aid in France, examining decisions made by France in regards to 
its own state interests, but also those made in conjunction with objectives laid out by the 
European Union, United Nations, World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, and other multilateral agencies.  Current French development policy is 
an outgrowth of immigration policy, which has been and continues to be a subject of 
enormous debate.  Concerned with the increasing number of immigrants entering and 
settling in the country, France sought to curb the flow through state- and European-level 
policies.  As the economic situation of developing nations progressively worsened, thus 
increasing rates of emigration, other European nations and the European Union began to 
re-evaluate development aid policies in order to look for new ways to support the 
economies of struggling countries while maintaining control over migration rates.   
After World War II, and in light of a number of anti-racist and anti-colonial 
movements, Europe struggled to reconcile its need for labor with its xenophobic 
paranoia.  The convergence of restrictive migration in overdeveloped regions of the 
world (Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, & Hollifield, 2004) paired with the liberalization of 
underdeveloped nations’ economies has increased the economic disparities between the 
“global north” and “global south” (Mignolo, 2007; Quijano & Ennis, 2000) and made it 
difficult for people to earn a living outside of urban centers. At the same time, low-skilled 
workers were finding it hard to obtain visas for the US and Europe as they were 
eschewed in favor of high-skilled workers.  Shifts in immigration policy also included 
reductions in family reunification and denial of asylum requests, adding a new dimension 
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to the debate on immigration and challenging the humanitarian commitments versus the 
desire to protect national borders and cultures.  Overdeveloped nations began re-
examining and redefining their national identity in light of their increasing diversity, 
grappling with extremes of national inclusivity (in the form of assimilationist, 
integrationist, and multicultural policies) and cultural exclusivity (based on the belief that 
immigrants can never fully acculturate).  Xenophobic paranoia has manifested in both 
national and supranational (at the level of the European Union) policy making, from the 
French ban on “conspicuous religious symbols” (an explicit attack on Muslim women’s 
headscarves) and the burqua (a law that affects less than 500 in a population of over 68 
million) to the European Union’s recently passed “Pact on Immigration and Asylum” that 
attempts to standardize immigration across the member states.  Private organizations such 
as Frontex have coordinated efforts among EU nation-states to protect the national 
borders from asylum seekers and economic migrants (Geddes, 2000) and in 2004  were 
responsible for the repatriation of several thousand African individuals and families over 
the course of a year (de Haas, 2006).  As a result of global economic restructuring, so-
called “first world” nations are tightening their borders just as “third world” nations are 
finding it almost impossible to remain in their country.  
When discussing migration trends in the early 2000s, France often gives the 
impression that such trends were a relatively new phenomenon in France and the nation 
was caught unaware and unprepared for immigration, a notion that is reinforced by the 
lack of scholarship on immigration up until the 1980s.  The foundational, ideological 
myth of France as a unified state with a common national culture contributed to 
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immigration’s absence in academic and popular discourse (Hargreaves, 2005; Hollifield, 
1994; Noiriel, 1996).  Whereas scholars of US historiography were all too willing to 
accept immigration as a natural component of the nation, in France immigration was seen 
as “an ‘external’ (transitional, new, or marginal) problem, which is unrelated to the 
historical formation of France and has nothing to do with the ‘French’ or with their past” 
(Noiriel 1996: 5).    The irony was that France was a highly important destination of 
immigrants, particularly after the 1920s when the US greatly restricted entry to 
foreigners.  Even more ironic is that over 25% of the French population are second or 
third generation descendants of immigrants.  Immigration as a field of study, however, 
only developed following a combination of factors including the re-examination of 
national memory and cultural narratives and a large wave of migration that came as a 
result of a combination of “push” (global recession; political persecution) and “pull” 
(guest worker programs, industrialization, low birth rates) factors.  One of the most well 
known interventions in this matter is Gerard Noiriel’s The French Melting Pot: 
Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity (1996 [1988]).  Noiriel argues that 
immigration as a process that is “internal” to French history and seeks to position it as 
integral to its national identity.  Studying immigration in France is a complicated and 
contradictory process that involves taking into account the ideological premises that have 
kept and continue to keep migration at bay, and the political and economic incentives to 
keep the borders at least somewhat porous.   
World War II left France with a very weak infrastructure, a poor labor force, and 
low population growth.  Proponents of “populationism” made a case to recruit 
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“immigrant workers and their families from the culturally compatible Southern European, 
Catholic populations of Italy, Spain, and Portugal” (Hollifield 1994: 147).  This 
deliberate selection of “culturally compatible” immigrants was a strategy to boost French 
industrialization and overall population with little consequence.  Overall though, French 
immigration became more liberal in reaction to the oppressive fascist Nazi-backed Vichy 
regime.  The moral-republican imperative towards expansive immigration was met with a 
crisis to control immigration following decolonization movements in the 1950s, 60s, and 
70s, “which was, ironically, a creation of nationalist and republican aspirations” 
(Hollifield, 1994: 149).  The spike in immigration from former colonies in North and sub-
Saharan Africa created the imperative to control the flows and not breach the “threshold 
of tolerance” (Givens, 2007).  Thus formed the basic immigration dialectic that persists 
today: the desire to uphold a liberal-republican political system that encourages migration 
worked in opposition to the desire to limit migration as a result of decolonization. 
FRANCE AND MIGRATION   
In recent years, French membership in the European Union has only served to 
highlight the conflict between France’s universalist dimensions of French Republicanism 
and its tendency toward ethnonationalist attitudes.  Common visa policies have 
undermined France’s ability to regulate border entries.  Moreover the development of 
more robust asylum and refugee policies has caused resentment by the French 
government to assume responsibility for displaced persons.  This is quite evident in 
France’s treatment of Haitian entrants.  What is fascinating, however, is the manner that 
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Haitians are treated in mainland France and in the overseas departments.  Haitian 
migration to France has always been on the smaller end, particularly migration to 
mainland France.  Whereas in the early 20th century wealthier Haitians would often send 
their children to study in Paris, or would flee themselves to Paris following political 
persecution by government regimes, the economic and political situation in Haiti had 
deteriorated significantly by the 1980s, and more Haitians left Haiti to look for better 
economic opportunities regionally.  Aside from the United States, some migrated to other 
islands in the Caribbean, including the French territories of Guadeloupe and Martinique.  
Sociologist Margarita Mooney writes “according to the 1999 census, more Haitians then 
lived in these three Caribbean departments—27, 349—than all the departments of 
metropolitan France, included Paris and its suburbs, where approximately 25,000 
Haitians lived” (Mooney, 2009: 157).   
In the French Antilles, and particularly Guadeloupe, Haitians bear the brunt of the 
economic crisis as a culturally inferior, economically exploited, and juridically 
discriminated group.  It is certainly a “paradox that Caribbean nationals [i.e., Haitians and 
Dominicans] going to live and work in other Caribbean countries (in this case, 
Guadeloupe and French Guiana) encounter a reception that is just as unfriendly as that 
accorded to migrants from those two countries in Europe or North America” (Giraud, 
2009: 51). The anti-Haitian sentiment in France in particular coincided with the anti-
immigrant sentiment of the 1970s and 1980s, when the French government introduced 
more work permit restrictions in the interest of reducing the foreign-born population 
(Giraud, 2009; Hargreaves, 1995).  In the Antilles, these laws were taken quite seriously, 
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with frequent deportations of Haitians who tried to enter the country or who had over-
extended their visa (Brodwin, 2001; Giraud, 2009). One of the main reasons Haitians felt 
outrage over their deportation was that many of those deported should have had a right to 
residency—many had been there for a decade or more. This right had been extended to 
the East Indian, Syrian, and Lebanese population. Haitians, however, are highly policed 
and denied access to citizenship rights that they are technically due. Giraud argues that 
the rejection of Haitians by Guadeloupeans stems from “a desire to escape at all costs 
from what Frantz Fanon called ‘the great black hole’ of poverty and to get as close as 
possible to the enviable world of the dominant species, the ‘whites’” (Giraud 2009: 51). 
He goes on further to say that it is a “passion for homogeneity” (citing Haitian sociologist 
Laennec Hurbon), but primarily tied to their identity, based on the desire to be a 
culturally distinct national group. Haitians living in Guadeloupe do not have much desire 
to intergrate into French-Guadeloupean life. This separatist attitude does not sit well with 
Guadeloupeans, who thus find Haitians suspect and “vulnerable to charges of political 
disloyalty and economic parasitism” (Brodwin 2001: 5). 
In mainland France, however, there have not been many studies on the Haitian 
immigrant experience.  Aside from small media reports of Haitians being detained upon 
entry for months following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, a systematic investigation of 
Haitian migration to France does not exist.  It is clear, however, that France does not give 
preferential treatment. In December 2010, seventy-five Haitians who’d arrived in the 
months after the disaster were reported to be in custody of immigration officials.  When 
asked about these detainees, the minister of immigration Eric Besson replied, “They don’t 
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have their papers in order, they cannot establish residency in France…these people lied, 
pretended that they wanted to study in Benin when they really wanted to live in France.  
We accommodate those who respect the law, not frauds (as quoted in “Haïti: le tri 
français” Le Canard Enchainé, December 29, 2010, my translation).” France’s 
preoccupation with its border security over the lives of Haitian people underscores the 
larger struggle around French national identity in the context of increased population 
diversity and non-white claims to citizenship. 
James Hollifield makes a compelling argument in attempting to understand how 
France’s liberal-republicanism began to give way to restrictive ethnonationalism.  He 
establishes that  
 
the relationship between immigration and nation building is absolutely crucial in 
enabling liberal democratic and republican states to control immigration and make 
immigration policy…the more closely associated immigration is with the political 
myths that legitimate and give life to the regime, the easier it is for the state to 
justify its immigration and refugee policies and to manage the ethnic or 
distributional conflicts that often arise as a result of immigration (Hollifield, 2004: 
145).   
 
He goes on further to argue that France experiences a crisis in its national identity 
as a republican nation.  Whereas before the only criteria for difference was one’s juridical 
status (either you’re French or not), immigrant became synonymous with non-White and 
non-Christian as more North Africans emigrated.  Policies aimed at reducing immigration 
failed as more people entered as economic and political refugees, due to an economic 
recession in the 1970s and 80s.  He explains: 
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In 1981, French immigration policy took another turn with the election of 
France’s first left-wing government since the Popular Front of 1936.  François 
Mitterrand and the Socialist Party promised to make life easier (and more secure) 
for the millions of foreigners living in France, while at the same time, asserting 
greater control over illegal immigration in order to protect French workers from 
unfair foreign competition…Immigration control was inextricably linked with 
problems of integration and religion, as French authorities started to come to grips 
with the permanent settlement of millions of Muslim North Africans and the 
arrival of an increasing number of sub-Saharan Africans, many of whom were 
entering as asylum seekers (Hollifield, 2004:159).    
 
Furthermore, the rise in second-generation immigrants (born on French soil) 
created tensions within France of who could claim French identity.  Although France had 
a policy of jus soli, where one gains citizenship through birth on French territory, in the 
1990s, this “loophole” came under attack by the then-Minister of the Interior Charles 
Pasqua who, along with a number of other reforms, made it difficult to impossible for 
children of undocumented immigrants but born in France to obtain citizenship papers 
before the age of 18.  This left thousands of French-by-birth youth in a void of 
citizenship, belonging to neither the country of their parents nor the country in which 
they were born and raised (Stovall & Abbeele, 2003: 7). Over the course of a decade, 
various other laws were passed as part of an immigration reform package (e.g., Debré 
law, passed in 1997; Chevènement law, passed in 1998).  The modifications affected all 
manner of people: undocumented parents who were no longer able to apply for 
citizenship on behalf of their children, thus securing their own right to stay in the country; 
foreigners who in hoping to marry French citizens were forced to wait two years before 
they could acquire citizenship; foreigners who were subject to random police stops for 
identity checks; and asylum seekers who were more scrutinized and prone to rejection.  
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The Pasqua-Méhaignerie laws were passed in a time when the leader of the Front 
National Jean-Marie Le Pen was generating support for his right-wing politics and 
despite his known anti-Semitic, racist, and xenophobic attitude, still managed to have a 
high approval rating.  In a television appearance, Le Pen declared, “French nationality, it 
is either inherited or merited, to the total exclusion of procedures that grant [citizenship] 
automatically” (Front National-Le Pen on Immigration, 2007 my translation).       
The Pasqua-Méhaignerie laws blatantly attacked migrants from North Africa and 
Eastern Europe, in a desperate attempt to maintain the French identity as pure, white, 
secular, and earned.  In a direct contrast to their purported open-access to citizenship, 
France was desperate to maintain their mono-ethnic nationalism.  The public fear 
generated by French lawmakers with claims that migrants, both legal and undocumented, 
were responsible for the rising unemployment, decreased access to housing, and general 
degradation of French life, contributed to the passing of the laws, and even gave Le Pen 
won 16.86% of the popular vote in the 2002 presidential election.  Things have not 
improved over time—in the 2012 presidential elections, his like-minded daughter Marine 
Le Pen won a historic 17.9% in the primaries, placing her in third place behind the 
incumbent president Nicolas Sarkozy, who captured 27.2% and eventual election winner 
Francois Hollande, at 28.6%.   
As soon as the new migration laws were put into place, thousands of people living 
in France found themselves stuck without citizenship (or chance of citizenship) of any 
kind and at risk for deportation.  According to one news source, “French officials 
report[ed] that the number of people deported from France in 1994 rose 53 percent to 
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11,400; another 566 were expelled, at a total cost to the French taxpayer $18 million” 
(Migration News, 1995).  The number of permanent entries decreased to their lowest 
level since World War II.  Deportation, a sort of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing, is in 
itself a violent and at times deadly process; in 2003, a recently arrived Ethiopian asylum 
seeker, 24-year-old Mariame Getu Hagos, was detained for five days before his claim for 
asylum was rejected and he was scheduled to fly out of Roissy-Charles DeGaulle airport 
(Fekete, 2005).  He did not even make it off the ground before he was suffocated through 
the use of a “folding technique” (which involves a person in a sitting position, heads 
between the knees and arms behind the back, and has since been banned) and later died in 
the hospital.   
As France tried to balance its role in the European Union with its own national 
interests, French immigration law and policy became much more restrictive, in 
contradiction to it’s liberal-republican foundations.  France’s current problems with 
immigration stem from its desire to see everyone as French first, and therefore they must 
construct a narrative that precludes irreconcilable cultural difference (citation and/or 
further explanation).  In doing so, France has tried to distance itself from a history 
predicated upon reinforcing racial differences and many French politicians have used the 
law to try and shape national memory and historical discourse (citation). 
In 2001, a law was passed by Christine Taubira, a black French female member of 
Parliament (before her promotion to minister of Justice in 2013 under the current 
president François Hollande) that stated that France acknowledged the slave trade as a 
crime against humanity, and that the history of the slave trade and slavery would be 
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taught in schools.14  Barely four years later, a new bill was introduced by Hamlaoui 
Mekachera that sought to recognize the contributions of French soldiers during the 
Algerian war, and a conservative member of Parliament, Christian Vanneste, added an 
amendment that cited the “positive role” of colonialism.15  Incensed, the same year of the 
bill’s passage, Aimé Cèsaire even refused to meet with Nicolas Sarkozy—the former 
president of France who was then the Minister of the Interior—because of Mr. Sarkozy’s 
endorsement of the bill, one that was pushed through by his political party.  Whereas 
Taubira’s law fought for the presence of the slave trade and slavery within curricula, it 
never indicated how educators should approach the subject, and therefore Mekchera’s 
law is well placed to shape the conversation around French imperialism as a necessary 
                                                
14 In article 1 and 2 of the bill entitled “Loi nº 2001-434 du 21 mai 2001 tendant à la reconnaissance de la 
traite et de l'esclavage en tant que crime contre l'humanité” (Law nº2001-434 of May 21, 2001 towards the 
recognition of the slave trade as a crime against humanity”), it is stated that “The French Republic 
recognizes that the transatlantic slave trade and the slave trade in the Indian Ocean on the one hand, and 
slavery on the other hand, perpetuated from the fifteenth century, in the Americas and the Caribbean, in the 
Indian Ocean and Europe against the African, Malagasy and Indian populations Amerindian, constitute a 
crime against humanity….Educational and research programs in history and humanities programs will 
provide the slave trade and slavery the important place they deserve. (“La République française reconnaît 
que la traite négrière transatlantique ainsi que la traite dans l'océan Indien d'une part, et l'esclavage d'autre 
part, perpétrés à partir du xve siècle, aux Amériques et aux Caraïbes, dans l'océan Indien et en Europe 
contre les populations africaines, amérindiennes, malgaches et indiennes constituent un crime contre 
l'humanité….Les programmes scolaires et les programmes de recherche en histoire et en sciences humaines 
accorderont à la traite négrière et à l'esclavage la place conséquente qu'ils méritent.”) 
15 In article 4 of the bill entitled “Loi n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation 
et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés” (Law nº 2005-158 of February 23, 2005 seeking 
recognition of the Nation and the national contribution of repatriated French citizens), it is stated that 
“university research programs are to give the history of the French presence overseas, especially in North 
Africa, the place it deserves.  School programs are to recognize in particular the positive role of the French 
presence overseas, especially in North Africa, and give their place in history and sacrifices of veterans of 
the French army from the territories the prominent place that they deserve.  
 
(“Les programmes de recherche universitaire accordent à l'histoire de la présence française outre-mer, 
notamment en Afrique du Nord, la place qu'elle mérite. 
Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, 
notamment en Afrique du Nord, et accordent à l'histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l'armée 
française issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit.”) 
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and beneficial aspect of history.  French lawmakers understood the power of the 
educational system as a means of indoctrination.  As an ideological state apparatus, the 
school is an important battleground for those trying to ensure a homogenous state.  Of the 
school, Althusser writes that it “teaches ‘know-how’, but in forms which ensure 
subjection to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its ‘practice” (Althusser, 1971).  
Mekchera’s law is just one example of France’s concern with its history and 
national identity.  Historically it has used language and the law to explicitly create a 
narrative that painted France in a more favorable light, or at the least absolve it from 
certain responsibility.  Mekchera’s law specifically addresses French presence in North 
Africa as positive, but then what of a state like Haiti, officially declared as “failing” in the 
context of development aid?  What are the positive contributions of France to Haiti’s rise 
and fall?  The point is, however, that this question needn’t be asked because it is clear 
that Haiti wasn’t part of the discussion.  The very fact that no French president had ever 
stepped foot on Haitian soil for 206 years, until the earthquake, is a testament to France’s 
lack of concern or even contempt for the country.  I would even argue that France’s 
project around national memory operates to exclude Haitians in particular as France 
struggles with migration in a highly racialized environment.   
The problem of French immigration became a problem of French integration, and 
this socio-cultural problem has overshadowed any political or economic justifications for 
low-skilled migrant entry.  For countries that primarily “export” low-skilled labor such as 
Haiti (Richman 2005), this can only have negative consequences for those that seek their 
fortune in France.  In recent years, France has developed a new tactic that doesn’t merely 
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address keeping people out, but helps potential migrants stay where they are and 
encourage immigrants to return home.  In the following section, I turn towards 
development policy. 
HISTORY OF FRENCH DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
  Unlike France’s history of immigration, development aid is generally traced 
back to the end of World War II.  As France sought to free itself from the clutches of 
Nazi Germany, in 1941 beloved General Charles de Gaulle held a conference in London 
to formally declare resistance to the regime.  Prime Minister Winston Churchill was 
among the other guests in solidarity with de Gaulle.  French territories in Africa, 
including Chad, French Cameroun, and Congo, also threw their support behind France 
and committed troops to the cause.  In order to finance “Free France”, de Gaulle created a 
treasury named Caisse Centrale de la France Libre (Central Treasury of Free France).  
The Caisse Centrale was put into place to manage the funds directly supporting troops in 
the French territories in Africa.  Over the next several decades, this treasury transforms 
over a dozen times to eventually become today’s Agence Française de Developpment. It 
is significant to note, however, that these institutional transformations were generally to 
benefit France’s colonies in Africa and the Caribbean.  It wasn’t until the 1980s that 
France enlarged the field to include other developing countries.  
The global feeling of concern over the economic state of Europe post-World War 
II led to the creation of several supranational bodies to help manage international 
relations and promote international monetary stability.  The International Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—now subsumed under the World Bank—and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were created at the 1944 United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference (also known as the Bretton Woods Conference.)  In 
1945, the United Nations officially replaced the ineffective League of Nations.  
Following the creation of these multilateral institutions, European nations hoped to boost 
recovery and level the playing field between nations by boosting industrial production 
worldwide.  The World Bank and IMF promoted economic development in struggling 
nations through rapid Western-style industrialization, but inherent inequalities between 
the Western powers and nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America resulted in little 
progress, and in fact made these nations more dependent on the global capitalist system 
that necessitated a certain level of exploitation (AidWatch.org, 2013).   Even after the 
period of decolonization in Africa and Asia towards the end of the 1950s and 60s, the 
newly independent countries found themselves in dire straits, unable to repay loans.  
With that, the World Bank and IMF instituted structural adjustment policies in the 
defaulting countries, policies that liberalized their economies, devaluing their currency in 
order to make their markets more attractive for imports and foreign investments.  These 
neoliberal policies continued through to the end of the cold war, when it became clear 
that few countries had managed to extricate themselves from debt and economic crisis.  
The growing gap between the “first” and “third” world nations ultimately led to a 
series of conferences and fora that birthed highly influential development aid policy 
frameworks in today’s world:  the UN’s Millennium Development Goals set in 2000, the 
Monterrey Consensus on financing for development in 2002, the High Level Fora on Aid 
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Effectiveness, set in Rome, Italy in 2003, Paris, France in 2005, Accra, Ghana in 2008, 
and Busan, Korea in 2011.  The MDGs created a link between development frameworks 
and a specific set of targets to be achieved by 2015 (Fowler, 2003).    
The goals are: 
• Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
• Achieve universal primary education; 
• Promote gender equality and empower women; 
• Reduce child mortality; 
• Improve maternal health; 
• Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 
• Ensure environmental sustainability; and 
• Develop a global partnership for development.  
These goals required a re-thinking of how these goals would be financed.  The 
Monterrey Conference in Mexico addressed mobilizing domestic financial resources for 
development, dealing with developing countries’ external debts, and some of the 
consistency and coherence of international aid.  The attendees were asked to commit 
0.7% of their gross national income towards aid.  To date, only five out of the 24 
countries who committed have met that threshold, although the United States outstrips 
everyone in actual dollars (see table 2 and table 3).  
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Table 2: Net ODA in 2012 in dollars, Source: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development  
 
Table 3: Net ODA in 2012 as % of GNI Source: Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development  
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nations in order to hold each other mutually accountable (The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, 2005).  
These documents are referenced often in French development policy, and 
structure the country’s funding commitments.  In the past two decades, France underwent 
a series of reforms to better focus their energies on regions and nations that were deemed 
a priority, notably Sub-Saharan Africa (which in 2011 received 41.6% of France’s total 
available aid and is set to receive up to 60% by 2013), the Mediterranean, and “fragile 
and crisis” countries.  As of 2011, France’s overall objectives are to 1) foster sustainable 
and equitable growth for the poorest populations; 2) combat poverty and inequality; 3) 
preserve global public goods; and 4) ensure global stability and the rule of law.  The 
development cooperation strategy also cites health and agriculture as two key priority 
areas.  These were all subsumed under the new strategy of co-development.   
CO-DEVELOPMENT 
Co-development was France’s attempt to be more responsible, while still being 
guided by the political-economic imperatives and ideological premises that informed 
France’s immigration laws.  The policy can be defined as “the process through which 
immigrants contribute to the socioeconomic development of their country of origin while 
assimilating into the country to which they have immigrated, to the mutual benefit of 
both countries” (Panizzon, 183).  France's co-development strategy is actually a 
combination of various policies, informal and codified into law, that include co-
development, solidarity development, and decentralized government cooperation.  Unlike 
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co-development, which emphasizes migrant participation, solidarity development is a 
"government-to-government funding of development initiatives with an emphasis on 
reducing migratory root causes, like unemployment…[and] qualifies as structural aid" 
(194-195).  According to economics scholar Edith Archambault, solidarity is actually a 
“basic principle of French thinking about social economy; it encompasses such notions as 
membership feeling, income redistribution, and joint liability” (Archambault, 2001). 
Decentralized government cooperation is a sub-strategy of solidarity development that 
sought to stem "brain drain" in countries with heavy high skilled emigration.  Panizzon's 
article provides a useful summary of France’s challenges in balancing its immigration 
concerns with the growing pressure to support less developed countries via development 
aid.  As Panizzon puts it, “France went through a 'learning process' and reinvented the 
concept as it internalized feedback from the diaspora” (ibid, 219).  He goes on further to 
note that “co-development never quite lost its close link to return migration, a fact 
summarized in the slogan that co-development was designed to give a human face to a 
security agenda” (‘visage humanitaire d’une politique sécuritaire’)(ibid, 219).  
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One of the more intriguing solutions that France developed in 2008 was a co-
development banking strategy.  In a tripartite strategy, migrants would be able to create 
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savings accounts that would be used exclusively for development investment purposes.  
This strategy relies on a direct relationship between French banks and banks in the home 
country, thus redirecting money exchanges from private companies like Western Union 
and reinforcing the banking system in the developing country.  Panizzon sees the co-
development savings account and bank passbook as a positive step, offering "a valuable 
incentive mix of tax breaks and penalties" that would hold individual migrants 
accountable in their investments, as well as positively benefit the banking industry both 
in France and in the migrant's home country.  However in order to receive the tax breaks, 
migrants are limited to investing in the areas that France, not the home country, has 
deemed a priority.  Few migrants have taken advantage of this process however, probably 
because it wasn't widely advertised.  The banking scheme does hold migrants more 
accountable--which was a problem that I identified in my research--it also undermines 
community building, and encourages migrants to be oriented towards helping their 
country of origin, and not necessarily each other.  Panizzon sees this as a positive, but 
when these strategies are compared to development strategies in Canada or in the US, it 
actually is a weaker form. 
In a study on Haitian diaspora organizations and their work in reinforcing the 
social service sector in Haiti, Patrica Weiss Fagen and colleagues compared the 
challenges of development in four locations most populated by Haitians, Miami, New 
York, Boston, and Montreal (Fagen, 2009).  Their aim was to show how such 
organizations “have addressed serious gaps in Haitian health care delivery and education 
[and] to shed light on how Haitian migrants and those still in the country are contributing 
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to development processes which have implications for international policies and 
practices” (Fagen, 2009: 4).  Canada is unique in the sense that it has specific measures to 
make Haitian diaspora projects more effective.  The government created an umbrella 
organization called the Group of Canadian-Haitian Development Organisations (le 
Regroupement des Organismes Canado-Haïtiens pour le Développement - ROCAHD) 
through which a matching grants program was established to fund small development 
projects created by member organizations.  Membership conditions included good 
organizational governance—capacity to demonstrate effective leadership, active 
membership, capacity to create a budget, evaluate a program, etc.  This kind of initiative 
worked not only to motivate individuals and organizations to be effective, but also 
reinforced a sense of community belonging through membership in ROCAHD.   
Community building and reinforcement is a necessary part of the partner country-
diaspora-donor country equation.  Overall, organizations played an important role in 
bridging Haitians between their new country and Haiti, and there were many 
collaborations between countries, but not as often between cities.  In the locations in New 
York, Miami, and Boston, the rate of success was more contingent on the history of the 
particular community and the ability to mobilize the younger generation.  Haitians in 
Paris were very much aware of the differences in their community structure compared to 
those in the US and France, and would often mention this point in frustration with their 
own community.  This was one of the main impetuses for the creation of PAFHA in 
2002.  Their goal was to, “accompany Haitian migrants on the path towards integration 
into French society and to facilitate the activities and member projects that contribute to 
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development in Haiti as well as in France by searching for funding sources, material 
resources, technical skills, and all other legal means necessary to achieve these 
objectives.”16  Community building requires visibility and communication that can 
contribute to accountability and investment, the same goals as the banking program.  
What it of course doesn't do is contribute to the French banking system, and this 
selfishness on the part of the French government is painfully obvious and has been 
subject to criticism.     
The French funding agency Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has 
actually demanded more autonomy and accountability from the organizations requesting 
aid.  This has allowed them to become more selective in whom they fund, while 
permitting better follow-up with each organization they assist.  In a conference paper by 
Guillaume Cruse, an agent with the AFD discussing his organization’s forays into co-
development, he states,  
 
…[T]he AFD is not looking to assist novice initiatives. These kinds of operations 
demand a lot of energy and determination, which is not the jurisdiction of this 
institution, especially if the expected results are uncertain in light of the exerted 
efforts.  It is our mission to accompany organically movements already in 
progress to offer a cumulative advantage17 (my translation, Cruse 376-377 in 
OCDE 2005).   
 
This reasoning is certainly logically sound, but the consequence is that diasporas 
with less resources, infrastructure, and training to begin with remain at a disadvantage.  
                                                
16 Taken from the website, www.pafha.fr  
17 (Original translation) “Mais l’AFD ne cherche pas non plus à s’appuyer sur des initiatives trop 
novatrices. De telles opérations exigent beaucoup d’énergie et de détermination, ce qui n’est pas du ressort 
d’une telle institution, surtout si les résultats attendus restent incertains par rapport aux efforts déployés. Il 
nous appartient en particulier d’accompagner des mouvements naturels déjà en œuvre pour essayer de 
favoriser des effets cumulatifs porteurs.” 
 197 
There was a clear awareness that of the difficulties in trying to characterize and tailor 
policy to each diaspora they work with.  Furthermore, their aims were very modest, 
seeking only to assist between 5% to 10% of each diasporic population.  How does one 
support less organized diasporas?  The “viable market” attitude of the AFD reinforces 
inequalities in the diaspora’s “purchasing power” because many of those who have the 
desire and network to help face economic, legal, and technical barriers that make it 
virtually impossible to effect any change.  Combined with a lower negotiating power 
among fragmented migrant communities, the undocumented status of a large percentage 
of migrants, and a less developed banking culture in both the migrant community and 
home country (Vasconcelos 185 in OCDE 2005), you are left with a market failure with 
no alternatives aside from remittances and official development aid.    
FRANCE-HAITI PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK 
In 2007, France created an intervention framework that would guide France’s 
cooperative action in Haiti from 2008-2012 (Document Cadre de Partenariat France-
Haiti 2008-2012, 2007). France’s aim, in tandem with other bilateral and multilateral 
donors, was to be, 
 
…engaged at the Haitian government’s side, to contribute to the financing of the 
country’s economic and social development program as well as to ease public 
spending though a debt reduction initiative, which would permit the Haitian 
government to have room for manoeuver in the budget and take on the 
responsibility of the reconstruction process (Document Cadre de Partenariat 
France-Haiti 2008-2012, 2007, my translation). 
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The policy combines the objectives of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, 
the Haitian government’s priorities outlined in the “Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper” published in 2007, and the French government’s priorities in 
international cooperation as outlined by the Comité Interministériel de la Coopération 
Internationale et du Développment (CICID).   The partnership framework document 
(DCP) is written by and for the French government (and not jointly with Haiti, although it 
cites Haitian policy), and outlines a tripartite strategy for French cooperation: 
 
First, in line with the Millennium Development Goals, the French government’s 
development aid agency, the Agence Française de Développement will primarily 
focus on Haiti’s infrastructure and education sector;  
Second, France will also invest resources in the health and rural development 
sectors; 
Third, the French embassy in Haiti will develop programs and partnerships to 
address and support democratic rule, immigration and co-development, the 
promotion of cultural diversity and the French language, and higher education and 
scientific research.   
 
Of course, this document was written before the devastating earthquake that 
destroyed much of the nation’s capital in January 2010.  The international community 
mobilized to offer material and monetary assistance in Haiti’s dark hour. France was first 
on the scene to provide emergency assistance due to its nearby territories in the 
Caribbean.  The French government committed to 326 million euros in aid—the second 
largest amount after the United States—50% of which had been distributed as of the end 
of 2011 (Collin & Keller, 2012).  It appears, however, that the framework continued to 
serve as France’s main policy in Haiti. 
 199 
In context, the France-Haiti DCP is a miniaturization of a broadly held 
development policy.  The question then becomes, does the DCP actually achieve the 
internationally-held aims of harmonization, co-development, and cooperation? These 
organizations were meant to level the playing field between nations by boosting industrial 
production, but inherent inequalities between the Western powers and nations in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America resulted in little progress and made these nations more 
dependent on the global capitalist system that necessitated a certain level of exploitation.   
The France-Haiti partnership framework document is a combination of a series of 
policies that are for the most part written by international parties.  It sets the historical 
context for Haiti’s current issues, although carefully excluding any direct mention of 
France’s role (colonial or contemporary) in Haiti’s predicament.  France cites its 
justification for intervention as: 
• Small sum necessary for investment  
• The mechanisms for realizing the goals are supple which contribute to a 
quick execution of the projects 
• Only francophone country in the Caribbean  
The reasons are very practical and are clearly in line with French interests at the 
very least.  The sectors that would receive priority are actively in line with the 
millennium development goals and France’s own development goals, and not with Haiti’s 
development goals as outlined in Haiti’s “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” published 
in 2007.   
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MDG France Haiti 
-Infrastructure 
-Education 
-Health 
-Rural Sector 
-Agriculture and rural 
development 
-Tourism 
-Infrastructure 
-Science, technology, and 
innovation 
Table 5: Sector Priorities 
 
The France-Haiti DCP recognizes the importance of the Haitian diaspora, 
particularly in light of the hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances they send to 
Haiti.  The policy focuses on three main groups within co-development: Haitian 
associations in France, “representatives of scientific, technical, and economic 
diasporas”—skilled professionals and researchers—, and those Haitians wishing to return 
home.  All groups would be able to apply to special monies that would support them in 
project development in Haiti.   
The policy would be funded entirely by bilateral and multilateral donors.  The 
amounts “pre-earthquake” are revealing: 
• The European Commission has set aside 233 million euros to support 
infrastructure, good governance, and education. 
• The Inter-American Development Bank has set the limit of aid at 50 million US 
per year, 50% of which to go to roads, 25% of which to supplement the state 
budget, and the rest (12 million) for all other projects. 
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• The World Bank in 2006/2007 gave 62 million US for primary education, 
transportation, and land and energy management.  It will hold up to 9 million for 
disaster management. 
• The United States has annually given 150 to 200 million US to reinforce 
government capacity and job creation, and support the health sector. 
• Canada has promised 520 million over the course of 2006-2011 for good 
goverenance. 
• Spain promised 12 million in 2007. 
• The United Nations assists Haiti through its special envoy mission, MINUSTAH.  
The mission works in conjunction with several other UN agencies including 
UNICEF, UNESCO, and PNUD.   
The total of these aid sources is roughly 562 million.  In 2010, however, the total 
committed aid to Haiti from these same sources totaled over a billion.18  It is important to 
note however that in the year following the disaster only 1% of the total aid distributed 
went through the government; the rest was routed through private organizations.  
Moreover, the fact of disbursement and expenditure serves as grounds for success, rather 
than actual results (Fowler, 2003: 22). 
The policy is comprehensive and does focus on some of the most important 
sectors in need of support in Haiti.  The France-Haiti DCP seeks to reinforce police 
capacity, rural development, and water and sanitation.  The policy also identifies specific 
                                                
18 Taken from data set found at : http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/OCHA_R32sum_A893.XLS 
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partnerships that are necessary to accomplish the overall goals laid out in the document, 
which spreads the accountability and highlights the importance of partnerships.  The 
main weakness of the policy, however, is that it reads like a more traditional top-down 
policy directive, with marching orders from the French government and other 
international agencies, and the burden of responsibility for achieving those tasks is set on 
the Haitian government’s shoulders.  Reinforcing the institutional capacity of the Haitian 
government is not a priority.  Though the document portends to take into account Haiti’s 
needs, France clearly aims to protect its own interests, including its borders and its 
language.   
The disconnect can be read in the French goal of “cultural diversity and the 
French language.”  French is one of two official languages in Haiti, the other being 
Haitian Creole.  French and Haitian Creole have a diglossic relationship: though a large 
part of business and government affairs are conducted in French—a holdover from 
Haiti’s colonial past—less than 10% of the population is literate in the French language 
(whereas 100% of the population speaks Haitian Creole.)  In the past three decades, there 
has been a concerted effort by Haitians to use Haitian Creole in official communication in 
an effort to make Haitian politics accessible to the population.  There has also been a 
push to standardize grammar and spelling in order to make way for more publications in 
Haitian Creole.  It is thus interesting to note France’s focus on “francophonie” through 
the technical support of a francophone high school and teacher training in French.   
Problematically, there is a distinction made between French NGOs in Haiti and 
ostensibly French NGOs created by the Haitian diaspora.  The policy document 
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emphasizes the cooperation between France and French NGOs, which include Doctors 
without Borders and Red Cross-France.   Separately, it discusses the Haitian diaspora and 
its (potential) economic contributions.  The concern is two-fold: first, there is the 
assumption that Haitians in France have enough access to socio-economic resources to be 
able to benefit from these funds.  On the other hand, France says little about how to truly 
incorporate these organizations into the development framework; rather they are yet 
another group to fund (and not so subtly, another group to encourage to leave France.)  
This policy is not truly in conversation with the Paris declaration on aid, which strives to 
create partnerships at every level.  In spite of the Paris declaration of aid that sought to 
work with countries in achieving their goals, the France-Haiti DCP does not seem to 
genuinely take Haiti’s goals in mind.  In the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper, the Haitian government listed as its three main goals: 
• growth in the agricultural and rural development sector; tourism; updating and 
modernizing infrastructure; research, technology, and innovation 
• human development with a priority in offering basic social services 
• democratic rule with a priority on justice and security (IMF, 2008) 
Fowler notes that these poverty reduction strategy papers are actually a 
requirement by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, and that “without approval of 
World Bank and IMF boards, no concessionary finance or debt reduction can be 
provided…Moreover, many other donors are adopting a country PRSP as the basis for 
coordination and for allocating their aid” (Fowler, 2003: 17).  Countries in desperate need 
of aid “may avoid detailing what they really want to do in favour of specifying what they 
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think the Bank will approve. Further, the degree to which a PRSP is country, rather than 
government, owned will depend on the extent of real participation across society as a 
whole” (Fowler, 2003: 18).    Historically the Haitian people have be left outside of 
decision-making arenas. Haiti’s government, due its lack of fiscal autonomy, has been 
often at the mercy of international forces.  In fact, France was involved in the 2006 
ousting of the democratically-elected president Jean-Betrand Aristide (and though this 
fact is mentioned in the policy, there is no acknowledgement of this move contributing to 
Haiti’s political instability.)  Moreover, Haitian civil society, neither in France nor in 
Haiti, is truly implicated in the crafting or execution of this policy.  Two of the four 
sectors identified as important vectors for pulling Haiti out of poverty—tourism and 
science, technology and innovation—were ignored.  This is not to say that the other 
sectors are not as important, but true co-development would respect the choices made by 
the partner nation and accompany the partner nation in its endeavor.  Given that the 
France-Haiti document is based in part on the Growth and Poverty Reduction paper, it 
means that there was perhaps less participation by Haiti than can be inferred from the 
policy’s wording. 
BUILD BACK BETTER? : THE HAITIAN EARTHQUAKE OF 2010 
The impact of the 2010 earthquake on Haitians cannot be understated.  The 
capitol and some of the surrounding areas were devastated, with government buildings, 
including the National Palace, and famous landmarks destroyed.  The death toll stood at 
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an estimated (and disputed19) 300,000 persons, with an additional million displaced.  
News media coverage documented the disaster with gratuitous images of bodies trapped 
under rubble or in mass graves that motivated and mobilized the international community 
in unprecedented ways to provide emergency disaster relief. 
The earthquake prompted France to take a historic first step: on January 17, 2010, 
President Nicholas Sarkozy landed in Port-au-Prince, the first time a French president 
had ever stepped foot on Haitian soil ever.  He told the audience that France intended to 
“write a new page in our history with Haiti” and that 
 
The role of the international community, and that of France is to help Haitians 
regain control of their destiny…international assistance will be massive, and 
should be long term, but it is up to Haitians, and themselves only, to define a true 
‘national project’ and to then drive it, because it is their country and their future 
(Sarkozy, 2010).   
   
In the weeks and months following the earthquake, other national leaders echoed 
Sarkozy’s comments, promising both a new page in international relations with Haiti and 
billions of dollars to assist in the development and support of said “national project.”  
According to the UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti, between 2010 and 2012, 6.3 
billion dollars were pledged.  Organizations such as the American Red Cross and Wyclef 
Jean’s nonprofit Yele collected millions intended for disaster relief (food, shelter, health 
care, etc.), while some was earmarked later to rebuild infrastructure.   
The Fondation de France proudly declares that they raised 34 million euros  
(approximately 46 million dollars) in only a few weeks following the earthquake, and 
                                                
19 http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/one_year_later_haitian_earthqu.php?page=all 
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with that they established a special Solidarité Haïti fund through which they funded a 
total of 273 projects.  They did their best to be as transparent as possible with who they 
funded and where, taking care to “privilege the support of NGOs already active in Haiti 
for a long time, having developed partnerships with communities and local authorities” 
(Solidarité Haïti: Trois ans après, 2013).  Yet these were the actions of one private 
foundation.  In juxtaposition, real attempts at collaboration with Haitian and other 
national leaders maintained revealed that nothing was going to change. 
Although the outpour was unexpected but welcome, it did not live up to the hope 
of being able to, in President Bill Clinton’s famous catchphrase, “build back better.”  Of 
the billions promised by nations, for example, only 56% has actually been disbursed.  
Nations such as Venezuela and the US promised over a billion dollars each, only to 
distribute less than 33% of the total (Venezuela, for example, only distributed 18.8% by 
the end of 2012.)  In other words, though it first appeared that Haiti had been given a 
grotesque opportunity to carry out projects that would put an impoverished Haiti on the 
path towards development, the majority of the aid necessary to do so never materialized.  
Moreover, of the aid that was distributed, less than 1% ever reached the Haitian 
government; by and large the funding actually went back to its source.  According to one 
report, the single largest recipient of the money donated by the US government was the 
US government, and 
Thirty-three cents of each of these US dollars for Haiti was actually given directly 
back to the US to reimburse ourselves for sending in our military.  Fourth two 
cents of each dollar went to private and public non-governmental organizations 
like Save the Children, the UN World Food Program and the Pan American 
Health Organization (Ramanauskas & Quigley, 2012).   
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While it became clear within those first days that the Haitian government was on the 
whole incapable of managing the disaster given that many of its ministries and national 
palace had been reduced to rubble, it was only a matter of time before the Haitian 
government felt obligated to cede much of its sovereignty to foreign institutions.  The 
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) that was formed in March 2010, and later 
supplemented by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, concretized this seeping of power.  The 
IHRC was half made up of Haitian leaders and half of international donors such as the 
US, Brazil, the European Union, and the Inter-American Development Bank, but was 
meant to be “Haitian-led.”  Its purpose was to evaluate and approve projects geared 
towards the reconstruction, interestingly regardless of whether they had the funding or 
not.  The money that was pledged by members of the IHRC was placed into the Haiti 
Reconstruction Fund to be able to multilaterally fund large-scale projects.  What 
occurred, though, was that donors would earmark funds to be used for their specific 
projects, thus turning “multilateral cooperation and coordination” into “bilateral aid often 
tied to return to the country of origin or specific individuals who wield political 
influence” (Willems, 2012: 44).  According to the media activist and freelance reporter 
Joris Willems, the Haitian members quickly realized that their role was to merely approve 
and endorse the decisions made by the IHRC’s leadership.  Willems concludes, 
 
As far as transparency goes—one of IHRC’s guiding principles—the IHRC has 
failed.  Its reluctance to share supposedly public information with journalists, 
researchers, and even its own board members is obvious…concerning projects 
and their financing, donors still prefer to finance their own projects instead of 
supporting existing one already approved by the board.  The HRF completely 
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bypasses its very own objectives—financing projects of strategic importance—by 
earmarking most of the available funds (Willems, 2012: 44).  
 
Far from being a game changer, the earthquake actually revealed and re-entrenched the 
problematic practices that had served mainly to benefit all nations but Haiti.  That is not 
to say that progress hasn’t been made, but that progress has not been with the full 
participation of the Haitian government, nor are the advancements necessarily in line 
with the needs of the Haitian people.   
CONCLUSION 
Today, at the beginning of 2014, Haiti has taken a backseat in French national and 
international priorities.   The new French ambassador to Haiti, Patrick Nicoloso, frankly 
stated in his first press conference20 in July 2013, “There is no change, nor a desire to 
break ties” in the Franco-Haitian relationship.  It is arguable that France certainly never 
intended to be, either before or after the earthquake, a major partner in Haiti’s future.  
Commercial relationships have barely grown: although French exports to Haiti have 
doubled between 2008 and 2012, imports of Haitian products have stagnated21.   
This chapter’s aim however was to show the impact government, organizations, 
and policies can have on the capacity for small hometown associations to act in their own 
interest without the necessary support. The mad scramble for funding by small 
organizations was in clear recognition that it was a limited window, and it only 
encouraged short-term planning and action.  In this vein, one can see how easily the 
                                                
20 http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article14799#.Us_0JGRDtbw 
21 http://www.ambafrance-ht.org/Relations-economiques 
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potential contributions of Haitian hometown associations—with their limited sphere of 
influence and resources—can be undermined.  The interests of foreign nations to provide 
contracts to their own companies (even when those companies had little to no experience 
or capacity to do the job effectively) are prioritized over the local knowledge and 
networks that members of hometown associations could offer.  This contributes to a more 
competitive, rather than cooperative, environment.   Moreover, the focus was on service-
delivery projects, rather than looking at longer-term strategies aimed at poverty 
reduction.   
There is little chance that the policies and agencies of the French state will be able 
to serve in a supportive role for Haitian hometown associations, despite research stating 
that their success is tied to close government collaboration.  According to the report by 
the Migration Policy Institute, Diaspora: New Partners in Global Development Policy,  
there are four action-areas that need to be addressed when seeking to encourage the 
success of a country’s diaspora and its organizations:  
• Actions to strengthen the capacity of diaspora groups 
• Actions to help country-of-origin governments engage more effectively with their 
diasporas 
• Actions to strengthen donors' capacity to create partnerships with diasporas 
• Actions to build and share knowledge among diasporas 
These areas of intervention require a focus on the steps that would best serve the interests 
of the country being helped, and not the country helping.  However this also requires the 
diaspora to be able to appropriately and effectively represent its own interests, which the 
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Haitian diaspora—no matter where—has been unable to do.  National policy and 
international aid organizations will always be able to set the agenda as long as there is 
little resistance.     
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Conclusion 
The importance of the Haitian diaspora to the development of Haiti is undeniable.  
Beyond remittances, Haitians living abroad have access to greater educational 
opportunities and other forms of social and economic capital that, combined with their 
personal connection to the country, can be mobilized to Haiti’s benefit.  This has always 
been the strength and the appeal of a diaspora, both as a category of people and as a 
theoretical concept.  The aim of my dissertation however has been to show the different 
challenges that Haitians living overseas have organizing within a new country as well as 
long-distance in Haiti.  These challenges span from grappling with internal dynamics to 
competing with the resources and agendas of large international aid organizations.  
Indeed, these kinds of things are not unique to the Haitian diaspora; all organizations are 
made up of individual personalities that may or may not gel, and competition between 
organizations big and small is inevitable.  My objective was to call attention to the 
expectations of the diaspora others—Haitians and non-Haitians, small organizations and 
large agencies, Haiti and other countries invested in helping Haiti—have and lay out the 
reasons why the diaspora can often fail to meet those expectations.   
Transnational organizations, hometown associations included, have gained 
importance in development policy (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001) 
since they are defined by a membership that is considered “diasporic,” that is, having 
some national or cultural relationship with a country of origin, and as a result are 
arguably better placed to assist in development and reconstruction efforts.  Haiti is a 
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particularly important site to discuss the intersection of diaspora, development, and 
transnationalism because 1) they have a discursively and politically recognized diaspora 
that critical to Haiti’s survival, but are also seen at worst as a threat by Haitians 
(Drotbohm, 2009; Perito & Maly, 2006); 2) the country has the second highest number of 
NGOs per capita (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010), which brings up questions of dependency 
and state sovereignty; and 3) in spite of a long history of diaspora involvement and 
investment in the country, their impact remains fairly localized and Haitian transnational 
organizations continue to be marginalized by the state and international NGOs.  Many 
studies have already addressed the relationship of the Haitian diaspora to Haiti, but have 
focused on the diaspora in North America (Basch et al., 1993; Laguerre, 1998; Zephir, 
1996).  The Franco-Haitian diaspora must then compete with the domineering influence 
of North American investment in Haiti and the decreasing political and social capital 
associated with France, which can affect how transnational organizations in France 
intervene in Haiti, and how local Haitians perceive them, notably as far as language is 
concerned given the heavily class-marked nature of French compared to English.  
When I originally set out to write this thesis, I reflected quite a bit on my intended 
audience.  My research focus was inspired by the self-reflection of Franco-Haitians 
themselves, frustrated by the limitations of their activity, by the lack of human and 
material resources, by the short attention span of the media, by their alienation in the 
North-American-centric discourses on the Haitian diaspora, by the lack of involvement 
and cooperation by the Haitian government—simply put, frustrated by it all.  I, too, had 
begun to internalize that frustration and set out to better understand what exactly was 
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going on.  In the end what I found was a mix of internal and external pressures, some 
obvious and others less so, that if left unaddressed would continue to alienate Haitians in 
France from Haitians in the North American diaspora as well as in Haiti.  Moreover, I 
began to see how the internal conflicts were often a product of the lack of agency felt by 
Franco-Haitians to capacity to develop, fund, and carry out a project, and their ability to 
steer the agenda set by the Haitian government often in conjunction with international 
donor agencies.   Thus, the primary audiences for this thesis are the policy makers and 
researchers that have the capacity to offer a form of support that the Franco-Haitian 
diaspora lacks.  That is not to say that that Haitians in France are not empowered, but if 
given the right tools and resources, their capacity to effect change could be broadened.  
What exactly does this support look like?  There are three areas that I would offer 
as a point of departure for improving the outcomes of Haitian diasporic organizations: 
training, funding, and institutional tie-ins.  I argue that an effective solution in 
empowering the Franco-Haitian diaspora requires addressing all three, interconnected 
areas.   
When the French Foundation funded the PAFHA for two years to support their 
initiative to train associations on how to craft a project proposal (with the goal of getting 
such a proposal funded), it was in recognition that this kind of training was needed.  
PAFHA worked with the nonprofit Consultants Sans Frontières (Consultants Without 
Borders, based in Switzerland) to hold workshops both in Haiti and in France to help 
each side create more realistic and well thought out projects, and even improve the 
relationship between organizers in France and Haiti.  The first round of workshops were 
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successful overall, in spite of logistical problems and low attendance.  It was clear that 
more workshops like these were needed, and on a more regular basis.  Haitians in France 
had many ideas for ways they could help their hometown back in Haiti, but didn’t often 
know where to begin, or incorrectly figured the project could be implemented with 
extremely limited resources.  
Because there was a lack of training and institutional savvy as to how to write 
proposals, funding was difficult to obtain, aside from small private donations.  Funding 
streams are traditionally set up to support organizations that have been successfully 
funded in the past and shown a “return on investment.”  Start-up funding is difficult to 
come by, and thus financing options are limited.  Moreover, the availability of monies 
can often depend on the immediate need of a country, particularly in times of a disaster.  
Disaster capitalism (Dupuy, 2010) is an ugly reality that forces countries in crisis to “take 
what they can get” before the attention is drawn elsewhere.  This was certainly the case 
following the unprecedented amount of donations that poured in following the 2010 
earthquake.  Haitian organizations were quite aware that this was a limited window of 
opportunity, and did their best to obtain funding for projects that had languished on the 
back burner.  In fact, so much attention was poured onto Haiti that when an earthquake 
and tsuanmi struck Japan a little over a year later, killing 18,000 people, leveling a 
coastal city, and destroying a nuclear power plant, it was claimed that people suffered 
“donation fatigue” [CITE].  According to the publication Chronicle of Philanthropy, in 
the seven days following a disaster, Haiti lagged only behind Hurricane Katrina in 
amounts donated to various charities and organizations (Dickler, 2013).  Japan only 
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received approximately $87 million, compared to $275 million donated to Haiti, and 
$514 million donated towards Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.   
Part of the reason for the scramble lay also with the impression that associations 
needed to work on their own because there was so little institutional support.  There was 
a lot of tension between agencies that were extensions of the government (such as the 
Haitian Consulate and Embassy of France, and the Ministry of Overseas Haitians based 
in Haiti) and the nonprofit sector.  I would often observe some measure of reluctance on 
the part of the Haitian nonprofit organizers to deal with the Embassy or Consulate.  There 
were disagreements as to how much responsibility there lay with the each domain, each 
side blaming the other for the lack of accountability.   
 
To restate the question, what exactly does “support” look like for Haitian 
diasporic organizations?  It looks like being able to work in better alignment with 
government institutions to create programs that will provide training and material 
resources to small organizations who could thus apply successfully for more funding, 
leading to more successful initiatives in Haiti.  The closer institutional tie-in would also 
lead to better coordination of, and communication between, various associations, and 
reduce the amount of redundancy in their projects.  It is significant to call attention to 
these issues as Haiti continues to search for its footing, not only after the 2010 
earthquake, but after over two centuries worth of struggle to claim sovereignty and 
establish a government worthy of its people.  For the past three to five decades, 
discourses of development have placed the responsibility of helping a country considered 
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“underdeveloped” on the shoulders of “first world” nations such as the United States and 
Canada, or on the supranational European Union.  Now that there is an opportunity to 
think differently, decision makers must avoid paying lip service and instead truly 
empower diasporic associations to take action and effect change.  
It is clear that while France has attempted to revise its development strategy, it 
has not pushed itself far enough in applying those changes.  As a result, policies such as 
the France-Haiti partnership framework document read like an official development aid 
directive, rather than something drafted with full, equal participation of all involved 
parties.  Given that France seems to be at the least aware of the importance of working in 
“partnership”, one of the biggest recommendations I would offer is that France should 
clearly define its co-development policy.  In doing so, the international community would 
be in a better position to hold France accountable to its own policy goals.  Furthermore, 
France would be able to draft a policy that more accurately reflects their national 
development goals, rather than simply parroting the goals of multilateral institutions.   
Something like the France-Haiti partnership framework document needs to be re-
written/revised to be more attentive to the desires of the Haitian government and Haitian 
people.  Rather than requiring the Haitian government to focus on areas that it may not be 
feel comfortable expanding, France (and other nation-states and institutions) should take 
more seriously the efforts of the partner government, and allow more sovereignty.  The 
French government must be more attentive to the current socio-linguistic environment in 
Haiti.  French-only language schools will only reinforce the French language’s elitism, 
and continue to make certain kinds of knowledge inaccessible.  I would recommend that 
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France work with Haiti to develop bi-lingual education, which could be aligned with 
current efforts by France’s Caribbean departments to incorporate Antillean creole into 
local education.     
Strategic partnerships with NGOs must be revisited as well.  Strategies and 
projects created by French NGOs and by “French” NGOs—that is, hometown 
associations and other transnational organizations created by members of the diaspora—
should not be separated.  Current policy “ghettoizes” diaspora NGOs, devaluing their 
potential contribution.  Co-development strategies should take better into account the 
specialized knowledge and potential contributions of diaspora NGOs, which would in 
turn increase the diaspora NGOs capacity to develop, execute, and evaluate their projects.  
  
The late anthropologist Begona Aretxaga states that “the capacity of people to 
become historical subjects [by] deliberately intervening in the making and changing of 
their worlds is the product of a movement that goes back and forth from discursive 
possibility to experience to change in the conditions of possibility” (Aretxaga, 1997:8).  
In other words, the Haitian community has not been without agency, but the current 
strategy they have developed works in certain ways to prevent them from being directly 
targeted as a problematic immigrant group in France, but has also worked in detrimental 
ways by making it difficult for new migrants to turn to an established community and to 
establish a collective for transformation. What is necessary is the exposure of France’s 
roots of power, which to a large extent lies in its ability to shape the historical 
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imagination so that it can continue to deny the existence and agency of the very 
populations that threaten it.  
One important way to begin working towards this is by recognizing the 
specificities of location when discussing diasporic communities.  There is already a trend, 
but this cannot merely inform intellectual conversations, but must also reach into those 
discourses that can have tangible effects on a population, on a country.  In the case of 
Haiti, many scholars have finally begun to talk about diasporas, plural, which has 
broadened the conversation from who and what is diaspora to where and how is diaspora 
created.  These questions are important because in order to think through how a diaspora 
can be effective, we must understand the circumstances through which they act.  This 
however precludes that diasporas want to act--there is an expectation, a sense of 
responsibility that comes with the label diaspora, that perhaps is not fair or deserved.  
Diaspora's path from a category to identity also heaped on a sense of agency and capacity 
for action.  As this dissertation has shown, not all diasporas are created equal, and 
perhaps it is acceptable that some, even within one origin population, will simply not 
produce the same formations. 
What of the diasporans themselves?  Amongst Franco-Haitians, there was a 
constant desire to compare their communities to those in the United States and Canada.  
Indeed, my very presence and research topic contributed to the spectre of “better” 
diasporas, a physical embodiment of how successful communities in New York, Miami, 
and Montreal were in producing second-generation Haitians, capable of speaking in 
Haitian Creole and French, and engaged in Haitian cultural production.  What, then, is an 
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effective diaspora? Michaëlle Jean, Canada’s former governor-general who currently 
serves as UNESCO’s special envoy for Haiti, was quoted in an newspaper article22 as 
saying,  
 
When people speak about Haitians, all they say is they speak about their 
resilience, as if these people were born for catastrophes. ... I think it’s time to see 
more than resilience in the Haitian people. They are capable. It’s a work force that 
needs more investment and that can be very promising. 
 
It's not about an ideal type: it is easy to believe that given the right set of 
circumstances, one can produce the most effective result.  Rather it's about understanding 
the history, experiences and circumstances that create a particular set of options.  
 
                                                
22 http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/time-to-lead/forging-a-new-haitian-strategy-trade-not-
aid/article2035116/?service=mobile 
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Epilogue 
Twelve o’clock rolled past, and my colleagues and I waited for more people to show up.  
I wasn’t quite anxious, but I could feel the expectation of the executive director of the 
nonprofit where I work, especially given all the food that was there.  Confident, I waved 
my hand dismissively—“I know Haitians, they’re always late, but they’ll show.”  Sure 
enough, almost an hour after the program’s scheduled start time, every chair was 
occupied in the medium-sized conference room.  I got started: 
 
Thank you everyone for coming.  It’s nice to see both old and new faces!  
Welcome.  My name is Mitsy, and I work for the nonprofit LIFT, which sets 
short- and long-term goals with people, related to housing, employment, and 
public benefits.  We work together week after week to accomplish those goals to 
help lift people out of poverty.  I work primarily with the Haitian community, and 
many of you come to me for help with the job search.  What has impressed me, 
however, is how often many of come to me with a job already, in spite of not 
speaking a lot of English or having a lot of experience.  My goal today is to get 
everyone is a room together so that we can all help each other, exchange 
information, so that as a community we can help each other out. 
 
Most of the audience nodded their heads.  Feeling confident, I soldiered on.   
 
I often use the example of the ‘Spanish’ [panyol]—many of you say the Spanish 
folks work together to help each other, and that Haitians tend to be mistrustful and 
don’t want to help one another.  I would like to fight against that stereotype.  We 
are here because we believe that things could be different.  In this room, there are 
20 people that you might never have met before.  I encourage you to take 
advantage of this and widen your network; help each other, and together we can 
be a better community.”   
    
The two-hour program got underway, and by the end, people had shared their common 
struggles, come up with some concrete suggestions, and exchanged employer addresses 
that especially benefited the large number of certified nursing assistants present.  The 
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event by nearly all accounts was a success, but I was unable to prevent one woman from 
sharing her doubts about the whole thing to the whole group, and everyone listened: 
 
The problem isn’t the lack of jobs, it’s Haitians themselves.  We were talking 
about the Spanish earlier—they help each other, and they are in positions of 
power to help one another.  Haitians are not in positions of power, and even when 
they are, they don’t want some other Haitian to take their position so they keep it 
to themselves.   
 
No one said anything in response.  Later, as we were wrapping up, the same woman 
called out to grab my attention: “Blan! [foreigner!]”  I spun around, incredulous that this 
woman could dare debase me in such a way, to not even acknowledge my diasporic 
origins but to go straight to Othering me.  But for her, being Haitian is her shield and 
sword, her blessing and curse, and it is something that cannot be approximated or 
imitated.  Even as it shifts from one city or country to another, there is a perceived 
immutability that makes it easy to judge whether someone is or isn’t Haitian, and to feel 
confident to speak on behalf of an entire people, even as there is evidence to support the 
contrary.   
 
This is what made this work so hard, from start to not-quite-finish.  It is an uphill battle, 
one that will take patience, strategy, and a willingness to step away in order to return with 
fresh eyes.  
 
After all, I know Haitians. 
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